Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Alviti
| Decision Date | 23 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | C.A. No. 18-378-WES |
| Parties | AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC.; Cumberland Farms, Inc.; M&M Transport Services, Inc.; and New England Motor Freight, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. Peter ALVITI, Jr., in his official capacity as Director of the Rhode Island Department of Transportation ; and Rhode Island Turnpike and Bridge Authority, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Gerald C. DeMaria, James A. Ruggieri, Higgins Cavanagh & Cooney, LLP, Providence, RI, Charles Rothfeld, Pro Hac Vice, Colleen M. Campbell, Pro Hac Vice, Evan Tager, Pro Hac Vice, Michelle Webster, Pro Hac Vice, Reginald Goeke, Pro Hac Vice, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, Richard Pianka, Pro Hac Vice, ATA Litigation Center, Arlington, VA, for Plaintiff American Trucking Associations, Inc.
Gerald C. DeMaria, James A. Ruggieri, Higgins Cavanagh & Cooney, LLP, Providence, RI, Charles Rothfeld, Pro Hac Vice, Colleen M. Campbell, Pro Hac Vice, Evan Tager, Pro Hac Vice, Michelle Webster, Pro Hac Vice, Reginald Goeke, Pro Hac Vice, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs Cumberland Farms, Inc., M&M Transport Services, Inc., New England Motor Freight, Inc.
Keith David Hoffmann, Michael W. Field, Rhode Island Office of the Attorney General, Rebecca Tedford Partington, DeSisto Law, LLC, Providence, RI, for Defendants.
Before the Court are Motions to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum and Subpoenas for Deposition Testimony, ECF Nos. 85, 87, and 89, filed by three non-parties, Governor Gina M. Raimondo, Speaker Nicholas Mattiello, and Representative Stephen R. Ucci, as well as Defendants’ Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum and Subpoena for Deposition Testimony from CDM Smith, Inc., ECF No. 120. For the reasons explained herein, the Motions are DENIED.
In 2016, the Rhode Island General Assembly passed "The Rhode Island Bridge Replacement, Reconstruction, and Maintenance Fund Act of 2016", R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-13.1-1 et seq. ("RhodeWorks"). This statutory scheme permits tolling of certain "large commercial trucks only," limiting the daily maximum toll charge per individual truck to forty dollars ($40.00) and the maximum toll for a single "border-to-border through trip on Route 95" to twenty dollars ($20.00). R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-13.1-4(c) - (d). Additionally, an individual truck is subject to only one toll "per toll facility, per day in each direction, or an equivalent frequency use program[.]" Id. § 42-13.1-4(b).
Shortly after tolling under RhodeWorks began in June 2018, Plaintiffs, various trucking and transport companies, brought suit alleging that RhodeWorks violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution because it discriminates against interstate commerce and out-of-state truckers in both intent and effect; the tolls do not reflect a fair approximation of the use of the tolled facility; and the tolls are excessive in relation to the benefits conferred. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3-10, ECF No. 1. Plaintiffs’ allegation of discriminatory intent relied in part on a study commissioned by the Rhode Island Department of Transportation ("RIDOT") and completed by CDM Smith, Inc. ("CDM Smith") prior to the enactment of RhodeWorks:
[The study] found that, absent the toll caps for multiple trips in Rhode Island, trucks with Rhode Island-issued license plates would pay approximately 45% of the RhodeWorks tolls, while trucks with out-of-state license plates would pay approximately 55%. But "after adjusting for the multi-trip discounts, about 60 percent of truck tolls would be charged to out of state trucks, while about 40 percent would be [charged to] Rhode Island [trucks]."
Compl. ¶ 85 (quoting CDM Smith, Truck Traffic Count Summary Report 1-4 (Oct. 2015)). Plaintiffs also pointed to statements attributed to the Governor, Speaker, and Representative prior to the passage of RhodeWorks. For example, Governor Raimondo reportedly said, "The reason I prefer the tolling proposal is because the majority of the burden is on out-of-state truckers and out-of-state companies who are using — and I would say abusing — our roads." Compl. ¶ 80 (). Likewise, Speaker Mattiello is quoted as stating that "a lot of the burden for the repair of our bridges, overpasses and infrastructure is passed on to out-of-state truckers" and that "[a] lot of the cost gets shifted to out-of-state truckers[.]" Compl. ¶ 80 (). A similar statement is attributed to Representative Ucci: "The tolling relies on 60 percent revenue from out of state trucks who would have never paid to come through this state." Compl. ¶ 87 ().
In the first go-around, the Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, but the case returned after Plaintiffs successfully appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. See Mandate, ECF No. 37; Mar. 19, 2019 Opinion and Order, ECF No. 33. The Court subsequently denied Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, as well as Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. See July 20, 2020 Order, ECF No. 72; Sept. 10, 2020 Mem. and Order, ECF No. 105.
In July 2020, Plaintiffs issued subpoenas seeking deposition testimony from Governor Raimondo, Speaker Mattiello, and Representative Ucci, as well as subpoenas duces tecum seeking (a) documents or communications regarding efforts to mitigate economic impact on Rhode Island citizens; (b) documents regarding the expected or actual impact of the toll caps on in-state vs. out-of-state truckers; (c) documents regarding the expected or actual impact of tolling only certain classes of trucks on in-state vs. out-of-state truckers; (d) documents regarding the potential impact on interstate commerce; (e) documents regarding alternative methods for raising funds; (f) drafts of RhodeWorks and related, failed bills, including mark-ups, comments, red-lines, revisions, etc.; (g) communications between the Governor and legislators regarding RhodeWorks or other methods of raising funds; and (h) documents regarding the public statements made by the movants and others. See Governor Raimondo's Mot. to Quash ("Gov.’s Mot."), Ex. B, ECF No. 85; Speaker Mattiello's Mot. to Quash ("Spkr.’s Mot."), Ex. B, ECF No. 87; Representative Ucci's Mot. to Quash ("Rep.’s Mot."), Ex. B, ECF No. 89; ECF Nos. 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81.2 The three non-parties, represented by Defendants’ counsel, each filed a Motion to Quash the subpoenas. Following extensive briefing, the Court held a hearing on September 25, 2020.
Shortly before the hearing, Plaintiffs issued subpoenas to CDM Smith seeking deposition testimony and documents regarding the contractual relationship between the Rhode Island Department of Transportation ("RIDOT") and CDM Smith, the data and analysis collected and produced by CDM Smith, and communications with CDM Smith. See CDM Smith Mot. to Quash ("CDM Mot."), Exs. A, B, ECF No. 120. While the three initial Motions to Quash were under advisement, Defendants filed a Motion to Quash the CDM Smith subpoenas "[f]or the same reasons articulated" in the motions of the Governor, Speaker, and Representative. CDM Mot. 6. The Court now addresses the four Motions to Quash.
A party may serve a subpoena to obtain documents or deposition testimony. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1). Upon the timely motion of the recipient of a subpoena, the Court must quash any subpoena that "requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter" or that "subjects a person to undue burden." Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A).3
The Governor, Speaker, and Representative argue that their subpoenas should be quashed based on legislative privilege and undue burden. See Gov.’s Mot. 3, 38-39; Spkr.’s Mot. 3, 32-33; Rep.’s Mot. 3, 32-33. Additionally, the Governor argues that she is protected by the deliberative process privilege. See Gov.’s Mot. 5-8. Lastly, Defendants contend that the CDM Smith subpoenas should be quashed based on legislative privilege and deliberative process privilege. See CDM Mot. 5. For the following reasons, the Court concludes that the interests at play require breaching the privileges, and that compliance with the subpoenas would not be unduly burdensome.
Federal legislative privilege for state legislators derives from the Speech and Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides absolute immunity in civil and criminal cases for members of Congress. Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Workers v. Harwood, 69 F.3d 622, 630 (1st Cir. 1995).4 This immunity protects legislators from liability for "speech and debate [in the halls of Congress,] voting, ... circulation of information to other legislators, ... participation in the work of legislative committees, ... and a host of kindred activities." Id. (citations omitted). To safeguard this absolute immunity, the clause also entails absolute evidentiary and testimonial privileges. See In re Grand Jury, 821 F.2d 946, 953 (3d Cir. 1987).
By its terms, the Speech and Debate Clause does not apply to state legislators. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The Supreme Court, however, has determined that the basic protections embodied in the Clause, which have "taproots in the Parliamentary struggles of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," are part of federal common law. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372–75, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951). In civil cases – but not criminal cases – this immunity is absolute. See Acevedo-Cordero v. Cordero-Santiago, 958 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1992). Here, the movants were not named as defendants, so the question is not one of immunity; rather, at issue is immunity's close cousin, privilege.
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Am. Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Alviti
...was greater than the State Officials' and the RIDOT defendants' interests in preventing disclosure. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Alviti, 496 F. Supp. 3d 699, 715 (D.R.I. 2020). The district court subsequently refused to certify its denial for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(......