Amable v. New Sch.

• Decision Date: 27 July 2021
• Docket Number: 20-CV-3811 (KMK)
• Citation: 551 F.Supp.3d 299
• Parties: Elizabeth AMABLE and Kaitlyn Amable, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. The NEW SCHOOL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

551 F.Supp.3d 299

Elizabeth AMABLE and Kaitlyn Amable, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.The NEW SCHOOL, Defendant.

20-CV-3811 (KMK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed July 27, 2021

Alec M. Leslie, Esq., Sarah Westcot, Esq., Philip L. Fraietta, Esq., Bursor & Fisher, P.A., New York, NY, Counsel for Plaintiffs.

Jonathan M. Kozak, Esq., Isaac J. Burker, Esq., Susan D. Friedfel, Esq., Jackson Lewis P.C., White Plains, NY, Counsel for Defendant.

OPINION & ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:

Elizabeth Amable and Kaitlyn Amable ("Plaintiffs") bring this putative class action against The New School ("Defendant"), alleging that Defendant's transition to online classes in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic deprived students of the educational experience for which they had bargained. Plaintiffs assert claims against Defendant for (1) breach of contract, (2) unjust enrichment, (3) conversion, and (4) money had and received. Before the Court is Defendant's Motion To Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (the "Motion"). (See Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 23).) For the following reasons, the Motion is granted.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts are drawn from Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint and are taken as true for purposes of resolving the instant Motion.

In January 2020, Plaintiff Kaitlyn Amable ("Amable") began the spring 2020 semester as an undergraduate student at The New School, a private university in New York City that enrolls over 10,000 students and offers approximately 80 "different degree/diploma programs and majors." (First Am. Compl. ("FAC") ¶¶ 2, 18, 23, 29 (Dkt. No. 14).) Amable was pursuing a Bachelor of Fine Arts degree in Defendant's "Communication Design" program, which "relies extensively on in-person instruction, peer collaboration, and access to [Defendant's] facilities." (Id. ¶¶ 17–18.) Amable and her mother, also a Plaintiff in this Action, collectively paid Defendant approximately $15,000 in tuition and fees for the spring 2020 semester. (Id. )

Although the spring semester began on January 21, 2020 and proceeded unremarkably for the next eight weeks, the COVID-19 pandemic brought normal university operations to an abrupt halt in mid-March. Defendant suspended in-person teaching for the remainder of the spring semester. (See id. ¶¶ 9–10.) Thus, from March 12 until the end of the semester on May 11, all classes were conducted online. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 11.)

Plaintiffs allege that by shifting its instruction to an online format, "Defendant did not deliver the educational services, facilities, access and/or opportunities that [they] and the putative class contracted and paid for." (Id. ¶ 12.) In other words, Plaintiffs contend that under their contractual agreement with Defendant, they agreed to pay tuition and fees in exchange for in-person academic instruction and related services. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 15.) Plaintiffs do not pinpoint a contractual provision that explicitly guarantees in-person instruction, but instead invoke various representations made in Defendant's course catalog and other documents. (See id. ¶¶ 5–7.) The spring 2020 course catalog (the "Course Catalog"), for example, allows students to search for and select courses based on their preferred "Campus," which includes either New York City, Paris, or the "Online" campus. (Id. ¶ 6.) Amable's course schedule for the spring 2020 semester (the "Course Schedule") indicated that each of her classes would take place on Defendant's New York City campus, as opposed to its "Online" campus. (Id. ¶ 23.) She therefore "understood and believed that every course in which [she] enrolled was to be taught in-person." (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiffs also point to Defendant's "Attendance Statement," which emphasizes the importance of regular class attendance and participation, (see id. ¶ 7), as well as certain promotional language on Defendant's website, which "markets [the] on-campus experience as a benefit of enrollment, (id. ¶ 38). Plaintiffs allege that "the in-person nature of the courses was part of the benefit of the bargain," and they would not have paid the same amount in tuition and fees—if any—had they known that part of the instruction would be delivered online. (Id. ¶ 22.)

According to Plaintiffs, the transition to online instruction not only violated their contractual agreement with Defendant, but also produced a learning environment that was "subpar in practically every aspect." (Id. ¶ 12.) In particular, Plaintiffs point to the "lack of facilities, materials, and access to faculty," as well as the lost "opportunity for collaborative learning and in-person dialogue, feedback, and critique." (Id. ; see also id. ¶ 40.) They argue that the remote instruction offered during the pandemic "[was] not even remotely worth" the amount they contracted for and paid under the expectation that classes would be taught in-person. (Id. ¶ 40.) Yet, despite allegedly violating its contractual agreement with Plaintiffs and providing an inferior alternative to regular, in-person instruction, Defendant has not refunded "any" of the tuition or fees Plaintiffs paid for the spring 2020 semester. (Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs maintain that although Defendant may "not have [had] a choice in cancelling in-person classes, it nevertheless has improperly retained funds for services it [did] not provid[e]." (Id. ¶ 15.)

Accordingly, Plaintiffs brought claims for (1) breach of contract, (2) unjust enrichment, (3) conversion, and (4) money had and received on behalf of themselves and a putative class of similarly situated individuals. (See id. ¶¶ 51–85.) They seek disgorgement of a pro-rated portion of tuition and fees proportionate to the amount of time that classes were offered online "and campus services ceased being provided." (Id. ¶¶ 16, 63, 68, 78.) Plaintiffs also seek an order certifying a class and subclass under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, compensatory and punitive damages, prejudgment interest, an order of restitution "and all other forms of equitable monetary relief," any injunctive relief deemed proper, and an order awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees to the putative class counsel. (See FAC Prayer for Relief.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint on May 15, 2020, (Dkt. No. 1), and their First Amended Complaint on September 2, 2020, (Dkt. No. 14). On September 16, 2020, Defendant filed a pre-motion letter seeking leave to file a motion to dismiss, (Dkt. No. 15), to which Plaintiffs responded the following week, (Dkt. No. 16). Following a pre-motion conference on October 7, 2020, (see Dkt. (minute entry for Oct. 7, 2020)), the Court adopted a briefing schedule for the instant Motion, (Dkt. No. 21). Pursuant to this schedule, Defendant filed the instant Motion and supporting papers on November 20, 2020. (Dkt. Nos. 23–26.) Plaintiffs filed their Opposition papers on December 23, 2020, (Dkt. Nos. 27–28), and, after receiving leave to file an oversized brief, (Dkt. Nos. 29–30), Defendant filed its Reply on January 7, 2021, (Dkt. No. 31). On February 2, 2021, Defendant provided notice of supplemental authority supporting the instant Motion. (Dkt. No. 32). On March 26, 2021, Plaintiffs offered supplemental authority in opposition to same. (Dkt. No. 33.) On March 31, 2021, Defendant responded to Plaintiffs’ proffer of supplemental authority and offered additional authority in support of its Motion. (Dkt. No. 34.) Finally, Defendant submitted an additional notice of supplemental authority on April 26, 2021. (Dkt. No. 35.)

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

The Supreme Court has held that although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations" to survive a motion to dismiss, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his [or her] ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (alteration omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, a complaint's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Although "once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint," id. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and a plaintiff must allege "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, if a plaintiff has not "nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[ ] complaint must be dismissed," id. ; see also Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ("Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ " (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) )); id. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (" Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.").

"[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint," Erickson v. Pardus , 551...