Amado v. Ken-Mac Motors, KEN-MAC

• Decision Date: 20 December 1955
• Docket Number: KEN-MAC,No. 9590,9590
• Citation: 119 A.2d 125,83 R.I. 452
• Parties: George AMADO, p. a., v.MOTORS, Inc. Ex.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 125

119 A.2d 125

83 R.I. 452

George AMADO, p. a., v. KEN-MAC MOTORS, Inc.

Ex. No. 9590.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Dec. 20, 1955.

John Quattrocchi, Jr., Providence, for plaintiff.

Francis A. Kelleher, Thomas F. Kelleher, Providence, for defendant.

CAPOTOSTO, Justice.

This is an action of assumpsit brought by a minor, through his next friend, to recover certain sums which the minor plaintiff paid to the defendant, a dealer in used cars, as the purchase price of such a car. The case was tried before a justice of the superior court sitting with a jury and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $415.95. The defendant's motion for a new trial was heard and denied. The only exceptions pressed by the defendant in this court are to the denial of that motion and to the refusal of the trial justice to direct a verdict in its favor. All other exceptions have been expressly waived.

A summary of the evidence, as we understand it, is sufficient for our purposes. In October 1951, according to plaintiff and his witnesses, defendant, well knowing that plaintiff was a minor, sold him a 1941 Oldsmobile sedan for $350 cash, the bill of sale being made out in the name of his brother Michael so that the sale would appear to have been made to an adult. When the Oldsmobile proved to be seriously defective mechanically, plaintiff returned it to defendant in December and, after some discussion, the latter consented to take the car back and to allow plaintiff substantially what he had paid for it if he was willing to purchase another car. The plaintiff then and there selected a 1947 Plymouth sedan which defendant agreed to sell him under a conditional sales agreement if he, being a minor, 'could get somebody else to sign' for him. Shortly thereafter plaintiff returned with his brother Michael who signed the necessary papers as suggested by defendant, whereupon plaintiff paid certain incidental charges, took possession of the Plymouth and drove it away.

The evidence for defendant in substance was that, upon learning plaintiff was a minor, he was told that no car would be sold to him because of his age; that his reply was: 'Well, my brother Michael is buying the car'; and that the sale of the Plymouth under the conditional agreement, which after crediting the cash value of the Oldsmobile called for payment of the balance at the rate of $51.05 a month, was made to the adult Michael and not to the minor plaintiff.

It further appears that the Plymouth agreement was discounted with the Associates Discount Corporation of South Bend, Indiana. Shortly after making the first payment to that corporation at its office in Providence, the car was badly damaged in an accident. Disagreement as to the liability for the damage to the car resulted in plaintiff making no further payments under the contract. When the Associates Discount Corporation repossessed itself of the car because of such failure, plaintiff disaffirmed the contract with defendant on the ground that he was a minor and brought the instant case to recover all moneys paid by him in connection therewith.

The law governing the disaffirmance of a contract by a minor is undisputed. McGuckian v. Carpenter, 43 R.I. 94, 110 A. 402, 16 A.L.R. 1473. There is also no question that plaintiff was a minor at the time of the two transactions hereinbefore mentioned, and that an automobile was not a necessity in his condition and station in life. The decisive issue in the case was whether in each instance defendant, well knowing that plaintiff was a minor, sold him the two cars under the pretense that it was selling them to his adult brother Michael, or whether such sales were in truth and in fact made to Michael. The jury decided that issue in favor of plaintiff and the trial justice subsequently approved their verdict upon his independent review of the evidence in ruling on defendant's motion for a new trial.

The defendant's exception to the refusal of the trial justice to direct a verdict in its favor is without merit. The evidence of record was so conflicting that the credibility of the witnesses became of prime importance in determining the basic question of fact at issue. This court has stated on numerous occasions that a verdict should not be directed for a defendant if, on any reasonable view of the evidence the plaintiff is entitled to recover; that the trial justice is not then concerned with determining the weight of the evidence, nor with passing on the credibility of the witnesses; and that all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Nottie v. Picchione, 74 R.I. 93, 59...