Amador v. New Mexico State Bd. of Ed.
| Decision Date | 16 June 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 8754,8754 |
| Parties | Albert A. AMADOR, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NEW MEXICO STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
On November 8, 1966, Albert Amador, Jr., a certified and qualified school teacher, was elected a member of the State Board of Education. The State Board, in 1962, adopted a resolution requiring the suspension of the teaching certificate of a teacher elected to the State Board. Upon being served with an order to show cause why his teacher's certificate should not be suspended, Amador sought and was granted an injunction restraining and enjoining the State Board of Education from enforcing its resolution or suspending Amador's teaching certificate. The Board has appealed.
The State Board of Education was created by art. XII, § 6 (Supp.1967) of the State Constitution, one member to be elected from each judicial district for terms of six years. The Constitution requires the Board to determine public school policy and to have control, management and direction of all public schools, pursuant to authority and powers provided by law. The constitutional provision respecting rules or regulations is not self-executing but the Board's power to promulgate the rule now under consideration must be found in and is limited by statute. See Bourne v. Board of Education of City of Roswell, 46 N.M. 310, 128 P.2d 733; State ex rel. Hannah v. Armijo, 37 N.M. 423, 24 P.2d 274. The Board relies upon § 77--8--19(A), N.M.S.A.1953, for its authority to suspend Amador's teaching certificate. The provision reads:
'The state board may suspend or revoke a certificate held by a certified school instructor or administrator for incompetency, immorality or for any other good and just cause.'
Relying on Haymaker v. State ex rel. McCain, 22 N.M. 400, 163 P. 248, L.R.A. 1917D, 210, the Board argues that the office of member of the State Board of Education and that of a public school teacher are incompatible, and then reasons that since the statute grants authority to revoke a teacher's license for 'good and just cause,' the suspension of Amador's license was for 'good and just cause' and is authorized by the statute.
The law requires teachers to be licensed, but it is well settled that the right to practice a profession or vocation is a property right. State v. Collins, 61 N.M. 184, 297 P.2d 325. Legislation concerning revocation of this right is highly penal in its nature and is to be strictly construed. Roberts v. State Board of Embalmers & Funeral Directors, 78 N.M. 536, 434 P.2d 61. It is equally well established that when a statute authorizes revocation or suspension of a license entitling one to practice a profession or vocation for certain specified reasons, revocation or suspension is strictly limited to those specified. Roberts v. State Board of Embalmers & Funeral Directors, supra. It is argued that the words 'for good and just cause' grant to the Board broad discretionary authority. However, it is firmly established that statutes delegating powers to administrative agencies must clearly provide reasonable standards as a guide in the exercise of the discretionary powers. City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13.
It is likewise a fundamental principle that courts will not declare a legislative act unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis upon which it can be upheld. State ex rel. Lee v. Hartman, 69 N.M. 419, 367 P.2d 918; Fowler v. Corlett, 56 N.M. 430, 244 P.2d 1122. In authorizing revocation or suspension of a license by reason of 'incompetency or immorality' the legislature employed words having a reasonably certain meaning in the law, but then added 'or for other good and just cause.' These words in themselves have no reasonably defined meaning in law, and, if they are to be given the broad interpretation contended for by the Board, would seem to permit the revocation of a teacher's license for matters having no reasonable relation to the underlying purpose of the statute. See Sage-Allen Co. v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 677, 179 A. 195, 98 A.L.R. 897, where the Connecticut court said:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Daddow v. Carlsbad Mun. School Dist.
...Const. art. XII, § 6. We have previously concluded, however, that Section 6 is not self-executing, Amador v. New Mexico State Bd. of Educ., 80 N.M. 336, 337, 455 P.2d 840, 841 (1969), and the State Board's control is limited to its statutory powers enumerated under NMSA 1978, Sections 22-2-......
-
State ex rel. Stratton v. Roswell Independent Schools, s. 10957
...teacher and school board is contractual only." Brown v. Bowling, 56 N.M. at 101, 240 P.2d at 849; cf. Amador v. New Mexico State Bd. of Educ., 80 N.M. 336, 455 P.2d 840 (1969) (the position of school teacher is not an office within meaning of statute providing that office becomes vacant whe......
-
Alvarez v. Chavez
...livelihood if he is to remain in elected office, are indeed substantial barriers to his candidacy. See Amador v. New Mexico State Bd. of Educ., 80 N.M. 336, 337, 455 P.2d 840, 841 (1969) (laws concerning revocation of license to practice vocation are to be strictly construed). Consequently,......
-
State v. Nichols
...147 Fla. 337, 3 So.2d 502, aff'd, 148 Fla. 271, 4 So.2d 253; Kravis v. Hock, 136 N.J.L. 161, 54 A.2d 778; Amador v. New Mexico State Bd. of Education, 80 N.M. 336, 455 P.2d 840; Hinshaw v. McIver, 244 N.C. 256, 93 S.E.2d 90; Annos. 5 A.L.R.3d 690, 9 A.L.R.3d We therefore uphold the judgment......