Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Wonderland Shopping Center, Inc.

Decision Date17 July 1963
Docket NumberAFL-CI,P,No. 56,56
Citation122 N.W.2d 785,370 Mich. 547
PartiesAMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS OF AMERICA,laintiff and Appellee, v. WONDERLAND SHOPPING CENTER, INC., a Michigan Corporation, Henry S. Alper, Resident Agent, Officer and Representative of Wonderland Shopping Center, Inc., Richard Gieryn, Resident Manager, Agent and Representative of Wonderland Shopping Center, and Henry S. Alper and Agnes V. Alper, his wife, and Abe Green and Rose Green, his wife, owners of Wonderland Shopping Center, Defendants and Appellants.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Zwerdling, Miller, Klimist & Maurer, Detroit, for appellee.

Milton M. Maddin, Detroit, for defendants and appellants.

Before the Entire Bench.

CARR, Chief Justice.

As appears from its amended bill of complaint in the case, filed January 18, 1962, plaintiff is an unincorporated association representing workers, among others, engaged in the manufacture and sale of men's clothing. It was alleged that it 'has among its primary objectives promotion of purchase and sale of aforesaid articles of clothing which are entitled to display the Union label owned by plaintiff.' The corporate defendant is the operator of a shopping center in the city of Livonia, Wayne county, Michigan. In such center there are a number of stores operated under leases given by defendants who have alleged in their answer to the bill of complaint that the individual defendants in the case are the actual owners of the property and operate it as such. Between the leased stores and the public highway is a large parking area designed for use by patrons of said stores and others having business relations therewith. Within the shopping center are maintained malls by which access to the various places of business in the center can be reached.

Among the tenants in the shopping center is a corporation designated as 'United Shirt Distributors, Inc.' In connection with its promotional work, as set forth in its pleading, plaintiff sought, through a representative, a distribution of handbills adjacent to the entrance from the mall to said store. Attached to the bill of complaint was a handbill of the kind in question. It was printed in conspicuous type, and obviously designed to discourage the purchase of non-union made clothing. Attention was directed to the claim that United Shirt Distributors, Inc., was offering for sale clothing made by a manufacturing company employing other than union labor. The handbill urged refusal to purchase such clothing, and affirmatively sought the cooperation of prospective customers in demanding apparel bearing the Amalgamated Union label. Printed in large type were the inquiries: 'Does your suit and shirt have a Union label? If not, why not?' Printed in type of smaller size at the bottom of the handbill was a statement to the effect that it was not directed against employees of the store or the employees of another employer servicing the store.

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

An examination of the handbill in question indicates that the basic purpose thereof was to promote the sale of clothing bearing the union label, which plaintiff in its bill of complaint alleged that it owned, and, to the furtherance of such end, the prevention of the sale of wearing apparel not having such a label attached thereto. It is conceded that no labor dispute in the ordinary acceptance of the term is here involved. Plaintiff sought permission for the distribution of the handbills immediately outside the entrance to the United Shirt Distributors store, and on the mall designed for access to such place of business as well as to other stores in the shopping center. Such permission was refused, and thereupon plaintiff instituted the present suit seeking injunctive relief against interference in any way with the claimed right to conduct its promotional campaign in the manner indicated. In support of its position the constitutional guarantees with reference to freedom of speech are invoked.

It was the claim of defendants in the trial court that the shopping center was private property, and that the entrances to the building and the use of the passageways therein were not dedicated to the public for general use but were maintained for the purpose of allowing access to the places of business of the various tenants within the shopping center, and for the accommodation of persons having or contemplating business therewith. Defendants further asserted that under the leases with said tenants they were obligated to protect the right of 'quiet enjoyment' of the various places of business concerned, that interference in any form with the business of a tenant was prejudicial to the property rights of defendants, and that the asserted right of freedom of speech did not authorize plaintiff to conduct its promotional activities by the means and in the manner sought.

On application by the plaintiff the circuit judge granted a temporary injunction. Following the hearing the relief sought by plaintiff was granted. In the opinion filed emphasis was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265, and the general conclusion was indicated that a distinction is to be drawn between a single store and a multiple shopping center, resting on the extent of the operation. The right of each storekeeper to prevent an unauthorized intrusion was recognized. It was held, however, that the property of defendants, because of its extent and purposes, had lost its identity as private property. Decree was entered in accordance with the opinion and defendants have appealed.

On the hearing of the case a representative of the plaintiff was called as a witness and testified that he had been employed for approximately 11 years in the label department and that his work involved the promoting of the union label. He stated further in his testimony that in such promotional work emphasis was placed on the purchase of clothing, and on various other merchandise as well, bearing the label. As a part of such procedure the public was urged to buy products with the label thereon, and to refuse to buy articles of industry not produced by union labor. The witness further indicated that the particular handbill involved in the case was designed to further the purposes sought. He stated that he had surveyed the store of the United Shirt Distributors, Inc., and had determined as a result of such survey that clothing was being offered for sale therein that did not bear the Amalgamated label. The actual distribution of handbills was accomplished by a representative standing in proximity to the entrance to the store and passing out the printed exhibit to persons entering the place of business. It appears from the testimony of the witness in question that from $300,000 to $400,000 is expended annually throughout the country in the promotion of the union label and the sale of union made goods.

Here, as in the circuit court, plaintiff relies on Marsh v. Alabama, supra. That decision involved a prosecution, brought under a State statute, for distributing religious literature on the premises of a suburb of Mobile, Alabama, known as Chickasaw. Said town was owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. Property therein comprised residences, streets, a sewer system, a sewage disposal plant, and a so-called business block. It was emphasized in the majority opinion that, except as to ownership, Chickasaw had all the characteristics of an ordinary American town. The public generally used the company owned streets and sidewalks, apparently without any question being raised as to the right to do so. The defendant in the case was convicted of a violation of the statute, the proofs indicating that, standing on a sidewalk near the postoffice maintained in the company town, she attempted to distribute literature of a religious nature. Appellant was advised that she could not distribute the literature without a permit being issued to her. She refused to desist from her venture and her arrest followed, the resulting prosecution being under a provision of the State code declaring it to be a criminal offense to enter or remain on the premises of another after having been warned not to do so.

In reversing the conviction, such reversal being by a divided court, it was pointed out that under prior decisions neither a State nor a municipality could completely bar the distribution of religious or political literature on its streets, sidewalks and public places, or make such right conditional on obtaining a permit. In reaching the conclusion indicated, it was said:

'We do not think it makes any significant constitutional difference as to the relationship between the rights of the owner and those of the public that here the State, instead of permitting the corporation to operate a highway, permitted it to use its property as a town, operate a 'business block' in the town and a street and sidewalk on that business block. Cf. Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 340, 24 L.Ed. 224. Whether a corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of the community in such manner that the channels of communication remain free. As we have heretofore stated, the town of Chickasaw does not function differently from any other town. The 'business block' serves as the community shopping center and is freely accessible and open to the people in the area and those passing through. The managers appointed by the corporation cannot curtail the liberty of press and religion of these people consistently with the purposes of the Constitutional guarantees, and a state statute, as the one here involved, which enforces such action by criminally punishing those who attempt to distribute religious literature clearly violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

'Many people in the United...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • May 20, 1968
    ...Store Employees Union Local No. 444, 16 Wis.2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876 (1962). Compare Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Wonderland Shopping Center, Inc., 370 Mich. 547, 122 N.W.2d 785 (1963) (affirming four-to-four a lower court holding that handbilling in a shopping center is protect......
  • Simerka v. Pridemore, 2
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • March 4, 1968
    ... ... -owned 'public area' considered in Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Center, ... The six are Daniel v. Murray Corp. of America, 326 Mich. 1, 39 N.W.2d 229; Gonter v. L. A ... Leonard Refineries, Inc., 370 Mich. 531, 122 N.W.2d 805, and Moran v ... ...
  • Hightower v. City of Grand Rapids
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan
    • October 17, 2018
    ...passage was cited favorably by the Michigan Supreme Court in Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Wonderland Shopping Ctr., Inc. , 370 Mich. 547, 122 N.W.2d 785,789 (1963). In addition, criminal trespass statutes typically require an intent to remain upon the land after the n......
  • Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery and Confectionery Workers' Union, Local No. 31
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • August 31, 1964
    ... ... the sole issue of whether the owner of a shopping center may enjoin as trespass a union's peaceful ... In Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Wonderland ... Vogt, Inc. (1957) 354 U.S. 284, 77 S.Ct. 1166, 1 L.Ed.2d ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT