AMALGAMATED TRANSIT U. DIV. 1560 v. TRANSIT MGT. OF SE LA., Civ. A. No. 88-511.

• Decision Date: 12 February 1988
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 88-511.
• Citation: 682 F. Supp. 313
• Parties: AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION DIVISION 1560, et al. v. TRANSIT MANAGEMENT OF SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA, INC., et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

682 F. Supp. 313

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION DIVISION 1560, et al. v. TRANSIT MANAGEMENT OF SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA, INC., et al.

Civ. A. No. 88-511.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.

February 12, 1988.

William Lurye, Gardner, Robein & Healey, Metairie, La., for plaintiffs.

Michael S. Mitchell, McGlinchey, Stafford, Mintz, Cellini & Lang, T. Carey Wicker, Capetelli & Wicker, New Orleans, La., for defendants.

ORDER AND REASONS

MENTZ, District Judge.

Plaintiffs commenced this action to enjoin the privatization of five RTA bus lines until the privatization issue can be resolved by arbitration.

On Friday, February 5, 1988 the Court denied plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order on the basis that no irreparable injury would occur prior to the preliminary injunction hearing set for Wednesday, February 9, 1988. The parties agreed to consolidate plaintiffs' action for a permanent injunction with the preliminary injunction hearing. The parties also stipulated that affidavits could be offered in lieu of live testimony. At the close of plaintiffs' case defendants moved for a directed verdict, properly named a motion for involuntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The Court took defendants' motion under submission and now renders its findings of fact and conclusions of law. To the extent that any findings of fact are conclusions of law, they are adopted as such; to the extent that any conclusions of law constitute findings of fact, they are so adopted.

FINDINGS OF FACT

I.

Amalgamated Transit Union Division 1560 (the Union) and Transit Management of Southeast Louisiana, Inc. (TMSEL) are signatory to a collective bargaining agreement, effective from July 1, 1986 through 12:00 midnight June 30, 1988, which requires the parties to arbitrate all disputes arising from the interpretation or application of the agreement. See Collective Bargaining Agreement, Articles 5 and 6.¹ The Union and TMSEL have also agreed to arbitrate any dispute regarding the privatization agreement of November 7, 1986. See Plaintiff's Exhibit I, Par. 5.²

II.

Privatization has not resulted in the layoff of any employees of Union 1560.

III.

Mr. Cliff Franklin, Senior Director of Contract Operations of Greyhound Lines, Inc. (Greyhound) estimates that Greyhound will lose a minimum of $250,000 if the privatization project is enjoined. Affidavit of Cliff Franklin dated February 9, 1988, Par. 7.

Mr. James Mansbridge, General Manager of TMSEL, testified that privatization will save the company approximately $1,500 each weekday, $300 each Saturday, and $150 each Sunday. Affidavit of James Mansbridge dated February 9, 1988, Par. 3.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I.

The Court has federal question jurisdiction under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 over actions for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 185(c), 28 U.S. C. § 1331.

II.

The Court's jurisdiction under this act includes jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief to preserve the status quo pending arbitration. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970), Seafarers International Union v. National Marine Services, Inc., et al., 639 F.Supp. 1283, 1286 (E.D.La.1986), rev'd on other grounds, 820 F.2d 148 (5th Cir.1987).

III.

The requirements for granting status quo injunctive relief in support of arbitration are: (1) that the underlying grievance is subject to mandatory binding arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement; (2) that the party seeking the injunctive relief is ready and willing to submit the grievance to arbitration; and (3) that injunctive relief is warranted under ordinary principles of equity. Seafarers, 639 F.Supp. at 1286.

IV.

The principles of equity which the Union must prove to obtain preliminary relief are (1) that the position the Union will espouse in arbitration is sufficiently sound to prevent arbitration from being a futile endeavor; (2) that the Union will suffer injury so irreparable that a decision of the arbitration board in the Union's favor would be but an empty victory; (3) that the threatened injury to the Union outweighs any threatened harm to the other parties; and (4) that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest. See, Id. at 1286, f. 3, Local Lodge No. 1266, etc. v. Panoramic Corporation, 668 F.2d 276 (7th Cir.1981).

V.

The parties have agreed that the dispute over the privatization plan is arbitrable and Mr. Eugene Camese, the Union's president, has testified that he submitted this grievance for arbitration on February 3, 1988. Therefore, the remaining element that plaintiffs must establish is that injunctive relief is warranted under principles of equity.

VI.

The Court finds that plaintiffs will not suffer irreparable harm because the privatization will not render the arbitration process a hollow formality. The Union argues that the arbitrators will be less inclined to eliminate privatization if it is in operation. Though the Court understands plaintiffs' concern, this does not represent the type of harm that, by its occurrence, threatens the integrity of the arbitral process. Plaintiffs rely on cases in which a court enjoined the completion of a sale of corporate assets or the relocation of an industrial plant to another state. See Local Lodge No. 1266, 668 F.2d 276, Lever Brothers Company v. International Chemical Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir.1976). However, similar compelling circumstances are not present in the instant case. Plaintiffs' evidence does not indicate that an arbitration panel would be unable to award an adequate remedy, such as voiding the privatization contract, in the event it finds TMSEL in violation of its agreements. For these reasons plaintiffs have not proved irreparable harm.

VII.

Analysis of the third equitable principle, the balance of hardship to the parties, is not necessary because the Union's case for injunctive relief fails on the issue of irreparable harm. See Aluminum Workers International Union v. Consolidated Aluminum Corporation, 696 F.2d 437, 444 (6th Cir.1982). Nevertheless, it is clear from the record that plaintiffs' petition for an injunction would fail on this ground as well. Were a preliminary injunction issued, Greyhound would suffer a minimum of $250,000 in damages and TMSEL would lose profits amounting to $1500 each week-day, $300 each Saturday, and $150 each Sunday. Thus, plaintiffs' request for a thirty (30) day injunction would cost TMSEL $32,250. Meanwhile, plaintiffs have demonstrated no job layoffs or wage losses to union employees were a preliminary injunction denied.

The Court finds that plaintiffs have not presented sufficient evidence to obtain injunctive relief.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal is GRANTED and plaintiffs' application for...