Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp.
Decision Date | 17 November 1998 |
Docket Number | No. CX-98-784,CX-98-784 |
Citation | 586 N.W.2d 141 |
Parties | Michael A. AMARAL, et al., Appellants, v. The SAINT CLOUD HOSPITAL, Respondent. |
Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
Under Minn.Stat. § 145.64, subd. 2(1996), a physician's peer review materials are confidential and may not be disclosed merely upon request.
Richard A. Kempf, Susan E. Oliphant, Maslon Edelman Borman & Brand, L.L.P., Minneapolis, for appellants.
Kevin J. Hughes, Kevin M. O'Driscoll, Hughes, Mathews & Didier, P.A., St. Cloud, for respondent.
Considered and decided by DAVIES, P.J., and SCHUMACHER and SHORT, JJ.
AppellantsDr. Michael A. Amaral and Dr. Dan E. Miulli argue that the district court erred in granting respondent The Saint Cloud Hospital's motion for summary judgment on the ground that under Minn.Stat. § 145.64, subd. 2(1996), records relating to medical staff privileges are confidential.We affirm.
Amaral and Miulli are neurosurgeons at Saint Cloud Hospital.They were denied authorization to perform a medical procedure known as a palidotomy.Because of this denial, Amaral and Miulli each made a request to Saint Cloud Hospital for peer review information relating to staff privileges, membership, and participation status at Saint Cloud Hospital.Both requested essentially the same information:
Records and documents that refer or relate to reviews, evaluations, grants, denials, or recommendations regarding my staff privileges or status;
Minutes of meetings where I was discussed;
Complaints, criticisms, reports, recommendations, requests for review, requests for investigation, or any inquires directed to you or your committees referring or relating to me; and
Any records or documents you or your committees received, reviewed or considered in reviewing or reaching any decision about me, my staff privileges or status.
The requests were denied by the vice president of medical affairs, who claimed that the information was confidential under the Minnesota Review Organizations statute and was discoverable only if a physician had received an adverse determination by the hospital and challenged that determination in court.
After their requests were denied, Amaral and Miulli filed actions, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and served a discovery request on Saint Cloud Hospital, seeking the same data, records, and information they had previously requested.Saint Cloud Hospital rejected the discovery request, refused to produce any documents, and filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the documents were privileged.
The district court granted Saint Cloud Hospital's motion for summary judgment, finding that the language of the statute clearly stated that the requested information was privileged and that this interpretation was supported by the underlying policy of the statute.The court also found that the action was a declaratory judgment action to obtain records, not an underlying cause of action in which discovery requests may be granted.
Did the district court err as a matter of law in granting Saint Cloud Hospital's summary judgment motion on the basis that, under Minn.Stat. § 145.64, subd. 2(1996), peer review materials are confidential and may not be disclosed merely upon request?
In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, this court must decide whether any issues of material fact exist and whether the district court erred in applying the law.Wartnick v. Moss & Barnett, 490 N.W.2d 108, 112(Minn.1992)(citingOfferdahl v. University of Minn. Hosps. & Clinics, 426 N.W.2d 425, 427(Minn.1988)).In this case, determining whether summary judgment was properly granted turns on the construction of a statute.Interpreting a statute is a question of law that this court reviews de novo.Hibbing Educ. Ass'n v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 369 N.W.2d 527, 529(Minn.1985).The words and phrases of a statute are to be interpreted according to their most natural and obvious meaning unless it would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature.Homart Dev. Co. v. County of Hennepin, 538 N.W.2d 907, 911(Minn.1995)(citingMinn.Stat. § 645.08(1994)).
As a general rule, all data and information discussed by a review organization is confidential and is subject to neither discovery nor subpoena.Minn.Stat. § 145.64 subd. 1(1996).This restriction does not, however, apply to
professionals requesting or seeking through discovery, data, information, or records relating to their medical staff privileges, membership, or participation status.However, any data so disclosed in proceedings shall not be admissible in any other judicial proceeding than those brought by the professional to challenge an action relating to the professional's medical staff privileges or participation status.
Minn.Stat. § 145.64, subd. 2(1996).
Amaral and Miulli are not challenging an adverse decision made by the review organization, rather they are arguing that the statute allows them to obtain all peer review materials relating to them either by simply requesting them or, in the alternative, by serving discovery requests on the review organization.Saint Cloud Hospital, on the other hand, argues that physicians are not entitled to their peer review materials merely upon request, in the absence of an adverse action relating to staff privileges or participation status.Either would defeat the purpose of the statute, which is to ensure that other physicians are free to come to the committee with candid and honest reports.We find Saint Cloud Hospital's argument persuasive.
In this casethe legislative intent of the statute is clear, even though the language itself is not.The policy and purpose behind the language of Minn.Stat. §§ 145.61-.67, as they relate to health care organizations, is to
serve the strong public interest in improving the quality of health care.The statutes reflect a legislative judgment that improvements in the quality of health care will be fostered by granting certain statutory protections to health care review organizations.
Kalish v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 270 N.W.2d 783, 785(Minn.1978).Furthermore, the statute is designed to encourage medical professionals to monitor their own activities without judicial interference.Campbell v. St. Mary's Hosp., 312 Minn. 379, 389, 252 N.W.2d 581, 587(1977).In other words,
courts are ill equipped to pass judgment on the specialized expertise required of a physician, particularly when such a decision is likely to have a direct impact on human life.
Id.1
The legislative intent...
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Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp.
...professional at any time would mandate the turning over of documents that are otherwise protected by [the privilege provision]." The court of appeals affirmed on different grounds. See
Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp., 586 N.W.2d 141, 143-44 (Minn. App.1998). Specifically, the court declined to engage in an analysis of the plain language of the statute, relying instead on legislative intent. See id. at 143. In dismissing any plain language analysis, the court stated that "theSee Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hosp., 586 N.W.2d 141, 143-44 (Minn. App.1998). Specifically, the court declined to engage in an analysis of the plain language of the statute, relying instead on legislative intent. See id. at 143. In dismissing any plain language analysis, the court stated that "the legislative intent of the statute is clear, even though the language itself is not." Id. The court, in examining the legislative intent, relied on two decisions of our courtthe statute, relying instead on legislative intent. See id. at 143. In dismissing any plain language analysis, the court stated that "the legislative intent of the statute is clear, even though the language itself is not." Id.The court, in examining the legislative intent, relied on two decisions of our court to ascertain the purpose behind the privilege provision—Kalish v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 270 N.W.2d 783 (Minn.1978), and Campbell v. St. Mary's Hosp.,... -
In re Irwin
...instance, words and phrases of a statute should be interpreted according to their most natural and obvious meaning, unless such a reading would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature.
Amaral v. St. Cloud Hosp., 586 N.W.2d 141, 143 (Minn.Ct.App.1998). Every law should be construed to give effect to all of its provisions. Minn.Stat. § 645.16; Wagner, 555 N.W.2d at 754. That is, the statute should not be interpreted so that any word, phrase, or sentence...