Amarillo-Pecos Valley Truck Lines Inc. v. Gallegos

• Decision Date: 19 January 1940
• Docket Number: No. 4461.,4461.
• Citation: 99 P.2d 447,44 N.M. 120
• Parties: AMARILLO-PECOS VALLEY TRUCK LINES, Inc., et al.v.GALLEGOS, Commissioner of Revenue.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

44 N.M. 120

99 P.2d 447

AMARILLO-PECOS VALLEY TRUCK LINES, Inc., et al.

v.GALLEGOS, Commissioner of Revenue.

No. 4461.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Jan. 19, 1940.

Appeal from District Court, Santa Fe County; David Chavez, Jr., Judge.

Action by Amarillo-Pecos Valley Truck Lines, Inc., a corporation, and others to enjoin J. O. Gallegos, Commissioner of Revenue of the State of New Mexico, from collecting a certain mileage tax. From a judgment for the defendant, the plaintiffs appeal.

Affirmed.

The Federal Constitution does not afford protection against double taxation by a state.

Joseph L. Dailey and Waldo H. Rogers, both of Albuquerque, for appellants.

Simms, Modrall & Seymour, of Albuquerque, for appellee.

MABRY, Justice.

Appellant, as plaintiff below, filed suit for injunction against defendant and appellee, seeking to enjoin him from the collection of certain mileage tax which plaintiff charges was excessive and illegal. Upon hearing, judgment was rendered for defendant and the case dismissed.

Plaintiff is an operator of a line of trucks duly licensed by the State Corporation Commission, but responsible to the Commissioner of Revenue for the mileage tax properly imposed.

For a determination of the issues here presented we are called upon to interpret paragraphs (b) and (d) of Sec. 9, Chap. 224, Laws of 1937, which are from the mileage tax statute under which defendant, the Commissioner of Revenue, was attempting to act.

Paragraphs (b) and (d) of the aforementioned act provide, with reference to the method and manner of taxing the class of vehicles in question, as follows:

(b) “*** The ton capacity of all such vehicles shall be based, as to all trucks which have not been changed or rebuilt subsequent to their original manufacture, upon the factory list capacity thereof, and upon all trailers and semi-trailers and all rebuilt or changed trucks upon the actual capacity thereof.” (Italics ours.)

(d) “For the purpose of computing the charges hereby imposed, every trailer and semi-trailer shall be considered as a separate vehicle.”

Plaintiff challenges the method used by the defendant for computing the tax imposed upon the semi-trailer units, which appear to be somewhat extensively employed by it in its trucking operations.

A semi-trailer is defined as follows: “Every vehicle of the trailer type so designed and used in conjunction with a motor vehicle that some part of its own weight and that of its load rests upon or is carried by another vehicle.” Chap. 11, Art. 3, § 11-301 (f), N.M.Comp. Laws, 1929.

[1] Doubtless, but for the statute above referred to, the semi-trailer would not be classified as a separate vehicle. We know that without the aid of the truck tractor to which it is attached it is powerless to move its load. We also know that without the carrying capacity of the semi-trailer body the truck tractor or power unit would be useless as a facility for transportation. Ordinarily, it would take both to constitute a complete transportation unit. 5 Blashfield Cyc. of Automobile Law and Practice, Permanent Edition, § 3176, page 339; Leamon v. State, 17 Ohio App. 323. However, our statute has, for the purpose of fixing this mileage tax, provided that trailers and semi-trailers shall be considered as “separate vehicles.” The purpose to impose a heavier burden on semi-trailers is clear and ambiguity of language is wholly lacking. The statutory definition therefore controls.

The New Mexico statute provides a graduated mileage tax of from 1/8 of one cent per mile for freight carrying vehicles of 1 and 1/2 tons or less to 1 and 1/2 cent per mile for loads in excess of five tons.

The controversy here so far as we need note resolves itself about the answer to two questions, viz: First: what is the method to be employed in determining the “actual capacity” of a semi-trailer? That is to say, is the entire load carried by and upon the frame of the semi-trailer unit to be chargeable to the semi-trailer in the computation of the tax, or should there be charged only the proportion thereof whose weight actually rests upon the axle of the semi-trailer? It is conceded that the particular type of semi-trailer used by plaintiff has a distribution of weight of something like 60% resting upon the axle of the semi-trailer unit and 40% actually resting upon the truck or tractor unit to which it is attached.

Second: Assuming that the entire load is to be charged to the semi-trailer in determining “its actual capacity”, does this then not constitute an unlawful and unjust discrimination and therefore a violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights in view of the fact that a different rate of tax is levied upon what is called truck body units where there is no trailer or semi-trailer involved?

Counsel for plaintiff contends that defendant has improperly interpreted the law which he is called upon to administer in the collection of this mileage tax. He argues that in computing the “actual capacity” of the semi-trailer the load should be apportioned in approximately the ratio above shown and not upon the basis of charging the entire load to the semi-trailer taxes as a separate vehicle and unit. That is to say, there should be a separation of the gross pay load charging some to the tractor unit and some to the semi-trailer. Plaintiff argues that only the “axle” capacity, that portion of the load resting upon the axle of the semi-trailer, is the weight upon which the tax upon the semi-trailer unit should be computed. We do not determine here which would be the fairer method of taxation. We determine simply what the language means and thereby how the legislature intended to classify for taxation purposes, and, as we hereinafter show, whether such classification is reasonable.

[2] We hold that the legislature in separating the tractor and semi-trailer units for the purpose of this mileage tax, and providing that such semi-trailers would be taxed upon the basis of their “actual capacity”, meant to tax upon the load carried “within the frame” of the semi-trailer and regardless of the fact that a substantial part of the weight of the load rested upon the separate power or tractor unit. We can find no logic to support plaintiff's theory when we face the plain language of the statute; and particularly, viewing, as we must, the possibility that the legislature intended to place a heavier burden upon the semi-trailer type of freight carrier which the trial court, upon ample evidence, has found to be of cheaper construction and generally more hazardous to highway traffic.

It is argued that if we accept defendant's interpretation of the act plaintiff is then denied his constitutional rights under both the Federal and the New Mexico constitutions, that of due process of law and equal protection of the law.

Plaintiff urges that there is no basis in logic or reason to support defendant's claim of material differences and substantial distinctions between the semi-trailer combinations in question and the full body truck jobs to justify the much greater advantage which the latter has under the taxing statute. Plaintiff is unable to see that difference between the types from the standpoint of either public safety in their use or in highway damage which would justify the classification for such taxing purposes.

[3][4] It is to be conceded that the legislature had the right and was acting well within its power to make the classification between two types of freight hauling units if it can be said that the classification is a reasonable one. The courts in considering questions of this kind do not inquire into the motives impelling legislative action nor are they concerned with the wisdom, policy, or expediency of the law. This rule is of universal application and citation of authorities seems useless. But see Wagner v. City of Milwaukee, 180 Wis. 640, 192 N.W. 994; Anthony v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 577, 128 S.E. 633; Railroad Comm. of Texas v. San Antonio Compress Co., 114 Tex. 582, 278 S.W. 1115; Id., Tex.Civ.App., 264 S.W. 214; Union Steam Pump Sales Co. v. Deland, Secretary of State, 216 Mich. 261, 185 N. W. 353; Grossfeld v. Baughman, 148 Md. 330, 129 A. 370.

[5] The classification must be reasonable, but, necessarily a state has a wide range of discrimination in distinguishing, selecting and...