Amaro v. Williams

• Decision Date: 26 April 2019
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 18-cv-01991-CMA-SKC
• Parties: CHRISTIAN GARCIA AMARO, Applicant, v. DEAN WILLIAMS, PHIL WEISER, and MIKE ROMERO, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

CHRISTIAN GARCIA AMARO, Applicant, v. DEAN WILLIAMS¹, PHIL WEISER²,and MIKE ROMERO, Respondents.

Civil Action No. 18-cv-01991-CMA-SKC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

April 26, 2019

District Judge Christine M. Arguello

ORDER ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Applicant Christian Garcia Amaro has filed, through counsel, an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by a Person in State Custody (Doc. # 1) ("the Application"). He challenges the validity of his criminal conviction in Pueblo County District Court Case No. 04CR880. Having considered the Application, Respondents' Answer (Doc. # 17) and the state court record³, the Court denies the Application.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A jury convicted Mr. Garcia Amaro of first degree felony murder for his alleged involvement in an attempted robbery resulting in the death of Thomas Urlacher. (Doc. # 7-1 at 2-3.) The trial court sentenced him to a mandatory prison term of life without the possibility of parole. (Id.) Mr. Garcia Amaro appealed the judgment of conviction. In People v. Garcia-Amaro, No. 05CA2506 (Colo. App. Mar. 20, 2008) ("Garcia-Amaro I"), the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. (Doc. # 7-9.) The Colorado Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari. (Doc. # 7-1 at 2.)

Mr. Garcia Amaro then filed pro se a motion for postconviction relief under Colo. Crim. P. Rule 35(c). (Doc. # 7-1 at 2-3.) The district court denied the motion without a hearing. (Id.) In People v. Garcia-Amaro, No. 10CA0982 (Colo. App. Mar. 22, 2012) ("Garcia-Amaro II"), the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for additional proceedings. (Doc. # 7-6.) Specifically, the Colorado Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the district court with directions to hold an evidentiary hearing on several of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in the Rule 35(c) motion. (Id. at 10-14.) Following the hearing, the district court denied the motion, and Mr. Garcia Amaro appealed. (Doc. # 7-1 at 3.) In People v. Garcia-Amaro, No. 15CA1694 (Colo. App. Aug. 17, 2017) ("Garcia-Amaro III"), the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. (Doc. # 7-1.) The Colorado Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari. (Doc. # 7-2.)

In the Application filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August 6, 2018, Mr. Garcia Amaro asserts that (1) an unconstitutional complicity instruction was given to the jury; and (2) defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing (a) to properly advise him regarding plea offers; (b) to properly investigate and cross-examine a witness's drug use and criminal history; (c) to sequester a potential witness; and (d) to request an accessory after the fact instruction. (Doc. # 1 at 5-10, 15-35.)

Respondents conceded in the Pre-Answer Response (Doc. # 7) that the Application is timely under the one-year limitation period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), and that Mr. Garcia Amaro exhausted state court remedies for the asserted claims. (Id. at 4-9.)

On September 17, 2018, the Court directed Respondents to file an Answer that fully addressed the merits of the claims asserted in the Application. (Doc. # 8.) Respondents submitted their Answer (Doc. # 17) on January 11, 2019. Mr. Garcia Amaro did not file a reply.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") provides that a writ of habeas corpus may not be issued with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The applicant bears the burden of proof under § 2254(d). See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam).

A claim may be adjudicated on the merits in state court even in the absence of a statement of reasons by the state court for rejecting the claim. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98-99 (2011). In particular, "determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an unreasonable legal or factual conclusion does not require that there be an opinion from the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Id. at 98. Thus, "[w]hen a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Id. at 99. Even "[w]here a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." Id. at 98. In other words, this Court "owe[s] deference to the state court's result, even if its reasoning is not expressly stated." Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the Court "must uphold the state court's summary decision unless [the Court's] independent review of the record and pertinent federal law persuades [the Court] that its result contravenes or unreasonably applies clearly established federal law, or is based on anunreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." Id. at 1178. "[T]his 'independent review' should be distinguished from a full de novo review of the petitioner's claims." Id.

The Court reviews claims of legal error and mixed questions of law and fact pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Cook v. McKune, 323 F.3d 825, 830 (10th Cir. 2003). The threshold question the Court must answer under § 2254(d)(1) is whether the applicant seeks to apply a rule of law that was clearly established by the Supreme Court at the time of the relevant state court decision. See Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34 (2011). Clearly established federal law "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision. Id. at 412. Furthermore,

clearly established law consists of Supreme Court holdings in cases where the facts are at least closely-related or similar to the case sub judice. Although the legal rule at issue need not have had its genesis in the closely-related or similar factual context, the Supreme Court must have expressly extended the legal rule to that context.

House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 2008). If there is no clearly established federal law, that is the end of the Court's inquiry pursuant to § 2254(d)(1). See id. at 1018.

If a clearly established rule of federal law is implicated, the Court must determine whether the state court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of that clearly established rule of federal law. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 (2000).

A state-court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if: (a) the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases or (b) the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent. Maynard [v. Boone], 468 F.3d [665], 669 [(10^th Cir. 2006)] (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405). "The word 'contrary' is commonly understood to mean 'diametrically different,' 'opposite in character or nature,' or 'mutually opposed.'" Williams, 529 U.S. at 405 (citation omitted).

A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law when it identifies the correct governing legal rule from Supreme Court cases, but unreasonably applies it to the facts. Id. at 407-08. Additionally, we have recognized that an unreasonable application may occur if the state court either unreasonably extends, or unreasonably refuses to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context where it should apply.

House, 527 F.3d at 1018.

The Court's inquiry pursuant to the "unreasonable application" clause is an objective inquiry. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. "[A] decision is 'objectively unreasonable' when most reasonable jurists exercising their independent judgment would conclude the state court misapplied Supreme Court law." Maynard, 468 F.3d at 671. In addition,

evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations. [I]t is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by [the Supreme] Court.

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (internal quotation marks omitted). In conducting this analysis, the Court "must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported[ ] the state court's decision and then ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court." Id.

Under this standard, "only the most serious misapplications of Supreme Court precedent will be a basis for relief under § 2254." Maynard, 468 F.3d at 671; see also Harrington, 562 U.S. at 88 (stating that "even a strong case for relief does not mean...