Amato v. Erskine

• Decision Date: 01 March 1924
• Citation: 100 Conn. 497,123 A. 836
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: AMATO v. ERSKINE.

123 A. 836

100 Conn. 497

AMATO v. ERSKINE.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 1, 1924

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Leonard J. Nickerson Judge.

Habeas corpus by Rose Amato against George C. Erskine, as superintendent, to secure discharge of petitioner's son Sam Amato, from confinement in a reformatory. From a judgment sustaining the writ and ordering the prisoner discharged respondent superintendent appeals. Error, and cause remanded with directions to set aside judgment and remand prisoner to respondent's custody.

If the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, which, as a court of general criminal jurisdiction, has power to try persons over 16 years of age for carnally knowing a female under 16, was limited by the Juvenile Court Act 1921 to persons over 16, it nevertheless had power, in the absence of any provision in the act to the contrary, to inquire into and determine the jurisdictional facts of age, as it did before the act was passed by virtue of Gen.St.1918, § 1838 (C.G.S.A. § 17-389), and, where it found, as recited in the judgment file, that the age of petitioner's son who pleaded guilty to that offense was 18 years, that fact could not be relitigated in habeas corpus.

The petition for the writ alleged in general terms that the prisoner, a minor of 15 years of age, was unlawfully confined in the Connecticut reformatory. The respondent, as superintendent, made return that he held the prisoner by virtue of a mittimus of the Superior Court, of which a copy was annexed to the return. The petitioner replied, alleging that, while a minor of the age of 15 years Sam Amato was, on June 25, 1923, arrested, and by the city court of Derby bound over to the criminal term of the Superior Court; that on June 27, 1923, the prisoner was presented to the Superior Court on information filed by the state's attorney, and pleaded guilty to the offense of assault with intent to carnally know a female child under the age of 16 years, and that the Superior Court found him to be 18 years of age, whereas in fact he was but 15, and sentenced him to imprisonment in the reformatory. It is alleged that neither the city court nor the Superior Court had jurisdiction of the cause or of the person of Sam Amato, and that, being a minor under the age of 16, he could not be prosecuted for or convicted of a crime. A demurrer to the reply was overruled, and the respondent rejoined, denying the allegations of the reply as to the prisoner's age. This issue was found for the petitioner, and the trial judge ordered the prisoner discharged, holding that the object of the Juvenile Court Act of 1921 (Laws 1921, c. 336) was that a child under 16 should not be tried for any act in violation of law by a criminal court, and that the petitioner could relitigate the issue of Sam Amato's age, though the judgment file in that court recited that he was 18 years of age.

The finding on appeal includes the records of the city and Superior Courts, and finds that the criminal term of the Superior Court at which Sam Amato was convicted and sentenced had not been finally adjourned when this habeas corpus was heard and determined.

Walter M. Pickett, Asst. State's Atty., of New Haven, for appellant.

Alfonse C. Fasano and Frank Crapanzano, both of New Haven, for appellee.

BEACH J. (after stating the facts as above).

Three of the reasons of appeal involve the following propositions: (1) That as between co-ordinate courts the writ of habeas corpus will not be entertained while the court which first took jurisdiction still has power, upon the same representations, to discharge the prisoner; (2) that upon habeas corpus the truth of the recitals of jurisdictional facts in the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction cannot be inquired into; (3) that the Juvenile Court Act of 1921 does not abolish the criminal jurisdiction of the Superior Court over persons under the age of 16 years, so as to make the judgment and sentence in question a nullity.

The first and second propositions above outlined relate to the limitations necessarily inherent in habeas corpus proceedings, when the purpose of the writ is to have the court or judge hearing the cause declare the judgment of another court to be a nullity.

" It is a rule essential to the efficient administration of justice that, where a court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and regularly acquires jurisdiction of the person, it becomes its right and duty to determine every question which may arise in the cause without interference from any other tribunal." Hurd, Habeas Corpus, 331, 332.

The rule above stated was applied to habeas corpus by the Supreme Court of the United States in a case where that court was asked to issue the writ to obtain the release of the petitioner from the custody of the marshal of the Southern District of the Indian Territory, who held him under sentence of death imposed by the territorial court of the United States. The question was whether the territorial court of the Indian Territory or the United States Court for the Eastern District of Texas had jurisdiction to try the petitioner; and that depended upon whether the latter court had " acquired jurisdiction" of the petitioner before September 1, 1896, the date upon which an act of Congress conferred jurisdiction on the territorial court, except of cases over which the district court had acquired jurisdiction before that date. Two warrants of arrest were issued, one by the territorial court, dated July 24, 1896, and another dated July 25, 1896, by the district court; the territorial court first obtained custody of the petitioner, and afterwards, but whether before or after September 1st did not appear, the marshal of the Eastern District of Texas demanded the surrender of the prisoner, which was refused. The trial and conviction in the territorial court were after September first. The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction depended on service, and, in the absence of proof of service by the marshal of the district court, it applied the " settled doctrine of this court that a court having possession of a person or property cannot be deprived of the right to deal with such person or property until its jurisdiction is exhausted, and that no other court has the right to interfere with such custody or possession," and denied the petition for the writ. In re Johnson, 167 U.S. 120, 125, 17 Sup.Ct. 735, 42 L.Ed. 163. In that case the rule was applied to courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction. Still closer in point is State exrel. Attorney General, 150 Ala. 489, 43 So. 490, 10 L.R.A. (N. S.) 1129, 124 Am.St.Rep. 79, in which the Supreme Court of Alabama issued a writ of prohibition restraining a judge from hearing and determining a writ of habeas corpus issued in behalf of one who was confined in jail under sentence of death, upon the alleged ground that the prisoner had become insane since his conviction. The court held that the prisoner was still in the custody of the court before which he was tried and convicted, and which had full power to stay execution and inquire into his sanity; citing In re Johnson, supra, and saying:

" Any other rule would produce a conflict of jurisdiction over the right to the custody of the * * * condemned prisoner, and lead to

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