Amberslie v. Prisoner Transp. Serv. of Am., LLC
| Decision Date | 04 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 9:17-CV-0564 (TJM/DEP) |
| Parties | AKANNI AMBERSLIE, Plaintiff, v. PRISONER TRANSPORT SERVICE OF AMERICA, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
JONATHAN M. BERNSTEIN, ESQ.
SHANNON T. O'CONNOR, ESQ.
DAVID E. PEEBLES CHIEF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a civil rights action brought by pro se plaintiff Akanni Amberslie, an inmate currently confined in a New York State prison facility, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against defendant Prisoner Transportation Services, LLC ("PTS"), a corporation organized under Tennessee law, and with its principal place of business near Nashville, Tennessee. In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant was engaged to transport him in custody from Fayetteville, Georgia to Broome County, New York as a pretrial detainee, and that during the course of the transport, he was exposed to inhumane conditions rising to a level of constitutional significance.
Currently pending before the court is a motion brought by defendant seeking dismissal of the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) and 12(b)(6), without leave to replead. In the motion, defendant argues that (1) plaintiff's complaint fails to set forth facts sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a plausible due process claim; (2) plaintiff's amended complaint fails to allege facts to support that hisconstitutional rights were violated pursuant to an official policy or custom under the criteria set forth in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); and (3) venue is improper in the Northern District of New York. Alternatively, defendant seeks a transfer of the action to the Middle District of Tennessee, where defendant is headquartered, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that defendant's motion to dismiss be granted, and plaintiff's complaint be dismissed.
On March 14, 2017, plaintiff was transferred into the custody of defendant PTS to be transported from Georgia to New York.3 Dkt. No. 35 at 3. In the ensuing days that he was in defendant's custody, plaintiff wasconfined to a cramped prisoner transport van, where he was unable to move or stretch for forty or fifty hours at a time. Dkt. No. 45 at 7. Plaintiff alleges that he was not provided with his medication in a timely fashion, that he was not given three meals per day, and that he was deprived of the use of the bathroom for up to seven hours at a time, resulting in his having to use a water bottle to relieve himself. Id. at 4-7; see also Dkt. No. 35.
Plaintiff alleges that he suffered these conditions as a result of defendant's "policies" and the lack of training of its personnel. Dkt. No. 35. In further support of his claim, plaintiff details the treatment of other individuals he claims were transported by defendant and subjected to either unsafe or inhumane treatment as a result of defendant's policies and lack of training. Dkt. No. 35 at 2-3. As a result of the conditions of his interstate transport, plaintiff alleges that he suffers from a variety of ailments, including anxiety, stress, headaches, night terrors, bladder issues, depression, and pain in his knees. Dkt. No. 45 at 1.
Plaintiff commenced this action on May 23, 2017. Dkt. No. 1. His original complaint named defendant PTS, the State of New York, and Broome County as defendants. Id. at 1-2. Following the grant of plaintiff'sapplication for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the court's review of his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A, Senior District Judge Thomas J. McAvoy issued a decision and order on June 8, 2017, in which he (1) dismissed all claims against the State of New York, with prejudice; (2) dismissed plaintiff's claims against the Broome County, without prejudice; (3) dismissed plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against defendant PTS, without prejudice; and (4) ordered that only plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim against defendant PTS survived the court's sua sponte review. See generally Dkt. No. 4.
In lieu of answering plaintiff's complaint, defendant moved on August 31, 2017 seeking dismissal of his remaining claims for failure to state a cognizable claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally Dkt. No. 23. Defendant also moved to dismiss on the ground that venue was improper pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and argued, in the alternative, that the action should be transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. See generally id. As a result of that motion, and following my issuance of a report and recommendation, JudgeMcAvoy issued a decision and order on February 22, 2018 dismissing plaintiff's complaint, but granting him leave to replead. Dkt. Nos. 33, 38.
Plaintiff availed himself of the opportunity to replead and filed an amended complaint on February 1, 2018. Dkt. No. 35. On March 6, 2018, defendant again moved for dismissal of plaintiff's amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing in the alternative that the action should be transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, and on May 31, 2018, submitted additional materials in support of its motion. Dkt. Nos. 39, 46. Plaintiff filed papers in opposition to the motion on May 25, 2018. Dkt. No. 45. Defendant's motion, which is now fully briefed and ripe for determination, has been referred to me for the issuance of a report and recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B) and Northern District of New York Local Rule 72.3(c). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
In its motion, defendant asserts that venue is improperly laid in the Northern District of New York, and that it is therefore entitled to dismissal of the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. No. 39-10 at 18-22. As an alternative to dismissal, defendant requests that the matter be transferred to the Middle District of Tennessee. See generally id. Plaintiff opposes the motion to dismiss, as well as defendant's alternative argument to transfer. See generally Dkt. No. 45.
To survive a motion to dismiss for improper venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the plaintiff's burden to plead that venue is proper in the district in which the case has been brought. Zaltz v. JDATE, 952 F. Supp. 2d 439, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). Where, as here, the parties have not yet engaged in discovery, the plaintiff must only make a prima facie showing of venue being proper, with all the pleadings and affidavits being construed in plaintiff's favor. Starr v. Michael Stars, Inc., No. 12-CV-860, 2013 WL 12291517, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2013) (Mordue, J.).5 Thus, in analyzing defendant's claim of impropervenue, the court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 384 (2d Cir. 2007). The court "may consider evidentiary matters outside the pleadings 'by affidavit or otherwise[.]' " TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 370, 375 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Kamen v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir. 1986)). The question of whether to dismiss on the basis of improper venue is entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court. Minnette v. Time Warner, 997 F.2d 1023, 1026 (2d Cir. 1993).
To determine whether venue in this district is "improper," and if a plaintiff's complaint is therefore subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(3), the court is guided by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which is applicable to claims filed pursuant to section 1983. See, e.g., Phillips v. PTS of Am., LLC, No. 16-CV-0466, 2017 WL 9325623, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 12, 2017) (). Pursuant to section 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in:
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1)-(3).6 As can be seen, "[i]n cases where the plaintiff brings a civil action in a district other than the one where any defendant lives, venue will be proper 'if a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred' in that judicial district." E. Mishan & Sons, Inc. v. Smart and Eazy Corp., No. 18-CV-3217, 2018 WL 6528496, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2)) ( plaintiff's choice of venue proper in the Southern District of New York where defendants, two California corporations, advertised, shipped, and marketed products to New York residents).
"In the event a court in which an action is pending finds that venue is improper, a court 'shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer [the] case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.' "Stern v. Westerman Ball Ederer Miller & Sharfstein, LL...
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