Ambulatory Servs. of P.R., LLC v. Sankar Nephrology Grp., LLC, 4:18-CV-916-A
Decision Date | 03 September 2019 |
Docket Number | NO. 4:18-CV-916-A,4:18-CV-916-A |
Parties | AMBULATORY SERVICES OF PUERTO RICO, LLC, ON ITS BEHALF AND DERIVATIVELY ON BEHALF OF SNG NARANJITO, LLC, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. SANKAR NEPHROLOGY GROUP, LLC, ET AL., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Came on for consideration (1) the motion of defendants Sankar Nephrology Group, LLC ("SNG"), Renal Physicians of North Texas, LC ("Renal Physicians"), and PPG Health, P.A. ("PPG")(collectively, the "SNG defendants") to dismiss,1 (2) the motion of defendants Ponniah Sankarapandian a/k/a Ponniah Sankar ("Ponniah") and Balamurgugan P. Sankarapandian a/k/a Bala Sankar ("Bala")(together, the "Sankars") to dismiss, and (3) the motion of defendant Branch Banking and Trust Company ("BB&T") to dismiss, each motion being directed to plaintiffs' second amended complaint. The court, having considered the motions, the responses of plaintiffs, Ambulatory Services of Puerto Rico, LLC ("ASPR"), on its own behalf and derivatively on behalf of SNGNaranjito, LLC ("Naranjito"), and Carlos R. Rivera ("Rivera"), the replies, the record, and applicable authorities, finds that the motions of the SNG defendants and the Sankars should be granted in part, and that the BB&T motion should be granted.
On November 12, 2018, plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this action. Doc.2 1. On February 1, 2019, they filed their amended complaint. Doc. 36. In response, defendants filed motions to dismiss. Docs. 38, 40, 45. And, on June 27, 2019, pursuant to the court's order of June 13, 2019, Doc. 79, plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint, Doc. 80, which is the operative pleading. Plaintiffs allege:
Rivera originally founded a hemodialysis clinic in Puerto Rico, Centro de Dialisis San Miguel Arcangel ("San Miguel"), and wanting to start another one, he sought an investor. Doc. 80 at 7, ¶¶ 22, 24. His search led him to SNG, which owned and operated other dialysis clinics, and Ponniah, SNG's controlling member. Id. at ¶ 24 & 10, ¶ 38. Based on representations made by Ponniah regarding his prior experience successfully operating SNG dialysis clinics, the future profitability of Naranjito, and hisability to complete the transaction without outside funding, Rivera agreed to sell 60% of San Miguel.3 Id. at 8, ¶¶ 26, 28.
The parties entered into a number of agreements regarding Naranjito. Id. at 8, ¶ 30. Pursuant to an Asset Purchase Agreement, SNG agreed to buy 60% of San Miguel's assets, with San Miguel transferring the remaining 40% to Rivera's company, ASPR. Doc. 81 at Appx. 0007-0034. Then, SNG and ASPR contributed their interests in San Miguel (the "contributed assets") to the new dialysis clinic, Naranjito, through a Membership Contribution Agreement ("MCA"). Id. Appx. 0036-0040. Thus, SNG became a 60% member and ASPR a 40% member of Naranjito. Id. at Appx. 0085. SNG and ASPR also entered into a Limited Liability Company Operating Agreement for Naranjito (the "Operating Agreement"). Id. Appx. 0042-0089. Pursuant to the Operating Agreement, a supermajority of owners was required to approve the borrowing of money or obtaining credit except for short-term unsecured obligations in the ordinary course of business. Doc. 80 at 10, ¶¶ 35-36; Doc. 81 at Appx. 0065. And, Renal Physicians entered into a Management Services Agreement ("MSA") pursuant to which it agreed to provide management services to Naranjito. Doc. 81 at Appx. 0091-0103.
To fund SNG's acquisition of 60% of San Miguel's assets, SNG and the Sankars got a secured loan from BB&T in the principal amount of $3,700,000 (the "BB&T loan"), leveraged all of Naranjito's assets, including ASPR's contributed assets, and granted a lien in favor of BB&T, and added Naranjito as a co-obligor on the BB&T loan. Doc. 80 at 12, ¶ 45. Neither Ponniah, SNG, or Renal Physicians ever informed Rivera of these obligations. Id. ¶ 46. BB&T knew that the BB&T loan must be kept secret from Rivera and acted to hide the fraudulent nature of the transaction. Id. at 14-15, ¶¶ 55, 59.
Renal Physicians caused hundreds of thousands of dollars to be transferred from Naranjito's bank account to an account or accounts controlled by SNG, which then used a portion of those funds to make electronic payments toward the BB&T loan. Doc. 80 at 35-36, ¶ 143. The Sankars and SNG then concealed those payments by emailing Rivera financial statements that omitted them. Id. at 40, ¶ 159.
ASPR and SNG eventually decided to sell Naranjito's assets. Rivera secured a $7 million offer from Bio-Medical Applications of Puerto Rico, Inc. ("Bio-Medical"), which belongs to an international conglomerate operating under the name Fresenius Medical Care. Doc. 80 at 27, ¶ 106. On February 9, 2016, SNG and ASPR executed an Agreement to Sell Assets of SNG Naranjito, LLCto Fresenius Medical Care (the "Member Sale Agreement"). Id. at 28, ¶ 107; Doc. 81 at Appx. 0112. The pertinent part of that agreement states that "the allocation of the proceeds of the sale of ownership interest shall be as follows" and indicates that SNG will be allocated $4,200,000, consistent with its 60% ownership interest in Naranjito, and ASPR will be allocated $2,800,000, consistent with its 40% ownership interest. Id. On January 3, 2017, Bio-Medical, at the direction of the Sankars and SNG, processed two wire transfers totaling $7 million: one transfer of $2,719,638.20 to an account in the name of SNG and Naranjito to satisfy the BB&T loan, and another in the amount of $4,280,361.80 to a separate account in Naranjito's name. Doc. 80 at 32, ¶ 132.
Following the sale to Fresenius, plaintiffs investigated and determined that defendants had defrauded them and others through a scheme of investing in and operating dialysis clinics including Naranjito. Doc. 80 at 33-42, ¶¶ 134-62. Through forensic analysis, plaintiffs discovered self-dealing by the Sankars and SNG and improprieties by other defendants. Id. at 42-43, ¶¶ 163-68.
The second amended complaint sets forth fifteen causes of action, which are as described in the court's memorandum opinion and order signed May 28, 2019, Doc. 76 at 2-8, except that what was described in that opinion as Count XVI is now Count Fifteenand Counts XV and XVII of the amended complaint are no longer being asserted.
Counts Four and Eleven reflect that they are brought by Rivera and ASPR, but as discussed, infra, Rivera is really not asserting any claims. The remaining counts are asserted only by ASPR, with the exception of Count Fifteen, wherein ASPR and Naranjito request judgment in their favor.4 Doc. 80 at 65.
In their respective motions to dismiss the second amended complaint, defendants assert that the claims against it or him should be dismissed for want of sufficient pleading.
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in a general way, the applicable standard of pleading. It requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), "in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,"Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) ( ). Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the "showing" contemplated by Rule 8 requires the plaintiff to do more than simply allege legal conclusions or recite the elements of a cause of action. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3. Thus, while a court must accept all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, it need not credit bare legal conclusions that are unsupported by any factual underpinnings. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) ().
Moreover, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the facts pleaded must allow the court to infer that the plaintiff's right to relief is plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. To allege a plausible right to relief, the facts pleaded must suggest liability; allegations that are merely consistent with unlawful conduct are insufficient. Id. In other words, where the facts pleaded do no more than permit the court to infer the possibility of misconduct, the complaint has not shown that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires thereviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
As the Fifth Circuit has explained: "Where the complaint is devoid of facts that would put the defendant on notice as to what conduct supports the claims, the complaint fails to satisfy the requirement of notice pleading." Anderson v. U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 554 F.3d 525, 528 (5th Cir. 2008). In sum, Id. at 528-29. Further, the complaint must specify the acts of the defendants individually, not collectively, to meet the pleading standards of Rule 8(a). See Griggs v. State Farm Lloyds, 181 F.3d 694, 699 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Searcy v. Knight (In re Am. Int'l Refinery), 402 B.R. 728, 738 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008).
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court may consider documents attached to the motion if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to the plaintiff's claims. Scanlan v. Tex. A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003). The court may also refer to matters of public record. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 268 n.1 (1986);Davis v....
To continue reading
Request your trial