Amedee v. Shell Chem. LP

• Decision Date: 31 May 2019
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-00487-SDD-RLB
• Parties: Leah Michelle AMEDEE v. SHELL CHEMICAL LP-GEISMER PLANT
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

384 F.Supp.3d 613

Leah Michelle AMEDEE

v.SHELL CHEMICAL LP-GEISMER PLANT

CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-00487-SDD-RLB

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana.

Signed May 31, 2019

Dale Edward Williams, Covington, LA, for Leah Michelle Amedee

Thomas J. McGoey, II, Jaclyn Elizabeth Hickman, Liskow & Lewis, New Orleans, LA, for Shell Chemical LP-Geismer Plant

RULING

CHIEF JUDGE SHELLY D. DICK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment¹ by Defendant, Shell Chemical LP ("Shell" or "Defendant"). Plaintiff, Leah Michelle Amedee ("Amedee" or "Plaintiff"), filed an Opposition² to which Shell filed a Reply.³ For the following reasons, the Court finds that Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was hired by Shell in August 2012 in the position of ID Process Technician in the Alpha Olefins and Isomerization Unit ("AOID Unit") at the Geismer Plant.⁴ Plaintiff claims that she has worked in this capacity for Shell despite the fact that she suffers from a lifelong condition of scoliosis

and back pain.⁵

Shell had an attendance management policy that informed employees of the "company's expectations regarding attendance: be at work on time; make every reasonable effort to minimize the amount of time away from work; notify your immediate supervisor promptly when not able to be at work as scheduled; and comply with the medical documentation/notification requirements set forth within the policy."⁶ Chargeable offenses include unexcused absences or absences that do not qualify for FMLA leave or an employee's failure to notify the supervisor that he/she is going to miss his/her shift.⁷ After an employee exceeds two incidents within a twelve-month period and has received a counseling session, the employee is subject to the formal discipline process. The formal discipline process in place includes: an oral reminder which includes a written document; a written reminder; and a decision-making leave. Additional absences may result in higher discipline including termination of employment.⁸

Defendant contracted with the Reed Group to facilitate all FMLA leave requests and authorizations. It is the employee's responsibility to submit the appropriate medical certifications to the Reed Group within the allotted time to obtain approved FMLA leave.⁹ Defendant contends that in the twelve-month period leading to Plaintiff's termination, she had the following unapproved absences that did not qualify for FMLA leave: Feb. 22, 2015;¹⁰ Apr. 8, 2015;¹¹ June 22, 2015;¹² July 16, 2015; Sept. 4, 2015; Nov. 9, 2015; Feb. 10, 2016; Feb. 22, 2016; and Feb. 29, 2016.¹³

Plaintiff disputes some of the dates listed as unapproved absences or leave. Plaintiff disputes July 16, 2015, arguing that she left work two hours before the end of her shift because she did not feel well. She claims to have sought medical treatment at an emergency room in Thibodeaux, Louisiana. She claims that her medical issues were related to being "picked on" at work. Plaintiff cites to no admissible evidence to support these "facts". Plaintiff also argues that leaving work early does not equate to a "chargeable absence" under Shell's policy and suggests that this incident was a "non-occupational disability".¹⁴

Plaintiff similarly disputes November 9, 2015 because she missed work due to a medical appointment "connected to an occupational disability" that should have been considered a "non-FMLA Occupational Health Issue".¹⁵ Again, Plaintiff does not direct the Court to any admissible evidence in support of her "facts".¹⁶

Plaintiff contends that she took "intermittent FMLA leave" from September 2014 through March 2015 due to her neck and lower back pain.¹⁷ Plaintiff also disputes Defendant's labeling of her absences or calling in to work as sick as "occurrences" that were used against her in the formal disciplinary process. Plaintiff contends that if an employee is scheduled for overtime work and calls in sick, it is not considered an "occurrence" for discipline purposes. Plaintiff contends that she was treated unfairly in this respect.¹⁸

Defendant argues that unsuccessful counseling sessions took place with Plaintiff, after which she received an oral reminder memorialized in writing and a written reminder. This purportedly qualified for the first two steps in Shell's formal disciplinary process.¹⁹ The written reminder is dated March 10, 2016, and Plaintiff does not dispute receiving the written reminder on this date.²⁰ Plaintiff argues that the "occurrences" that are outlined in the written reminder "were undeserved," and this was communicated to Chad Mason ("Mason"), Human Resources Account Manager, at Shell.²¹

On the very next day, March 11, 2016, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was operating her vehicle, she was involved in a one-vehicle accident, was arrested and issued a citation for driving while intoxicated.²² Plaintiff testified that the accident occurred some time before midnight on March 10, 2016, and that she was scheduled to report to work at 4:30 a.m. on March 11, 2016.²³ Following the accident, it is undisputed that Plaintiff called Harlan Hart ("Hart"), a supervisor at Shell, just before or around midnight and advised that she was in an accident, that she would not be in to work, and that it should be coded as "sick".²⁴ Plaintiff argues that she was experiencing back pain due to the accident.²⁵ The record evidence does not reflect that Plaintiff applied for FMLA leave for March 11, 2016, which was a Friday. She later applied for FMLA leave beginning March 14 or 15, 2016.²⁶

Defendant contends that "after an investigation", Shell decided to terminate Plaintiff. After several attempts to reach Plaintiff by telephone, Shell sent Plaintiff a letter terminating her employment. The first termination letter was dated March 30, 2016, but it was not delivered; therefore, Defendant issued the identical letter dated April 5, 2016.²⁷ Plaintiff admits receiving these letters on "March 30, 2016, and later on April 8^th".²⁸ Plaintiff was terminated for allegedly failing "to show up/properly report off for scheduled work".²⁹ Plaintiff disputes the reason for her termination and argues that she was on FMLA leave at the time she was terminated.³⁰ Plaintiff also contends that she had properly reported her leave, provided the necessary medical information to the Reed Group, and understood that most of her "absences" were approved and not considered "occurrences" subject to formal discipline.³¹ Plaintiff alleges that Defendant terminated her because of her back pain and medical treatment which was perceived as a disability in violation of the ADA.³²

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on July 11, 2016, alleging that she had been terminated in violation of the ADA.³³ Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, averring that Defendant violated the FMLA and the ADA. Specifically, Plaintiff asserted the following claims: (1) under 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1) of the FMLA for failure to restore to an equivalent position;³⁴ (2) under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) of the FMLA for interference with the exercise of FMLA rights; (3) under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) of the ADA for disability discrimination; and (4) under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) and (B) of the ADA³⁵ for failure to make reasonable accommodations and denying employment opportunities on the basis of a disability.³⁶ Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims of discrimination under the FMLA and ADA and for claims of interference with Plaintiff's FMLA rights.³⁷ Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to offer evidentiary support necessary to prevail on her claims and to defeat summary judgment. Defendant further contends that the uncontroverted evidence shows that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff contends that Defendant's reasons for termination were merely pretext.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment should be granted if the record, taken as a whole, "together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."³⁸ "When assessing whether a dispute to any material fact exists, we consider all of the evidence in the record but refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence."³⁹ The Supreme Court has interpreted the plain language of Rule 56(c) to mandate "the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."⁴⁰ A party moving for summary judgment "must ‘demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,’ but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case."⁴¹ If the moving party "fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response."⁴²

If the moving party meets this burden, Rule 56(c) requires the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and show by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, or other admissible evidence that specific facts exist over which there is a genuine issue for trial.⁴³ The nonmovant's burden may not be satisfied by conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, metaphysical doubt as to the facts, or a scintilla of evidence.⁴⁴ Factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, "but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts."⁴⁵ The Court will not, "in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts."⁴⁶ Unless there is sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict in the nonmovant's favor, there is no genuine...