AMENDMENTS TO FLA. RULES CRIM. PROC. 3.851, No. SC96646.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida
• Writing for the Court: HARDING, C.J.
• Citation: 772 So.2d 488
• Parties: AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3.851, 3.852 AND 3.993.
• Decision Date: 14 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. SC96646.

772 So.2d 488

AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3.851, 3..993

No. SC96646.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 14, 2000.

Honorable Stan R. Morris, Chairperson, Supreme Court Committee on Postconviction Relief in Capital Cases, Gainesville, Florida; Honorable Philip J. Padovano, Judge, First District Court of Appeal, Tallahassee, Florida; O.H. Eaton, Jr., Committee Member, Seminole County Courthouse, Sanford, Florida; Jerome C. Latimer, Chair, The Florida Bar Criminal Procedure Rules Committee, St. Petersburg, Florida; John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida; and Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Richard B. Martell, Chief, Capital Appeals, and Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Division Director, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioners.

Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Southern Region, and Todd G. Scher, Litigation Director, Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Gregory C. Smith, Capital Collateral Counsel, Northern Region, and Andrew Thomas, Chief Assistant CCRC, Northern Region, Tallahassee, Florida; Timothy P. Schardl, Special Assistant CCRC, Northern Region, and Mark E. Olive of the Law Offices of Mark E. Olive, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida; Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Christina A. Spaulding, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida; Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and W.C. McLain, Michael J. Minerva and Chet Kaufman, Assistant Public Defenders, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida; Richard Jorandby, Public Defender, and Gary Caldwell, Assistant Public Defender, Chief, Capital Crimes Division, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida; and Stephen Krosschell of Goodman & Nekvasil, P.A., Clearwater, Florida, Responding.

Tom Feeney, Johnnie B. Byrd, Jr., and John Dudley Goodlette, Tallahassee, Florida for John E. Thrasher, Speaker, House of Representatives, Amicus Curiae.

HARDING, C.J.

We have before us amendments to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 proposed by the Supreme Court Committee on Postconviction Relief in Capital Cases. We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below and in our opinion in Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So.2d 52 (Fla.2000), which we also issue today, we propose amendments to rule 3.851, as well as amendments to rule 3.852, rule 3.993, and the Rules of Judicial Administration, which we believe address this Court's concerns as well as effectuate the Legislature's intent as expressed in the Death Penalty Reform Act of 2000. See ch. 2000-3, Laws of Fla.; Fla. CS for HB 1-A (2000).

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In drafting these proposed rules, we have sought to identify and eliminate those capital postconviction procedures that have historically created unreasonable delays in the process, while still maintaining quality and fairness. For example, our proposals require an evidentiary hearing on the initial motion for postconviction relief. In light of the large number of summary denials of initial motions which the Court has been compelled to reverse under the current rules, we believe this change will reduce unwarranted delay in many cases. See Allen, 756 So.2d at 67. We also have provided for appointment of collateral counsel immediately after the death penalty is imposed. This change in rule 3.851, in combination with the proposed amendments to rule 3.852, will allow counsel to begin investigating postconviction claims while the direct appeal is proceeding and should eliminate much of the delay caused by the public records production process. Although the postconviction process will begin earlier than it currently does, we are actually lengthening the time postconviction counsel has to prepare. Under our proposals, counsel, who will be appointed immediately after the death sentence is imposed, will have until shortly after this Court's mandate issues in which to prepare and file the postconviction motion

Overall, our proposals attempt to strike a balance between the State's and the public's legitimate interest in the prompt and efficient processing of capital cases and this Court's duty to ensure that such cases are processed in a fair, just, and humane manner that conforms to constitutional requirements. See Allen, 756 So.2d at 65. Our proposals recognize both the necessity for a fair and efficient process and this Court's obligation to ensure that the courts of this state are available to grant relief for meritorious claims.

I. Background

This Court originally created and charged the Supreme Court Committee on Postconviction Relief in Capital Cases (the Morris Committee), which is chaired by Judge Stan R. Morris and comprised of judges with capital trial experience, to address the production of public records in capital postconviction proceedings. See Amendments to Fla. Rules of Crim. Pro.—Rule 3.852, 723 So.2d 163 (Fla.1998). By order dated March 31, 1999, the Court reconstituted the Morris Committee and asked it to assist the Court in developing a case management plan for capital postconviction relief and to recommend amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and 3.851 which would improve these procedures. In response to that charge, the Morris Committee filed its report with the Court on September 30, 1999, proposing the amendments to rule 3.851 at issue here. A roundtable discussion of the proposals attended by attorneys and judges experienced in capital postconviction proceedings was conducted at the Court in December 1999.

While the Court was considering the Morris Committee's report, the Florida Legislature passed the Death Penalty Reform Act of 2000 (DPRA), which became effective on January 14, 2000. The DPRA significantly altered Florida's capital postconviction court procedures. Most notably, the DPRA created a postconviction process in capital cases that runs almost parallel with the direct appeal proceedings. See ch. 2000-3, § 6, Laws of Fla.; Fla. CS for HB 1-A, § 6, at 15-19 (creating section 924.056, Florida Statutes). The Legislature also repealed rules 3.851 (Collateral Relief After Death Sentence Has Been Imposed), and 3.852 (Capital Postconviction Public Records Production), as well as rule 3.850 (Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence) to the extent that it is inconsistent with the DPRA. See ch. 2000-3, § 10, Laws of Fla.; Fla. CS for HB 1-A § 10, at 25. To replace the rules, the Legislature specifically created sections 924.058 and 924.059, Florida Statutes, "to regulate the procedures in actions for capital postconviction relief ... unless and until such procedures are revised by rule or rules adopted by the Florida Supreme

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Court which specifically reference this section." See ch. 2000-3, §§ 8-9, Laws of Fla.; Fla. CS for HB 1-A §§ 8-9, at 21-22

Constitutional challenges were immediately filed contesting the imposition of legislative rules to our court procedures, and confusion arose in the trial courts as to what rules applied to pending and new cases. To avoid a crisis resulting from the confusion that was caused by the new legislation and the numerous constitutional challenges thereto, and in response to the Legislature's request to adopt new rules, this Court readopted rules 3.850, 3.851, and 3.852 on a temporary basis in order to allow the Court adequate time to consider the challenges to the DPRA. See In re Rules Governing Capital Postconviction Actions, 763 So.2d 273 (Fla.2000). After readopting the rules on an emergency basis, the Court also published the Morris Committee's proposed amendments to rule 3.851 for comment and invited comments concerning the effect of the DPRA on the proposed amendments. The Court heard oral argument on the Morris Committee's proposals on the same day it heard arguments on the challenges to the DPRA. By separate opinion, we have found most of the provisions of the DPRA to be invalid because they violate the constitutional separation of powers and this Court's constitutional rule-making responsibility. See Allen, 756 So.2d at 54, 64.

Although we find it necessary to alter the Morris Committee's proposal, the Committee's diligent efforts provide the foundation for our proposed rules. We take this opportunity to commend and thank the Committee for its extraordinary efforts in respect to these procedures.

II. The Court's Proposed Amendments

After considering the Morris Committee's proposal, the comments filed in this case, the Legislature's dual-track scheme, and the challenges to the legislative scheme, we propose the attached amendments to rules 3.851, 3.852, 3.993, and the Rules of Judicial Administration. Together, these proposed amendments create a dual-track system similar to that enacted by the Legislature, and we have modeled our proposed time periods for capital postconviction public records production very closely after section 3 of the DPRA.

Most significantly, under our proposed new rules the postconviction process will begin immediately after the imposition of the death sentence. Within fifteen days after imposition of the death sentence, collateral counsel will be appointed under proposed rule 3.851 and the production of public records will begin under proposed rule 3.852. This will allow postconviction counsel the opportunity to immediately begin the investigation of the case and have access to the necessary public records.

Unlike the Legislature's dual-track scheme, however, under our proposal, the defendant will not be required to file a motion for postconviction relief until after this Court issues its mandate on direct appeal.¹ While we agree with the wisdom of appointing postconviction counsel immediately upon imposition of the death sentence, we envision potential constitutional dilemmas if the defendant is required to file the postconviction motion prior to this Court's decision on direct appeal when the

772 So.2d 491

outcome of the appeal may moot the necessity...