Amerbelle Corp. v. Hommell

• Decision Date: 02 July 2003
• Docket Number: No. 3:03CV355 PCD.,3:03CV355 PCD.
• Citation: 272 F.Supp.2d 189
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: The AMERBELLE CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. Jimmie HOMMEL and Color Works, Inc., Defendants.

272 F.Supp.2d 189

The AMERBELLE CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. Jimmie HOMMEL and Color Works, Inc., Defendants.

No. 3:03CV355 PCD.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

July 2, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Glenn A. Duhl, Jennifer M. Rockwell, Siegel, O'Connor, Zangari, O'Donnell & Beck, Hartford, CT, for Amerbelle Corp, plaintiff.

Robert Reginald Simpson, Attorney, Karen T. Staib, Shipman & Goodwin, Thomas W. Edgington, Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, P.C., Hartford, CT, L. Eric Ebbert, The Anderson Firm, Kingsport, TN, for Jimmie R. Hommel, Colorworks Inc, defendants.

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS

DORSEY, District Judge.

Defendants move to dismiss this complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. For the reasons set forth herein, the motion is granted as to Defendant Color Works, Inc.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, The Amerbelle Corporation ("Amerbelle"), is a Connecticut corporation authorized to do business in Connecticut. Compl. ¶ 1. Defendant, Jimmie Hommel ("Hommel"), was formally employed by Amerbelle as a laboratory manager from 1998 until 2001, during which time Hommel resided in Connecticut. Id. ¶ 2. Defendant, Color Works, Inc. ("Color Works"), is a Tennessee corporation not authorized to do business in Connecticut. Id. ¶ 3. Hommel is not alleged to live presently in Connecticut.

On November 3, 1997, Amerbelle hired Hommel as a laboratory manager. Pl.'s Compl. ¶ 11. On that date, Hommel entered into a written confidentiality agreement with Amerbelle providing that he would not disclose Amerbelle's trade secrets. Id. ¶ 12. While still employed by Plaintiff, Color Works offered Hommel a position that Hommel later accepted. Pl.'s Opp. Mem., Ex. A. Hommel's employment with Amerbelle ended on May 25, 2001. Compl. ¶ 15. Hommel allegedly has since contacted and solicited the business of Plaintiff's largest customer, which is located in the State of New York. Id. ¶ 19. On or about June 27, 2001, and again on July 9, 2001, Plaintiff informed Color Works of Hommel's confidentiality agreement. Id. ¶ 25.

Plaintiff alleges breach of contract, promissory estoppel, tortious interference of both contract and business relations, and misappropriation of trade secrets by Defendant Hommel. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges conspiracy, tortious interference with contract, misappropriation of trade secrets, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act ("CUTPA"), CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-110a, by Defendant Color Works.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. Furthermore, they argue that Connecticut's long-arm statutes do not apply and the exercise of jurisdiction does not comport with due process.

A. Standard for Motion to Dismiss

"When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant." Divicino v. Polaris Indus., 129 F.Supp.2d 425, 428 (D.Conn.2001) (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 566-67 (2d Cir.1996)). "When there has been no discovery conducted, the plaintiff need only assert `facts constituting a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction' to defeat a motion to dismiss." Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. Int'l Nutrition Co., 175 F.Supp.2d 296, 300 (D.Conn.2001) (quoting PDK Labs Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1108 (2d Cir. 1997)). When dealing with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, "in the absence of an evidentiary hearing or a trial on the merits, all pleadings and affidavits are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Jarrow Formulas, Inc., 175 F.Supp.2d at 300 (citing Sherman Assocs. v. Kals, 899 F.Supp. 868, 870 (D.Conn.1995)) Additionally, "regardless of the controverting evidence put forth by the defendant, the court must resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor." Surgical Corp., 25 F.Supp.2d at 44 (citing A.I. Trade Finance, Inc. v. Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76, 79-80 (2d Cir.1993)).

B. Personal Jurisdiction Analysis

In a diversity suit, a federal district court will look to the law of the forum state to resolve the question of personal jurisdiction as to an out-of-state party. United States Surgical Corp. v. Imagyn Med. Tech., 25 F.Supp.2d 40, 43 (D.Conn. 1998) (citing Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 231 (2d Cir.1963)). Questions of personal jurisdiction are resolved through a two-step inquiry: (1) does the Connecticut long-arm statute reach the foreign party; and, if so, (2) does the exercise of jurisdiction meet the "minimum contacts" requirement and thus satisfy constitutional due process. See United States Surgical Corp., 25 F.Supp.2d at 44; World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).

C. Applicability of Connecticut's Long-Arm Statutes

1. Hommel is Within the Reach of § 52-59b(a)

Hommel argues that CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-59b(a)(1), providing for jurisdiction when a defendant "transacts any business in the state", does not support personal jurisdiction over him because the statute only applies to "current" transactions. Mot. Dis. at 6. Plaintiff replies that this Court has jurisdiction under CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-59b(a)(1) given Hommel's signing an employment agreement in Connecticut while working and residing there.¹

The Connecticut Supreme Court has interpreted the language of CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-59b(a)(1) "to embrace a single purposeful business transaction." Zartolas v. Nisenfeld, 184 Conn. 471, 474, 440 A.2d 179 (1981). Plaintiff argues jurisdiction has been found in similar circumstances and that Hommel's signing an employment contract in Connecticut constitutes the "single, purposeful business transaction" that is sufficient to satisfy the Connecticut long-arm statute. See United States Surgical Corp., 25 F.Supp.2d 40, 44 (D.Conn. 1998) (finding jurisdiction where defendant also participated in six-week training program in Connecticut, attended various strategy meetings in Connecticut and received salary from plaintiff's Connecticut offices). Additionally, the Connecticut Appellate Court, in a breach of contract suit by a Connecticut employer against three former non-resident employees, found the "transacts any business" requirement was satisfied where the defendants signed their employment contracts in Connecticut, came to Connecticut for quarterly business meetings, and received expense reimbursement from Connecticut. See Hart, Nininger & Campbell Assoc., v. Rogers, 16 Conn.App. 619, 624-25, 548 A.2d 758 (1988).

In both United States Surgical Corp. and Hart, Nininger & Campbell Assoc., neither of the defendants ever lived in Connecticut and both plaintiffs brought their suit after the respective defendant was no longer employed by them. Accordingly, personal jurisdiction was found to exist over both out-of-state defendants due to a one time business transaction that occurred some time prior to the relative cause of action. Therefore, Defendant's contention that the "transacts any business" language of § 52-59b(a)(1) applies only to current transactions is without merit.

In the case before us, Hommel executed his employment contract in Connecticut, worked in Connecticut, resided in Connecticut throughout his entire employment with Plaintiff, and received paychecks that were drawn on Connecticut banks. Horowitz Aff. ¶ 6-8. Hommel's actions are therefore adequate to bring him within the reach of Connecticut's long-arm statute.

2. Color Works is Beyond the Reach of the Connecticut Long-Arm Statutes

The only basis for jurisdiction clearly argued by Plaintiff is § 33-929(f)(4).² Pl.'s Resp. Mot. Dis. at 16. Plaintiff argues that Color Works has tortiously interfered with a contract between Plaintiff and Defendant Hommel, and that this conduct occurred in Connecticut because Color Works purposefully solicited Hommel while he was employed by Plaintiff in Connecticut. Id. Plaintiff further argues that Hommel subsequently misappropriated trade secrets and confidential information by soliciting Plaintiff's customers.³ (Id. at 17).

Plaintiff's reliance on Smith v. Snyder, No. CV 990362743S, 2000 WL 739610, at *2 (Conn.Super.Ct. May 23, 2000), and Gelinas v. Smith, No. 38 78 30, 1991 WL 225165, at *2 (Conn.Super. Oct. 25, 1991), as standing for the proposition that Hommel's present status as an agent of Color Works necessarily confers jurisdiction over the foreign corporation employing him, is misplaced.⁴ The present case is distinguishable as Plaintiff has overlooked the fact that the individual defendants in both Snyder and Gelinas allegedly committed their tortious acts not only while acting as agents for their respective foreign corporations, but also while physically present in Connecticut. See Snyder, 2000 WL 739610, at *1; Gelinas, 1991 WL 225165, at *2. Plaintiff provides no legal authority that confers jurisdiction over a corporation because of such an after-the-fact relationship, the claim here not being founded on any impropriety in Amerbelle's offer of employment.

Under the plain language of § 33-929(f)(4), a court need only inquire as to the place where the tort occurred because "the statute requires tortious conduct in this state." See Bross Utils. Serv. Corp. v. Aboubshait, 489 F.Supp. 1366, 1373 (D.Conn.1980) (emphasis in original). Therefore, jurisdiction may be founded on § 33-929(f)(4) only if the tortious conduct occurred in Connecticut, regardless of whether the injury was felt in Connecticut from tortious activity occurring outside Connecticut. See Gen. Star Indem. v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., NO. 3:97-CV-2542 (EBB), 1998 WL 774234 *5 (D.Conn.1998); Marvel Prods. v. The Fantastics, 296 F.Supp. 783, 787 (D.Conn.1968).

This conclusion is further supported by comparing the text of the long-arm statute applicable to individuals to the corporate long-arm statute. Section 52-59b, the long-arm statute applicable to individuals, has two distinct sub-sections. One applies to...