America S/a Frutas v. M/V Cap San Rafael
| Decision Date | 12 April 2006 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 03-4624.,Civil Action No. 03-2362.,Civil Action No. 03-2360.,Civil Action No. 03-2361. |
| Parties | AMERICA S/A FRUTAS E ALIMENTOS et al., Plaintiffs, v. WV CAP SAN RAFAEL, et al., Defendants. America S/A Frutas E Alimentos et al., Plaintiffs, v. M/V CAP San Rafael, et al., Defendants. America S/A Frutas E Alimentos et al., Plaintiffs, v. M/V CAP San Rafael, et al., Defendants. Guararapes Agricola S.A., et al, Plaintiffs, v. WV CAP San Rafael, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Dante Mattioni, Stephen J. Galati, Mattioni, Ltd., Philadelphia, PA, for Plaintiffs.
Ann-Michele G. Higgins, David S. Santee, Rawle & Henderson, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Charles P. Neely, Lawrence D. Wright, Wright and O'Donnell, P.C., Conshohocken, PA, for Defendants.
These related admiralty cases all involved the shipment of mangoes from the port of Suape, Brazil to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania over the course of four months in 2002. The plaintiffs, America Frutas e Alimentos, Timbauba Agricola, and Tropicool ("Plaintiffs") are shippers of mangoes. They contracted with defendants Compania Sud Americana de Vapores S.A., Companhia Libra de Navegacao, Hamburg Sudamerikanische, and Columbus Shipmanagement (collectively "CSAV" or "Defendants") to transport a series of shipments of mangoes on the MN CAP San Raphael to North America. The mangoes that are the subject of these lawsuits were transported on voyages 3N, 4N and 5N from Suape, Brazil to Blackwood, New Jersey.1
Defendants are party to a series of agreements in which they share vessel space (in this case on the M/V CAP San Raphael) to enable bi-weekly trips between the east coasts of North and South America. Plaintiffs are shippers and consignees of mangoes grown in Brazil and shipped to North America for consumption. Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into an agreement providing for regularly scheduled transport between Brazil and the United States. The three voyages at issue here — 3N, 4N and 5N — were scheduled to leave Suape on August 7, 2002, September 18, 2002 and October 31, 2002 respectively. The approximate travel time between Suape and Philadelphia was 194 hours, and the carrier was scheduled to arrive at the Port of Philadelphia on August 18, 2002, September 28, 2002 and November 9, 2002. However, voyage 3N left Suape on August 11, 2002, arriving on August 23, 2002, voyage 4N left on September 23, 2002 and arrived on October 3, 2002, and voyage 5N left on November 3, 2002 and was delivered on November 18, 2002. The shipments therefore arrived in Philadelphia five, five and nine days late, respectively.
According to Plaintiffs, despite the delay, the mangoes were delivered to the port for shipping on the originally agreed date — i.e. one day prior to the scheduled departure. Plaintiffs further allege that the mangoes were delivered for shipping in good condition. As a result of the delay in the voyage, and possibly as a result of Defendants' negligent storage of the mangoes onboard the MN CAP San Raphael, Plaintiffs allege that the mangoes were delivered in an overripe and damaged condition. They have sued for damages due to the delay and subsequent reduced market value of the mangoes. Defendants have variously moved for summary judgment, arguing that they are contractually immune from liability for delay; that if they are liable, the delay was commercially reasonable and that they cannot be held liable for any damage; and that even if they are liable, their monetary liability is limited to $500 per "package" by the Carriage of Goods By Sea Act ("COGSA"), 46 U.S.C.App. § 1300, et seq.
The court has subject matter jurisdiction based upon a question of federal law, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV P. 56(c). The treatment of motions for summary judgment under COGSA is the same as a similar motion in any other type of litigation. Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. M/V OOCL Inspiration, 137 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir.1998). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A factual dispute is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Id.
A party seeking summary judgment always, bears the initial responsibility for informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a particular issue at trial, the movant's initial Celotex burden can be met simply by "pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. After the moving party has met its initial burden, "the adverse party's response, by affidavits or otherwise as provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). That is, summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party fails to rebut by making a factual showing "sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Under Rule 56, the court must view the evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The court must decide not whether the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other, but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the non-moving party has exceeded the mere scintilla of evidence threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court cannot credit the movant's version of events against the opponent, even if the quantity of the movant's evidence far outweighs that of its opponent. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir.1992).
There is some dispute as to which shipping documents control in this case. The three relevant sets of documents are the Service Agreement, the Sea Waybills and the carriers' tariffs.3 Defendants argue that the Sea Waybill and tariffs, standing alone, control this dispute. Plaintiffs agree that those two documents control, but argue that the. Service Confirmation, which detailed the timing and conditions of the carriage, also controls.
On their face, the Sea Waybills control when there is a conflicting clause between different contracts. Waybills ¶ 6. Here, Defendants argue that the clause in the Sea Waybill disclaiming "delay damages"4 conflicts with the timing set forth in the Booking Confirmation, and that the carriage agreement as embodied in the Waybill supersedes any and all conflicting agreements. They further argue that even if the clauses were not conflicting, the Booking Confirmation was not binding to begin with, and therefore should not be considered. Plaintiffs argue that the Booking Confirmation evidences a contract term above and beyond what was enumerated in the Waybill, and that therefore the times listed on it should be considered evidence of delay.
I agree with Defendants, and find that the Waybill is the controlling document here. Basic contract law disallows extrinsic evidence where the contract in dispute is integrated and where there is an absence of ambiguity, mistake or fraud. See Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Morris, 19 F.3d 142 (3d Cir.1994); Martin v. Berens, 67 Pa. 459 (1871). As there is no indication of mistake or fraud by the parties, or of any ambiguity in the Sea Waybill, I find that the Waybill (and associated tariffs) controls this dispute.
Admiralty disputes are governed by the Carriage of Goods By Sea Act.5 This law is essentially a codification of international treaties, and it applies to all disputes arising out of navigable waters. It was specifically designed for international voyages, but has been extended to some domestic maritime claims as well.
As the Eleventh Circuit has noted, under the complex statutory scheme, "[t]he burden of proof under COGSA shifts more frequently than the wind on a stormy sea." Banana Servs., Inc. v. M/V Fleetwave, 911 F.2d 519 (11th Cir.1990). Under COGSA, if a plaintiff shipper can prove its prima facie claim that (1) the cargo was loaded undamaged onto the carrier's ship; and (2) the cargo was damaged when it was unloaded from the ship at the point of destination, then the burden shifts to the carrier to prove the damage was not caused by its negligence, and was due to one of a number of enumerated COGSA exceptions.6 46 U.S.C.App. §§ 1303, 1304. The carrier can then rebut the prima facie case by showing that the damage was due to an excepted cause or that it exercised due diligence.7 If the" carrier meets this heavy burden, then the burden returns to plaintiff to establish that the carrier negligently cared for the cargo, that the vessel was unseaworthy, or that the carrier did not use due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy, and that these were at least a concurrent cause of the loss. See Sun Co., Inc. v. S.S. Overseas Arctic, 27 F.3d 1104 (5th Cir.1994); Lekas & Drivas, Inc. v. Goulandris, 306 F.2d 426 (2d Cir.1962). The carrier must then, in turn,...
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