American Aggregates Corp. v. Wente
| Decision Date | 01 June 1934 |
| Docket Number | 14,610 |
| Citation | 190 N.E. 552,100 Ind.App. 59 |
| Parties | AMERICAN AGGREGATES CORPORATION v. WENTE |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Rehearing denied October 1, 1934.
Transfer denied February 19, 1935.
1. APPEAL---Review---Conflicting Evidence.---Appellate Court will not reverse a judgment because of insufficient evidence where the evidence upon the material questions of fact is conflicting. p. 62.
2. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT---Acts of Agent---Scope of Agency.---Where a truck driver was authorized to sign a receipt for a truck his signing a title retention contract was held not within the apparent scope of his authority and therefore not binding upon his principal. p. 62.
3. EVIDENCE---Competency---Res Gestae---Acts Accompanying Sale.---In wholesaler's replevin action against his distributor's vendee for an automobile truck plaintiff's title retention contract held inadmissible as res gestae to show plaintiff's intention to retain title since defendant was not a party to the contract and not bound by such intention. p. 63.
4. APPEAL---Review---General Finding---Presumptions as to Essential Facts.---Appellate Court must assume facts essential to a general finding or verdict as found if there is any evidence to support such finding. p. 63.
5. ESTOPPEL---Equitable Estoppel---Grounds---Clothing Another With Apparent Authority.---Automobile wholesaler, who, though intending to retain title to trucks, delivered them to its distributor, held estopped from claiming title as against an innocent purchaser from the distributor. p. 64.
From Marion Superior Court; John W. Kern, Judge.
Action by American Aggregates Corporation against Otto E. Wente for replevin. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appealed.
Affirmed.
Clinton H. Givan, and Julius C. Travis, for appellant.
Carey & Cox, for appellee.
OPINION
Appellant corporation was a wholesale dealer in motor trucks. Its headquarters was in Greenville, Ohio.
Robert E. Huffard and others formed the Huffard Ruggles Company in the summer of 1928. Said firm was the Indianapolis distributor for appellant's trucks until about March, 1929, when the name of the firm was changed to "Huffard Motor Truck Company." Said Huffard Motor Truck Company continued to act as appellant's distributor until December, 1929, when R. B. Huffard, Inc., was formed and took over said agency and held it until March 18, 1930. Said Robert E. Huffard was the actual head of all said distributing firms, and handled most of the business himself.
Appellant delivered a certain truck to Huffard Motor Truck Company while said company was such distributor, and delivered another truck to R. B. Huffard, Inc., while it was such distributor. Said Robert E. Huffard, representing said distributing agencies respectively, sold both of said trucks to appellee Otto E. Wente.
Huffard, as a representative of one or the other of said distributing firms, sold appellee four other trucks.
Appellant corporation filed suit against appellee to replevy all of said trucks, the complaint being in the usual form of complaint for replevin. Appellant obtained possession of the trucks by filing replevin bonds. Appellee filed an answer in general denial, and the cause was submitted to the court for trial on the issues formed by said pleadings.
The court found for appellant as to said four trucks, and for appellee as to said two trucks, and rendered judgment accordingly, by which judgment appellant was ordered to return said two trucks to appellee or pay appellee $ 6,000.00. Appellant seasonably filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled, whereupon appellant perfected this appeal, assigning said ruling on its motion for new trial as its sole error relied upon for reversal.
Appellee filed a motion to dismiss this appeal. It will serve no good purpose to set forth the grounds of said motion. The court having considered said motion to dismiss this appeal, now overrules the same.
The causes for new trial assigned in the motion therefor, and discussed in appellant's brief are: (1) the decision is not sustained by sufficient evidence; (2) the decision is contrary to law; (3) the court erred in excluding appellant's Exhibit XI from the evidence.
The evidence was conflicting as to whether the two trucks were sent by appellant to its distributor on consignment or on open account. Evidence introduced by appellant tended to show that the distributor had no right to sell the trucks without an approval of the sale by appellant, that the sale by the distributor to appellee was made without appellant's approval, that appellant had retained the title to the trucks, hence appellee had acquired no title to them. Evidence introduced by appellee tended to show that there was no agreement between appellant and its distributor that appellant retained title to the trucks, that the transaction between them was not a sale on consignment, but was a sale on open account, and therefore appellee acquired title through the distributor.
That this court will not reverse a judgment for insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the decision, where the evidence on the material question or questions of fact, is conflicting is so elementary that citation of authorities to support the proposition is not necessary. We have read the evidence and find not only that there is...
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