American Auto. Ass'n v. Auto. Ass'n Of N.J..
| Decision Date | 03 September 1948 |
| Docket Number | No. 228.,228. |
| Citation | 61 A.2d 148 |
| Parties | AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE ASS'N et al. v. AUTOMOBILE ASS'N OF NEW JERSEY. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Court of Chancery.
Bill for injunction against alleged acts of unfair competition by the American Automobile Association, an nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of Connecticut, and others, against the Automobile Association of New Jersey, a New Jersey corporation. From the decree, complainants appeal.
Modified.
Harry Green, of Newark, for defendant-respondent.
Samuel P. Orlando, of Camden (Carl Kisselman, of Camden, of counsel), for complainants-appellants.
This is an appeal from an order entered in the Court of Chancery striking out certain portions of a bill of complaint filed by the complainants-appellants which bill seeks an injunction against alleged acts of unfair competition on the part of the defendant-respondent.
The bill of complaint was filed on December 3, 1947, by the American Automobile Association (also referred to in the bill as AAA) and two affiliate or member clubs whose activities are carried out in this state. The first nineteen paragraphs of the bill are taken up with a description of the size, extent of operations, insignia, purposes, objectives and activities of the complainants, together with statements as to the good will which they enjoy and the large sums of money expended in carrying out their activities. In paragraph 20 the defendant is described as a New Jersey corporation which has operated an automobile club since June 9, 1933, but which is not affiliated with the ‘AAA.’
Paragraphs 21 through 25 of the bill set forth the allegations on which the prayers for injunctive action are based. The portions stricken by the Court of Chancery are contained in paragraphs 22, 24, and 25, which may be partially quoted or summarized as follows:
22. ‘The name of the defendant was selected with the deliberate design of misleading prospective members of the AAA automobile clubs,’ particularly in the areas of New Jersey where the complainant affiliate clubs operate.
24. Use of the name selected by the defendant has caused great inconvenience and confusion to the complainants through misdelivery of mail and mistaken receipts of telephone calls.
25. Good will of the complainants has suffered because they have been blamed for failures of service on the part of the defendant and because practices of the defendant have been attributed to the complainants.
The prayers of the bill ask that the defendant be enjoined from using the name ‘Automobile Association of New Jersey’; that it be enjoined from using the symbol ‘AAA’ or any combination of two or three of the letters ‘A’ which would tend to deceive or confuse the public into believing that defendant was associated with the complainants; and that the defendant's officers, agents, etc., be enjoined from misrepresenting that defendant is affiliated with the complainants or that the members of the defendant would be entitled to the benefits or services to which members of the AAA and its affiliate clubs are entitled.
On December 10, 1947, defendant moved to strike out the bill of complaint on the grounds that it was duplicitous; that it failed to allege facts concerning misrepresentation and fraud and particulars of the alleged wrongs, but instead alleged conclusions only, which allegations were insufficient to show a cause of action and right to relief; that it lacked equity and complainants had an adequate remedy at law; and that it showed that the complainants were guilty of laches. The notice of the motion also stated that if the same were denied, the defendant would then apply for an order requiring a fuller and more particular statement of the cause of action, particularly as to the contractual relationships between the complainants. This notice further stated that if the foregoing motions were denied, a motion would be made to strike out paragraphs 21 through 25 on the ground that they alleged conclusions of fact and law and not facts.
A letter opinion was filed by the Vice Chancellor on which was based an order of the Court of Chancery dated March 8, 1948. This order provided: (1) That paragraphs 22, 24, and 25 be stricken, together with those prayers asking injunction against use of the name and symbols as mentioned above; (2) that fuller and more particular statements be provided with respect to the misrepresentation and fraud set forth in paragraphs 21 and 23, together with a broader allegation as to misrepresentations made in 1947; (3) that defendant's motion to dismiss the bill upon the ground that it was duplicitous be denied; and (4) that the fuller and more particular statement by the complainants be made within 10 days. It is from the order so entered that this appeal is taken.
The notice of appeal filed by the complainants states that such appeal is taken ‘from the whole and every part of said order.’ However, the petition of appeal merely contends error in the striking out of the certain portions of the bill. Defendant, being concerned with the broader statement in the notice of appeal, has put forth argument supporting that portion of the order requiring fuller and more particular statements by the complainants. However, we do not conceive that the complainants were aggrieved by this portion of the order, or that such matter need be considered here.
The real question presented on this appeal relates to the action of the court below in striking out three paragraphs and two prayers of the bill. A reading of the letter opinion of the Vice Chancellor reveals that this action as to paragraph 22 was based on laches and dissimilarity of names sufficient to avoid probability of confusion. The Vice Chancellor then found that paragraphs 24 and 25 were dependent upon paragraph 22 and should also be stricken. These findings form the elements of the arguments presented by the parties.
As a primary factor related to the question of laches, complainants argue that such question is prematurely raised in a motion to strike, citing Regan v. Cozy Lake, 137 N.J.Eq. 236, 44 A.2d 364. In that case, complainants were given the opportunity to prove reasons for their relay at the time of hearing, and the complainants on this appeal urge a similar opportunity.
As stated in the case of 536 Broad Street v....
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