American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Carson

• Decision Date: 06 November 1924
• Docket Number: 4 Div. 148
• Citation: 102 So. 219,212 Ala. 293
• Parties: AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INS. CO. v. CARSON.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

102 So. 219

212 Ala. 293

AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE INS. CO. v. CARSON.

4 Div. 148

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 6, 1924

Rehearing Denied Dec. 18, 1924

Appeal from Circuit Court, Covington County; W.L. Parks, Judge.

Action in detinue by the American Automobile Insurance Company against Johnson Carson. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Rushton Crenshaw & Rushton, of Montgomery, and E.O. Baldwin, of Andalusia, for appellant.

J Morgan Prestwood, of Andalusia, for appellee.

THOMAS J.

The rules governing the giving of the affirmative charge have been stated by this court and need not be repeated. McMillan v. Aiken, 205 Ala. 35, 40, 88 So. 135.

Under the conflicts in the evidence, jury questions were presented as to several material facts: The alteration vel non of the policy of insurance as to the factory number of the car as originally expressed in the policy; the initials on the doors of the car as sold and the absence thereof on the yar found in defendant's possession; the distance from Chicago to Pensacola; the time required to drive an automobile from and to the points indicated by the evidence. The time of the larceny of the car in Chicago is fixed as September 3 and that when defendant's car was seen in Florida was September 6, 1920; and the distance between the two points was 1,900 miles.

The testimony of an approximate distance and estimate of time is opinion evidence. In the consideration of such evidence the jury have the right to and should exercise a reasonable judgment, consult common knowledge and experience, and consider such evidence with all the other evidence on the question, and draw the reasonable inferences therefrom in finding the truth of the matter for decision.

Courts take judicial knowledge of the locations of Chicago and Pensacola and the approximate distance between the two points. People of Illinois v. Pease, Sheriff, 207 U.S. 100, 28 S.Ct. 58, 52 L.Ed. 121, 126. However, under one phase of the evidence it is shown that the usual route of travel between said cities was a greater distance than 1,900 miles, and that the mode of travel was by automobile. We take such evidence for the defendant as true, when considering the propriety of giving the general affirmative instruction for the plaintiff. The reasonable time required to transport a car between the said two points was a material question of fact for the jury. The cases of AEtna...