American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 19134

• Court: Supreme Court of Utah
• Citation: 689 P.2d 1
• Docket Number: No. 19134,19134
• Parties: AMERICAN COAL CO., Emery Mining Corporation, and State Insurance Fund, Plaintiffs, v. Terry W. SANDSTROM, Industrial Commission of Utah, and Second Injury Fund, Defendants.
• Decision Date: 01 May 1984

Page 1

689 P.2d 1

AMERICAN COAL CO., Emery Mining Corporation, and State

Insurance Fund, Plaintiffs, v. Terry W. SANDSTROM, Industrial Commission of Utah, and Second Injury Fund, Defendants.

No. 19134.

Supreme Court of Utah.

May 1, 1984.

Fred Silvester, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs.

Virginius Dabney, Gilbert Martinez, Frank V. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for defendants.

HALL, Chief Justice:

The plaintiffs, American Coal Co., Emery Mining Corporation and the State Insurance Fund, seek reversal of an Industrial Commission order awarding workmen's compensation benefits to Terry W. Sandstrom, but refusing reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for medical benefits and temporary disability benefits paid by the Second Injury Fund to Sandstrom during the period of temporary disability.

Sandstrom sustained personal injury in four separate industrial accidents during the period between 1977 and 1981. The State Insurance Fund was the insurance carrier for each of Sandstrom's employers at the time of the accidents. As a result of the accidents, Sandstrom suffers from a total over-all impairment of 20% permanent partial disability of the whole man to his back and 10% permanent partial disability of the whole man to his neck. The parties stipulated that of the 20% loss of body function attributable to the back injuries, the subject matter of this appeal, 10% was attributable to the 1981 accident and 10% to pre-existing conditions resulting from the 1977 accident. Sandstrom did not seek or obtain compensation benefits for the injuries sustained in the 1977 accident.

The State Insurance Fund sought reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund for payments the State Insurance Fund had made for medical care and temporary total disability. The administrative law judge denied reimbursement, ruling that the 1981 amendments to U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-69(1) required that payment of temporary total disability benefits and medical benefits to Sandstrom up until the date of his stabilization be the exclusive responsibility of the employer and its carrier.

Plaintiffs filed a motion for review with the Industrial Commission of Utah. Review was denied and the administrative law judge's findings and conclusions were affirmed in their entirety. Plaintiffs sought this writ of review, contending that the State Insurance Fund is entitled to reimbursement for 50% of the temporary total disability benefits.

Prior to 1981, this Court determined that, pursuant to the provisions of U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-69(1), the Second Injury Fund was responsible, not only for the proportion of the permanent disability compensation attributable to the pre-existing condition, but also for its proportionate share of the medical expenses and the temporary total disability compensation. ¹ The language of the statute interpreted in those cases remains virtually the same. However, in 1981, the legislature added two paragraphs to § 35-1-69(1). It is the interpretation of the second of these additional paragraphs in light of the previously interpreted and substantially unaltered language that is the subject matter of this appeal.

Section 35-1-69(1), as amended, reads as follows:

If any employee who has previously incurred a permanent incapacity by accidental injury, disease, or congenital causes, sustains an industrial injury for which either compensation or medical care, or both, is provided by this title that results in permanent incapacity which is substantially greater than he would have incurred if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity, or which aggravates or is aggravated by such pre-existing incapacity, compensation, medical care, and other related items as outlined in section 35-1-81, shall be awarded on the basis of the combined injuries, but the liability of the employer for such compensation, medical care, and other related items shall be for the industrial injury only and the remainder shall be paid out of the second injury fund provided for in section 35-1-68(1).

For purposes of this section, (a) any aggravation of a pre-existing injury, disease, or congenital cause shall be deemed "substantially greater", and compensation, medical care, and other related items shall be awarded on the basis of the combined injuries as provided above; provided, however, that (b) where there is no such aggravation, no award for combined injuries shall be made unless the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial injury is 10% or greater and the percentage of permanent physical impairment resulting from all causes and conditions, including the industrial injury, is greater than 20%. Where the pre-existing incapacity referred to in subsection (1)(b) of this section previously has been compensated for, in whole or in part, as a permanent partial disability under this act or the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law, such compensation shall be deducted from the liability assessed to the second injury fund under this paragraph.

Where the payment of temporary disability benefits, medical expenses, or other related items are required as a result of the industrial injury subject to this section, the employer or its insurance carrier shall be responsible for all such temporary benefits, medical care, or other related items up to the end of the period of temporary total disability resulting from the industrial injury. Any allocation of disability benefits, medical care, or other related items following such period shall be made between the employer or its insurer and the second injury fund as provided for herein, and any payments made by the employer or its insurance carrier in excess of its proportionate share shall be recoverable at the time of the award for combined disabilities if any is made hereunder.

This Court's primary responsibility in construing legislation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. ² Where the legislature amends a portion of a statute, leaving other portions unamended, or re-enacts a portion without change, absent substantial evidence to the contrary, the legislature is presumed to have been satisfied with prior judicial constructions of the unaltered portions of the statute and to have adopted those constructions as consistent with its own intent. ³

The first paragraph of amended § 35-1-69(1), with the exception of minor wording changes unrelated to this appeal, is virtually unchanged in substance from the pre-1981 statute. The plain meaning of this paragraph controls the interpretation of the remainder of § 35-1-69(1). After defining a pre-existing injury, the said first paragraph goes on to state that compensation will be awarded on the basis of the combined injuries, but that "the liability of the employer for such compensation, medical care, and other related items shall be for the industrial injury only and the remainder shall be paid out of the second injury fund ...." (Emphasis added.) This language makes it clear that the employer is not liable for expenses incurred that are not a result of the industrial injury, and this Court has previously so interpreted it. ⁴

The Second Injury Fund relies entirely upon the first sentence of paragraph 3 for its interpretation that the Second Injury Fund is not liable for reimbursement for any temporary disability expenses. However, in light of the plain language of the first paragraph, the third paragraph cannot be interpreted as the Second Injury Fund suggests. Paragraph 3 clearly states that the employer and its insurance carrier are liable for all temporary disability expenses up until the period of that disability ends:

Where the...