American Coal Mining Co. v. Special Coal and Food Commission of Indiana

Citation268 F. 563
Decision Date02 October 1920
Docket Number347.
PartiesAMERICAN COAL MINING CO. v. SPECIAL COAL AND FOOD COMMISSION OF INDIANA et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Indiana

Charles Martindale, and Whitcomb & Dowden, all of Indianapolis, Ind and Cooper, Royse, Bogart & Gambill, of Terre Haute, Ind for plaintiff.

Ele Stansbury, Atty. Gen., for the State.

James W. Noel and Howard S. Young, both of Indianapolis, Ind., for Special Coal and Food Commission of Indiana and others.

Before BAKER and EVANS, Circuit Judges, and GIEGER, District Judge.

BAKER Circuit Judge.

Respecting the motion for a preliminary injunction, the court is of opinion that certain parts of the bill do not present any emergency. Granting that the plaintiff has the right, under the federal Constitution, to have its outstanding contracts protected from interference, it would be time enough to consider that question when an actual order is made by the commission, the effect of the enforcement of which would be to impair such contracts. Until that time the question, in our judgment, is purely moot.

Similarly in regard to the question of interference with interstate commerce, no order has been made which directs this or any other mining company to do any specific thing. When some order may hereafter be made by the commission, the plaintiff instead of finding itself damaged, may possibly find itself benefited. If the commission should direct the plaintiff to produce a maximum of 100,000 tons of coal for Indiana consumption, and the plaintiff should say, 'We have already arranged for a larger Indiana consumption,' certainly the plaintiff would not be injured by such an order; or, if the commission were to direct the plaintiff to dispose of 100,000 tons to Indiana consumers, at a price of $2.50 per ton, the plaintiff might very gratefully accept the order and say 'We had expected to charge only $2.25 a ton.'

We will not indulge in any presumption that orders, when they come to be issued, will in fact cause or threaten to cause any material damage to the plaintiff.

The question of the license fees the court would not deem a sufficient basis for the issuance of an injunction pendente lite, because as far as our information of the Indiana law goes, the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy by paying under protest, and bringing an action for the recovery of the amount paid, with interest; and the coal commission statute itself provides that none of the penalties shall be enforced while a civil question is being determined. Even if there should be a threat of enforcement of penal provisions, by reason of a refusal to obey some order of the commission, it would be time enough then to appeal to a court of equity, on the ground that no adequate remedy at law existed, and that there was an impending, actual threat of invasion of rights.

There is involved, however, in this application for a preliminary injunction, the one foundational question of the right of the state to touch, at all, the coal-mining business.

If no such right exists in the state, then the temporary injunction should be issued at once; and because there would be no questions of fact to controvert, a final decree in favor of the plaintiff should at once be entered, if there is a total lack of power in the state to create this commission, through which to undertake the control of coal mining.

Does such a power exist? Of course, it is elementary that our federal government is one of enumerated, specially defined powers, and powers essential to the execution of those specifically granted, and that out state governments are organized on the exact converse of that theory. The state has all the powers of an absolute, unrestrained sovereign, except so far as the state surrendered certain sovereign powers with which to constitute and create the federal government.

The Legislature of the state is the agent of the people of the state in exercising the people's powers as an absolute sovereignty. The Legislature is an absolutely free agent in exercising state powers, except in so far as its principals, the people, have expressed a limitation in the state Constitution. For the purpose of this federal inquiry it may be taken that the state Legislature had the full power of the people of the state of Indiana, and that the people of Indiana stood as absolute sovereigns over the persons and properties within the limits of the state, except in so far as those powers of sovereignty had been surrendered to the federal government. Among the powers surrendered, of course, was the power over interstate and foreign commerce, treaty making, the war power, and others. But there remained to the people of Indiana, as absolute sovereigns, the whole of the police power over matters within the state. That means the power of the people to determine upon measures for the public welfare, which may be expressed by the Legislature without any limitation that is not imposed upon the state by the federal Constitution.

In this present inquiry concerning the right of the plaintiff to a preliminary injunction, the only federal question presented is that which arises under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, according to my present memory, in 1868. In 1868 there was a certain circle within which a person had his life, his right to his physical being. Within that circle he had free movement, and it was not until he came to cross its periphery that he collided either with his fellowmen or with the government as a social organism. And similarly in 1868 there existed circles which circumscribed a person's business and property rights.

Now, did the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment mean that civilization was arrested at that date? Did it mean that the historian of the year 3000 would look back to the year 1868 as the time of the formation of a crystallized stratum of civilization in which, as in the geological stratum, he might find the footprints of the megatherium and the fossils of the dinosaurus? If that is true, then every attempt since 1868 to narrow the circle within which one was entitled to life has been in violation of the federal Constitution. If that is so, then every statute which created and defined a new crime and provided a punishment for it was unconstitutional. If that is so, then every time a new condition was imposed by which liberty of contract was restricted, and this circle was diminished in its area, the statute creating the condition was unconstitutional. Property is coupled with life and liberty. It is thereby entitled to equal consideration, but certainly to no greater. And therefore a state Legislature was just as free to limit the circle in which property rights stood as it was to diminish the circles in which life and liberty, freedom of contract, freedom of action, were circumscribed.

Of course, all the cases that have upheld any sort of state legislation since 1868, that has in fact diminished one's condition with his fellows and with the state, have necessarily meant that this Fourteenth Amendment did not fix a date line at which civilization should be considered as stratified and embodied in a dead layer.

To my mind there are two classes of cases that illustrate the right of the state to exercise its police power. Over on the one side fall all of the cases in which there is a public franchise, or a public service, or a public utility. Over on that side belong, also, innkeepers along with the carriers, and to that class was added, in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 24 L.Ed. 77, the warehouse, which had been a private warehouse. In such cases the right to exercise the police power is based upon the fact that they either had a public charter, exercising a public power, like that of eminent domain, or they were performing a public service.

But there are other cases in which none of these elements of a charter, or the power of eminent domain, or a public service, or a devotion of property to public use, appears.

How about the law in Indiana, back in 1881, that forbade a lightning rod expert to sell 40 rods to a farmer, and put them up on his barn, and go in and get the farmer to persuade or coerce his wife into signing as surety? In that case there was no charter, no franchise, no eminent domain, no public service, involved. It was purely an interference with the right of private contract, without the slightest excuse of the kind found over on the other side of the line. And what was the basis of it? The basis was the finding by the Legislature that wrongs and oppressions were being inflicted upon the married women of this state through the persuasion or duress of husbands or sons, and that the condition was of such consequence to the state, as an organized society, that a stop should be put to it; and so the Legislature passed the law (Rev. St. Ind. 1881, Sec. 5119) that any contract of suretyship of a married woman should be void. That act was passed since 1868. If the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment created a crystallized stratum, so that never thereafter could the right of contract be impaired, then that law was unconstitutional.

How about the laws, in this coal-mining industry, relating to the furnishing of timbers and props, and cages, and ventilation and the general taking away of the freedom of contract between the mine operators and the miners with respect to the conditions under which they shall work? Under those laws it was no longer permissible for them to barter about what should be done with respect to the conditions in the mines. There was an absolute standard fixed, and the mine operator was absolutely prohibited from doing certain things. Why that law? Because of the dominance of the operator it was found by the Legislature that the men needed...

To continue reading

Request your trial
8 cases
  • Bratberg v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., 5872.
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 23 Octubre 1931
    ...Van Deman & L. Co., 240 U. S. 342, 36 S. Ct. 370, 60 L. Ed. 679, L. R. A. 1917A, 421, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455;American Coal Min. Co. v. Special Coal & Food Commission (D. C.) 268 F. 563.” Continuing, the court said: “The legislative or police power is a dynamic agency, vague and undefined in i......
  • Folk v. Atty. Gen. of Commonwealth of Pa.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
    • 27 Marzo 2006
    ...possess all remaining `numerous and indefinite' powers.")(some quotations omitted); American Coal Mining Co. v. Special Coal and Food Commission of Indiana, 268 F. 563, 565 (D.Ind.1920)("it is elementary that our federal government is one of enumerated, specially defined powers, and powers ......
  • Laramie Irrigation & Power Co. v. Grant
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 21 Julio 1932
    ... ... taken by them. Am. Coal Min. Co. v. Ill. Com., 268 ... F. 563; (App ... report of a commission provided for by the legislature in ... 1905, for ... ...
  • Bratberg v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Company, Inc., a Corp.
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 22 Agosto 1931
    ... ... registered letter addressed to LaPorte, Indiana, ... and also at seller's branch place of ... platform to be fastened onto, or a special platform which we ... think we should have as we ... 370, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455; American Coal Min ... Co. v. Special Coal & Food ... The mining company ... on the other hand relies on the ... commission or omission of such agent, engineers, or other ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT