American Cyanamid Co. v. King Industries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 February 1993
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 87-0110-P.
• Citation: 814 F. Supp. 209
• Parties: AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. KING INDUSTRIES, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

814 F. Supp. 209

AMERICAN CYANAMID COMPANY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. KING INDUSTRIES, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 87-0110-P.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

February 8, 1993.

Deming E. Sherman, Edwards & Angell, Providence, RI, for plaintiffs.

Amato A. Deluca, Mandell, Goodman, DeLuca & Schwartz, Providence, RI, Michael V. Burns, Westport, CT, for defendant King Industries.

Paul V. Reynolds, Boyer, Reynolds & DeMarco, Ltd., Providence, RI, for defendants Gar Electroforming, Electroformers, Inc.

Roy P. Giarrusso, Louis N. Massery, Boston, MA, George David Caruolo, Pass, Caruolo & Conley, East Providence, RI, for defendant Mite Corp.

Bruce D. Todesco, Mark O. Denehy, Adler Pollock & Sheehan, Inc., John A. Baglini, Higgins & Slattery, Providence, RI, Jaclyn McKenney, Serino, Young, Ley & Grumbach, Boston, MA, for defendant Hercules Inc.

John J. Barton, Pamela C. Slater, Taylor, Anderson & Travers, Boston, MA, John A. Baglini, Higgins & Slattery, Providence, RI, for defendant Axton-Cross Co.

Robert G. Flanders, Jr., Flanders & Medeiros, Providence, RI, Peter John Sacripanti, Sidley & Austin, New York City, for defendant M & T Chemicals, Inc.

Berndt W. Anderson, Roberts, Carroll, Feldstein & Peirce, Inc., Providence, RI, Theodore L. Barrett, Anthony Herman, Covington & Burling, Washington, DC, for defendant J.T. Baker Chemical Co.

Mark T. Nugent, Rice, Dolan & Kershaw, Providence, RI, for defendant Keuffel & Esser Co.

Michael A. Leon, Ralph T. Lepore, III, Janice Kelley Rowan, Warner & Stackpole, Boston, MA, John A. Baglini, Higgins & Slattery, Providence, RI, for defendants Hoechst Celanese Corp., Ciba-Geigy Corp.

Thomas C. Plunkett, Kiernan, Plunkett & Redihan, Providence, RI, for defendant Allied Signal.

William R. Landry, Blish & Cavanagh, Providence, RI, for defendant Con-Lux Coatings, Inc.

Richard R. Steinmetz, Murtha, Cullina, Richter & Pinney, Hartford, CT, Christine M. Gravelle, Tillinghast, Collins & Graham, Providence, RI, R. Bradford Fawley, Murtha, Cullina, Richter & Pinney, Hartford, CT, for defendant E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co.

Gregory L. Benik, McGovern, Noel & Benik, Gerald J. Petros, Hinckley, Allen, Snyder & Comen, Providence, RI, for defendant Hammermill Paper Co.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PETTINE, Senior District Judge.

With the trial of this contribution action fast approaching, defendants have objected to, and appeal from, the December 2, 1992 Order of the Magistrate denying defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of Order Striking Jury Demand and For Award of Jury Trial. For the reasons stated below, I GRANT defendants' Motion for Reconsideration. Having determined that defendants are not entitled to a jury trial in this case, however, I DENY the Motion For Award of Jury Trial.

I

This case stems from a finding of liability under § 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9607, against the American Cyanamid Company and Rohm & Haas Company (the "plaintiffs") in O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F.Supp. 706 (D.R.I. 1988), aff'd, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071, 110 S.Ct. 1115, 107 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1990). Having been found jointly and severally liable for the unrecovered response costs relating to the Picillo Superfund Site, plaintiffs filed this contribution action pursuant to CERCLA § 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1), which allows parties found liable under § 107 to sue other "liable or potentially liable" persons.

On December 30, 1990, the plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike the Jury Demands of defendants Mite Corporation ("Mite"), Keuffel & Esser Co. ("Keuffel"), and Allied Chemical Corporation ("Allied") on the ground that contribution actions under § 113(f)(1) do not permit a trial by jury. Mite, Keuffel and Allied never objected to the Motion to Strike, and on January 30, 1991, this Court granted the plaintiffs' motion without a formal memorandum decision.

On October 26, 1992, defendants filed their Motion for Reconsideration of Order Striking Jury Trial Demand and for Award of Jury Trial. Defendants sought reconsideration of the Court's January 30, 1991 Order striking the jury demands, on the basis of a recently-issued case upholding a right to jury trial for contribution claims under § 113(f)(1). See United States v. Shaner, C.A. No. 85-1372, 1992 WL 154572, 1992 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 9000 (E.D.Pa. June 16, 1992). Alternatively, defendants requested that this Court exercise its discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(b) and award defendants a jury trial based on the teachings of In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d 15 (1st Cir.1982), and the Seventh Amendment.

On November 9, 1992, plaintiffs filed their opposition to defendants' motion, relying on waiver under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38, law of the case, and alleged errors in the reasoning of the Shaner decision and others cited by defendants as the grounds for their opposition.

The Motion was referred to the Magistrate and on December 2, 1992, he issued his Memorandum and Order denying defendants' motion, and adopting in large part the reasoning in the plaintiffs' opposition brief, including its conclusion that Shaner was incorrectly decided.

II

A

While this jury trial issue has reared its head at the proverbial eleventh hour, it is not one which I can dismiss with ease on procedural grounds. Although the Court is not generally inclined to reconsider a ruling made over two years ago, and, no less, without objection from the adversely affected party, the Constitution's fundamental solicitude for the right to a jury trial compels a reconsideration of the defendants' position. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted: "`Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care.'" Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501, 79 S.Ct. 948, 952, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959) (quoting Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486, 55 S.Ct. 296, 301, 79 L.Ed. 603 (1935)). With these words in mind, and with the prospect of a protracted proceeding ahead, I believe that this issue warrants more detailed attention. I therefore reject plaintiffs' waiver and law of the case objections, and GRANT defendants' Motion for Reconsideration.

B

The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that "in suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ..." U.S. Const. amend. VII. The right to a jury trial includes more than the common-law forms of action recognized in 1791 at the time of passage of the amendment. "The phrase `Suits at common law' refers to `suits in which legal rights are to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone are recognized, and equitable remedies are administered.'" Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564, 110 S.Ct. 1339, 1344, 108 L.Ed.2d 519 (1990) (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447, 7 L.Ed. 732 (1830)).

The right to jury trial also extends to causes of action created by Congress. Id. (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 1835, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987)). In actions enforcing statutory rights, the Seventh Amendment "requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law." Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 1008, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974). The determination involves an examination of "both the nature of the issues to be tried and the remedy sought," and the second inquiry —whether the remedy sought is legal or equitable in nature—"is the more important in our analysis." Wooddell v. Intern. Broth. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, ___ U.S. ___, ___ - ___, 112 S.Ct. 494, 497-98, 116 L.Ed.2d 419 (1991) (citations omitted).

Before engaging in a Seventh Amendment analysis, however, it is appropriate to examine the nature of the right to contribution created by § 113(f)(1) to determine whether it demonstrates Congress' intent to create a right to jury trial. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 417 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. at 1835 n. 3 (1987) (construction of statute may avoid constitutional question). Section 113(f)(1) provides in relevant part:

(1) CONTRIBUTION—Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a).... Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.... 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).

The statute does not expressly state whether an action under § 113(f)(1) is to be tried before a jury. While it provides that "the court may allocate response costs among liable parties" (emphasis added), the function of "resolving contribution claims" is not expressly assigned to a judge. In addition, the court's participation in the allocation function is described in discretionary terms, and the statute does not expressly restrict that function to the province of a judge. Thus, the statute itself cannot be construed as stating whether there is, or is not, a right to jury trial. See Pomon v. General Dynamics Corp., 574 F.Supp. 147, 149 (D.R.I.1983).

As this Court has previously noted, "that the statute does not expressly provide for jury trials does not end the matter. Legislative intent, if discernible, must be consulted." Turner v. Leesona Corp., 673 F.Supp. 67, 69 (D.R.I.1987) (citing Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 366, 94 S.Ct. 1723, 1725, 40 L.Ed.2d 198 (1974)). Section 113(f)(1) was added to CERCLA by the Superfund Amendments and...