American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams

• Decision Date: 19 October 1993
• Docket Number: No. IP 92 1673 C.,IP 92 1673 C.
• Citation: 839 F. Supp. 579
• Parties: AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Dorothy M. WILLIAMS and Antonya M. Williams, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

839 F. Supp. 579

AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. Dorothy M. WILLIAMS and Antonya M. Williams, Defendants.

No. IP 92 1673 C.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

October 19, 1993.

John W. Hammel, Yarling Robinson Hammel & Lamb, Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiff.

Gerald J. Sufleta, Indianapolis, IN, for defendants.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

McKINNEY, District Judge.

The plaintiff, American Family Mutual Insurance Company ("American"), has moved for summary judgment. The parties have filed their briefs and the issues are ready to be resolved. For the reasons discussed below, this Court GRANTS American's motion for summary judgment.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The parties do not dispute the facts. In December 1991, the defendants, Antonya M. Williams ("Antonya") and Dorothy M. Williams ("Dorothy") were married and residing in the same household in Indianapolis. On December 19, 1991, Antonya was driving a 1990 Chevrolet van on Interstate Highway 70, in Kansas. Dorothy and others were riding in the van as passengers. Near Goodland, Kansas, Antonya lost control of the van on a bridge and struck a guard rail, causing the van to roll two or three times. Dorothy was injured in the accident and has suffered medical expenses, pain, and suffering.

American is a Wisconsin corporation with its principal place of business in Madison, Wisconsin. American issued an automobile insurance policy for the van to Dorothy for the period October 21, 1991 to April 21, 1992 (the "Policy"). Dorothy claims that the Policy covers her injuries arising from the accident. On December 2, 1992, American formally denied Dorothy's claim under the Policy. According to American, Dorothy's claim was excluded by a provision in the Policy which provides that bodily injury to any person related to and residing in the same household with the operator of the van is not covered.

On December 3, 1993, American filed a complaint for declaratory relief with this Court. American seeks a declaration that: (1) the Policy provides no coverage for Dorothy for her claims against Antonya arising out of the accident on December 19, 1991; (2) American has no obligation to defend or assist in defending Antonya against Dorothy's claims arising out of the accident of December 19, 1991; and (3) that American has no obligation to pay or satisfy any part of any judgment that may be rendered in favor of Dorothy and against Antonya for Dorothy's injuries arising out of the accident on December 19, 1991.

On June 1, 1993, American filed its motion for summary judgment. According to American, pursuant to the provisions of the Policy and Indiana law, American is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On August 2, 1993, Dorothy filed her response to American's motion. Dorothy argues that summary judgment is improper because Kansas law applies to the parties' dispute. American filed its reply on August 17, 1993.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Although a party bringing a motion for summary judgment must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of fact for trial, if that burden is met, the party opposing the motion must come forward with evidence of a genuine factual dispute. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Mere conclusory assertions, whether made in pleadings or affidavits, are not sufficient to defeat a proper motion for summary judgment. First Commodity Traders, Inc. v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 766 F.2d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir.1985).

An issue is genuine only if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In other words, the disputed fact must be outcome determinative. See Hossman v. Spradlin, 812 F.2d 1019, 1020-21 (7th Cir.1987). The Court's inquiry asks whether a reasonable fact finder could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment. Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 925 F.2d 1007, 1008 (7th Cir.1991).

The substantive law identifies which facts are considered material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. Only factual disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit in light of the substantive law will preclude summary judgment; irrelevant or unnecessary disputes will not. Id.

If a motion for summary judgment is made and properly supported, an adverse party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials in its pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. An adverse party must set forth specific facts, supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material allowed under Rule 56, showing that a genuine issue exists. Id. If the adverse party fails to make such a response, summary judgment, if proper, shall be entered. Id.; Tobey v. Extel/JWP, Inc., 985 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir.1993).

Since the Supreme Court's trilogy of decisions on summary judgment, see Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265; Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202; and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), it is clear that entry of summary judgment is mandatory where the requirements of Rule 56 are met. See Herman v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 400, 404 (7th Cir.1989); Spellman v. Commissioner, 845 F.2d 148, 152 (7th Cir.1988).

This district has established a procedure for parties to follow in supporting or opposing a motion for summary judgment. Pursuant to S.D.Ind.LR 56.1, the movant shall include in its brief, or in an appendix to its brief, a statement of material facts that it contends there is no genuine issue. The movant must support its statement with appropriate citations to evidentiary materials. Id. The movant is also required to file, as separate documents, proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and a proposed summary judgment. Id. Any nonmovant who opposes the motion for summary judgment is required to file within fifteen days from the filing date of the summary judgment motion a brief in support of its opposition and any evidentiary materials controverting the movant's position. Id. In its brief, or in an appendix to its brief, the opposing nonmovant is required to include a statement of genuine issues setting forth all material facts over which it contends a genuine issue exists. Id. The nonmovant's statement must be supported by appropriate citations to evidentiary materials. Id. If the nonmovant fails to controvert the movant's statement of material facts that exist without genuine issue by filing a statement of genuine issues, "the Court will assume that the facts as claimed and supported by admissible evidence by the moving party are admitted to exist without controversy." Id. The purpose of LR 56.1 is for the parties to give notice of the factual support for their respective arguments. Mirocha v. TRW Inc., 805 F.Supp. 663, 675 (S.D.Ind.1992).

III. DISCUSSION

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case because the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000.00 and is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction). This Court has the authority to grant American the declaratory relief it seeks pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

A. CHOICE OF LAW

The first issue to be addressed is what state's law controls the parties' dispute. As a rule, a court in a diversity case must apply the substantive law of the forum in which it sits, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), including that pertaining to choice of law, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941), so this Court will apply Indiana's choice of law rules in making its determination of which state's law governs each claim.

Indiana has developed two sets of rules for making choice of law decisions. First, in contract actions, Indiana's choice of law rules require that the law of the state with the most significant contacts to the subject matter of the litigation be applied. W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 585, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423 (1945); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 579 N.E.2d 1328, 1330-31 (Ind.Ct. App.1991); Dohm & Nelke v. Wilson Foods Corp., 531 N.E.2d 512, 513 (Ind.Ct.App.1988). In considering which state has the most significant contacts, the parties' acts touching the transaction in relation to the several states involved are evaluated, including the place of contracting, the place of negotiation, the place of performance, the location of the subject matter, and the domicile, residence, place of incorporation or place of business of the parties. Eby v. York-Division, Borg-Warner, 455 N.E.2d 623, 626 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983).

The second set of rules pertains to tort-based claims...