American Fed. Gov. Employees, Local 2119 v. Cohen
| Decision Date | 23 August 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-4020.,97-4020. |
| Citation | 110 F.Supp.2d 752 |
| Parties | AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 2119; Tony Carnes; Katherine Cruz; Randall L. Engle; David Garrison; Daniel Hendrickx; Lowell Herrick, Jr.; DeWayne R. Lamp; Michael Luckey; Robert O. Morris; and Barbara Painter, Plaintiffs, v. William S. COHEN, Secretary of Defense, et al., Defendants, and General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc., Defendant-Intervenor. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Mr. Kevin M. Grile, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff.
Mr. Oliver J. Larson, Mr. Craig C. Martin, Jenner & Block, Chicago, IL, for General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc.
Now before the Court are a Motion for Summary Judgment by Plaintiffs and a Motion for Summary Judgment by the Federal Defendants, in which General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. ("General Dynamics") has joined. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment [# 48] is DENIED, and the Federal Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgement [# 60] is GRANTED.
The individual Plaintiffs are present or former civilian employees of the Department of the Army working at the Rock Island Arsenal (the "Arsenal") in Rock Island, Illinois. Plaintiff American Federation of Government Employees Local 2119 is certified as the exclusive labor representative for the bargaining unit of wage grade civilian employees at the Arsenal, including the individual Plaintiffs. According to Plaintiffs, there has been a reduction in civilian job positions at the Arsenal over the last several years due to a lack of workload. This reduction in force has resulted in certain civilian employees either being separated from federal employment or involuntarily placed in lower graded positions.
The Arsenal is owned by the United States, and the Federal Defendants are officials and/or officers of the United States Government. Plaintiffs brought suit against the Federal Defendants contending that the reductions in force were caused by one or more of their decisions to award two defense projects to General Dynamics and another private contractor in violation of certain procurement and contracting statutes, as well as the Arsenal Act. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the Department of the Army erred in allowing certain tank gun mounts and new ultralight howitzers to be produced by private contractors without a cost comparison showing that production at a Government-owned facility could not be done on an economical basis.
The Court previously dismissed this case for lack of standing. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal with respect to the identified procurement and contracting statutes, but remanded for consideration under the Arsenal Act. American Federation of Government Employees v. Cohen, 171 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 1999). Both Plaintiffs and the Federal Defendants have now moved for summary judgment, and General Dynamics has joined in the Federal Defendants' motion. The motions are fully briefed and ready for resolution. This Order follows.
A motion for summary judgment will be granted where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party has the responsibility of informing the Court of portions of the record or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party may meet its burden of showing an absence of material facts by demonstrating "that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 2553. Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial is resolved against the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1142 (7th Cir.1988).
If the moving party meets its burden, the non-moving party then has the burden of presenting specific facts to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and produce evidence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 106 S.Ct. at 2553. This Court must then determine whether there is a need for trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may be reasonably resolved in favor of either party. Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.
The Arsenal Act provides:
The Secretary of the Army shall have supplies needed for the Department of the Army made in factories or arsenals owned by the United States, so far as those factories or arsenals can make those supplies on an economical basis.
10 U.S.C. § 4532(a). This statute "appears to be aimed at preserving the government's in-house military production capabilities." American Federation, 171 F.3d at 473.
When reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute that it is charged with administering under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Court is guided by the standard outlined in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), and may set aside the agency action only if it is "`arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.'" United States v. Dierckman, 201 F.3d 915, 923 (7th Cir.2000), citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1999); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 191 F.3d 845, 851 (7th Cir. 1999). The Chevron analysis starts with the language of the statute itself, and if "`the plain meaning of the text of the statute either supports or opposes the regulation,' then inquiry ends, and this court applies the statute's plain meaning." Dierckman, 201 F.3d at 923, citing Solid Waste Agency, 191 F.3d at 851. If the statute is either silent on the issue or ambiguous, then "`the court must defer to the agency interpretation so long as it is based on a reasonable reading of the statute.'" Id.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are entitled to no relief under the Arsenal Act because the language of the statute is permissive rather than mandatory. However, the plain language of the statute opposes this interpretation. Dierckman, 201 F.3d at 923, citing Solid Waste Agency, 191 F.3d at 851.
"[W]hen resolving a dispute over the meaning of a statute, we look to the statute itself to determine whether the statute is plain and unambiguous with regard to the dispute." Connor v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 218 F.3d 733, 740 (7th Cir.2000). Courts are required to give effect to the "clear meaning" of statutes as written, and to the extend that "a statute speaks with clarity to an issue, judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished." Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475-76, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992). With this basic principle of construction in mind, the Court finds no ambiguity with respect to the mandatory nature of the statute as applied to the Secretary's acquisition of "supplies needed for the Department of the Army." The plain language of § 4532(a) states that the Secretary of the Army "shall" have such supplies made in factories or arsenals if they can be made on an economical basis. Furthermore, the language of a joint policy statement dated July 7, 1992, entitled "Army Industrial Manufacturing Policy" reveals that the Army in fact acknowledged the primarily mandatory nature of the Arsenal Act in stating that "[t]he Secretary of the Army is required to have such supplies manufactured in Government facilities so far as those facilities can make those supplies on an economical basis." AR 2769 (emphasis added.) See also, Opinion Letter from the Comptroller General of the United States dated December 15, 1960 at 5 ()
The mandatory nature of the Army's Arsenal Act seems even more clear when contrasted with the parallel statute applicable for the Air Force, which states:
The Secretary of the Air Force may have supplies needed for the Department of the Air Force made in factories, arsenals, or depots owned by the United States, so far as those factories, arsenals or depots can make those supplies on an economical basis.
10 U.S.C. § 9532 (emphasis added). Although § 9532 originally had the same mandatory "shall" language as the Army Arsenal Act, the Air Force statute was subsequently amended to change the word "shall" to "may" in 1951, after the Secretary of the Air Force successfully persuaded Congress that the statute's directives should be permissive rather than mandatory in recognition of a period of great expansion in the Air Force. Senate Report No. 426, 1951 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192, 2197. Had Congress intended to apply the same standard to the Army via § 4532, it would have been simple enough to amend the language when both acts were re-examined and re-codified in 1956. Yet the word "shall" has remained unchanged in § 4532 to this day, and Defendants' argument that § 4532 is plainly permissive to the point that it is essentially unreviewable must be rejected.
The fact that the Court has determined that the word "shall" is plainly mandatory in nature does not end the Court's inquiry, however, as the remainder of the statutory language, including the statute's scope and applicability, is not as clear. For example, the Act applies to "supplies," but...
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