American Fed. of State & County v. Com. of Va.

Decision Date13 December 1996
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 94-165-A.,Civil Action No. 96-013-A.,Civil Action No. 95-026-A.,Civil Action Nos. 95-057-A to 95-060-A.,Civil Action No. 95-027-A.,Civil Action No. 95-138-A.,Civil Action Nos. 95-005-A to 95-008-A.,Civil Action No. 95-098-A.,Civil Action No. 94-097-A.,Civil Action No. 94-153-A.,Civil Action No. 95-209-A.,Civil Action Nos. 96-009-A to 96-011-A.,Civil Action No. 96-111-A.
Citation949 F.Supp. 438
PartiesAMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, Virginia Alliance of State Employees, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

Jay Joseph Levit, John Bertram Mann, Richmond, VA, and John C. Dempsey, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

James S. Gilmore, III, Mark Ralph Davis, Gregory E. Lucyk, Catherine Currin Hammond, George Walerian Chabalewski, Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, VA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WILSON, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, employees of twenty-one Virginia prisons and mental health hospitals bring these actions against the Commonwealth of Virginia ("Commonwealth") for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.1 The Commonwealth has moved to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming it has immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs counter that Congress passed the FLSA pursuant to its authority under the Fourteenth Amendment and that Congress properly abrogated the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Alternatively, plaintiffs contend that the Commonwealth waived or may have waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, and they seek to engage in discovery to uncover evidence of that waiver. The court finds that it is without jurisdiction and that further discovery is unwarranted. Accordingly, the court grants the motion to dismiss.

I. Background

Each action challenges the compensation policies of a specific Virginia prison or mental health facility,2 and each individual plaintiff in each action is employed by the specified facility. Plaintiffs allege that the Commonwealth deprived them of compensation in violation of the FLSA by (1) under-crediting or not counting certain hours worked for purposes of overtime compensation, (2) unilaterally implementing an overtime pay system that requires employees to accept compensatory time in lieu of monetary compensation, (3) denying overtime compensation to employees deemed "exempt" from FLSA requirements, and (4) generally failing to provide employees with the rights and protections of the FLSA. Because the allegations in each case are identical, the court has consolidated them.

The Commonwealth originally moved to dismiss on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars these actions. In a Memorandum Opinion and Order of July 10, 1995 this court denied the Commonwealth's motion, finding that Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity and that, in enacting the FLSA, Congress had in fact abrogated that immunity. Since the court entered that opinion, however, the United States Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). Seminole Tribe overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2273, 105 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), the case which established Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. In light of Seminole Tribe, the Commonwealth filed a renewed motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs oppose the Commonwealth's motion. They maintain first that Seminole Tribe is not controlling because Congress enacted the FLSA, in part, pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; second, that the Commonwealth waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by participating in federally regulated activity; and, third, that the Commonwealth may have waived its immunity by participating in federal programs that require such a waiver and that the court should permit the plaintiffs to engage in discovery on that issue. The court first turns to the applicability of Seminole Tribe and then to the waiver and discovery issues.

II. Applicability and Impact of Seminole Tribe

The Eleventh Amendment generally deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to adjudicate suits against a state by its citizens or citizens of other states.3 See Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304, 110 S.Ct. 1868, 1872, 109 L.Ed.2d 264 (1990). The plaintiffs in these consolidated actions are Virginia citizens who seek money damages from the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Commonwealth contends that the Eleventh Amendment bars these actions, while plaintiffs maintain that, under the FLSA, Congress properly abrogated the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court finds that Congress intended, but lacked the constitutional authority, to abrogate that immunity.

The Supreme Court has held that Congress has the power, in limited circumstances, to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. In Seminole Tribe, the Court reiterated the two-part test to determine whether Congress has done so. First, Congress must unequivocally express its intent to abrogate that immunity and, second, Congress must have the constitutional power to abrogate it. Seminole Tribe, ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1118 (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68, 106 S.Ct. 423, 425-26, 88 L.Ed.2d 371 (1985)). This court has previously held that Congress, in enacting the FLSA, unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See AFSCME v. Virginia, Civil Action No. 94-097-A (W.D.Va. July 10, 1995). The remaining question is whether, in light of Seminole Tribe, Congress had the constitutional authority to do so.

Prior to Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court identified two sources of constitutional authority empowering Congress to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The first was Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [that amendment]." See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3145, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976)). The second was the Interstate Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 3. See Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 14-16, 109 S.Ct. at 2281-83. (plurality opinion). In Seminole Tribe, however, the Supreme Court expressly overruled Union Gas and instead held that the Commerce Clause does not give Congress power to abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Seminole Tribe, ___ U.S. at ___ - ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1131-32. Seminole Tribe's holding leaves Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as the only valid source of congressional power to abrogate. It follows that, absent a waiver, the Eleventh Amendment bars this action if the Commerce Clause alone supports the FLSA.

Plaintiffs contend that the 1974 amendments to the FLSA were intended to end invidious discrimination against state and local government workers, similar to Title VII civil rights legislation. Thus, according to plaintiffs, Congress acted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress' own words and the absence of any rational connection to the Fourteenth Amendment, however, tell a different story. In enacting the FLSA, Congress specifically stated its source of authority as the "power to regulate commerce among the several States...." 29 U.S.C.A. § 202(b) (West 1978). Congress again emphasized its authority under the Commerce Clause in passing the 1974 amendments to the FLSA, and mentioned no Fourteenth Amendment purpose either expressly or by implication, H.R.Rep. No. 93-913, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2812, and no Fourteenth Amendment purpose appears. Moreover, as the Sixth Circuit has noted, in order for a court to infer that Congress passed legislation to enforce a Fourteenth Amendment right, there must be a "sufficiently strong logical connection between the aims of the act — to increase the wages and shorten the hours of certain employees — and central, obvious Fourteenth Amendment concerns" of race, sex or national origin discrimination. Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 210 (6th Cir.1996). In this court's view, the plaintiffs' generalized theory that Congress intended the FLSA to end "discrimination" amounts to an unwarranted expansion of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to proscribe economic distinctions not related to race, sex or national origin. Simply put, the court finds no logical connection between the aims of the FLSA and "central, obvious Fourteenth Amendment concerns." Id. Thus, the court finds plaintiffs' argument unpersuasive and joins other courts that have found the FLSA is based on the Commerce Clause and has no support under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Wilson-Jones, 99 F.3d at 210; Long v. Constantine, No. 89-CV-887, 1996 WL 679721 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1996); Rehberg v. Dep't of Public Safety, 946 F.Supp. 741 (S.D.Iowa 1996); Chauvin v. State of Louisiana and Dep't of Wildlife and Fisheries, 937 F.Supp. 567 (E.D.La.1996); Close v. New York, No. 94-CV-0906, 1996 WL 481550 (N.D.N.Y. August 19, 1996); Arnold v. Arkansas, No. LR-C-94-177, ___ F.Supp. ___ (E.D.Ark. July 10, 1996); Adams v. Kansas, 934 F.Supp. 371 (D.Kan.1996); Raper v. Iowa, 940 F.Supp. 1421 (S.D.Iowa 1996); Moad v. Arkansas State Police, No. LR-C-94-450 (E.D.Ark. May 15, 1996). Accordingly, this court is without jurisdiction to hear these cases unless the Commonwealth has waived its sovereign immunity. The court now turns to that issue.

III. Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity and Discovery

Even if Congress is without power to abrogate Eleventh...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Beasley v. Alabama State University
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • March 23, 1998
    ...F.3d 31, 39-41 (2d Cir.1997); Digiore v. Illinois, 962 F.Supp. 1064, 1075 (N.D.Ill.1997); American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v. Virginia, 949 F.Supp. 438, 442 (W.D.Va.1996). Whether or not these courts are correct is immaterial to the analysis here, however. This co......
  • Abril v. Com. of Virginia
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • May 21, 1998
    ...Eleventh Amendment immunity to federal FLSA actions and had unequivocally done so by its 1974 amendments to that Act. See 949 F.Supp. 438, 440 (W.D.Va.1996) (reciting procedural Following an unsuccessful effort by the Commonwealth to obtain interlocutory review of that decision, and while t......
  • At & T Com. of South Cent. States v. Bellsouth
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana
    • March 29, 1999
    ...Digiore v. Illinois, 962 F.Supp. 1064, 1075 (N.D.Ill.1997) American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees, AFL—CIO v. Com. of Virginia, 949 F.Supp. 438, 442 (W.D.Va.1996). See Footnote 33 for examples of cases ruling that constructive waiver is still applicable. 33. See BellSouth's Brie......
  • Digiore v. State of Ill.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • March 27, 1997
    ...Texas, 1997 WL 124220, at *5 (S.D.Tex. Mar.13, 1997); Bergemann, 958 F.Supp. at 67-68; American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Virginia, 949 F.Supp. 438, 441 (W.D.Va.1996) ("[A]bsent a waiver, the Eleventh Amendment bars this action if the Commerce Clause alon......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT