American Federation of Lab. v. Western Union Tel. Co.

• Citation: 179 F.2d 535
• Decision Date: 31 January 1950
• Docket Number: No. 10955.,10955.
• Parties: AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

179 F.2d 535 (1950)

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO.

No. 10955.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

January 31, 1950.

Thurlow Smoot, Cleveland, Ohio (Frank Bloom, Washington, D. C., Smoot & Riemer, Cleveland, Ohio, on the brief), for appellant.

Robert M. Weh, Cleveland, Ohio (Robert M. Weh, Burgess, Fulton & Fullmer, Cleveland, Ohio, on the brief), for appellee.

Before HICKS, Chief Judge, MARTIN and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

MARTIN, Circuit Judge.

In this action, brought in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, the defendant, Western Union Telegraph Company, filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground that "the Court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter." Judge Wilkin entered the following ruling in writing: "Having considered the defendant's motion to dismiss, the same is hereby sustained." Subsequently, the Chief Judge for the district entered this order: "The court having heretofore sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss, it is therefore ordered that the complaint herein is hereby dismissed at plaintiff's costs." The record is bare of any pronouncement by the district court of any reasons for dismissing the action. The American Federation of Labor, plaintiff below, has appealed from the ipse dixit order of dismissal.

The summary action of the district court foreclosed the introduction of any evidence. We must look to the complaint alone, therefore, to determine whether the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain it.

At the outset, it should be observed that jurisdiction is not rested upon diversity of citizenship. In its first numbered paragraph, the complaint asserts that jurisdiction of the United States District Court is based on section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Title 29 U.S. C.A. § 185, and on the Declaratory Judgment Act, section 274(d) of the Judicial Code, as amended, Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 400, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201, 2202.

Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, provides in the first three paragraphs, as follows: "(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

"(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act and any employer whose activities affect commerce as defined in this Act shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.

"(c) For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or against labor organizations in the district courts of the United States, district courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which such organization maintains its principal office, or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in representing or acting for employee members."

This Act makes it plain that the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties in no wise affects the jurisdiction of the United States District Court in actions for violation of contracts between an employer and the collective bargaining agency representing its employees; that such actions may be brought in any district where duly authorized officers or agents of such labor organization are engaged in representing or acting for employee members; and that a labor organization may sue in a United States court in behalf of employees whom it represents. The complaint herein is a well drawn pleading and sets forth in detail the factual basis upon which relief is sought in the United States court.

It is well settled that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted, unless it appears certain that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts proved in support of his claim as stated. This principle has been applied in actions brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. Stratton v. Farmers Produce Co., 8 Cir., 134 F.2d 825, 827; Manosky v. Bethlehem-Hingham Shipyard, 1 Cir., 177 F.2d 529; Clyde v. Broderick, 10 Cir., 144 F.2d 348.

The complaint avers that the appellant labor organization is and has been at all material times duly certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive bargaining representative of more than forty thousand employees of the appellee, including employees in its Cleveland, Ohio, office and specifically Mae Hart, formerly employed there as a telephone operator. The further allegation is made that authorized agents of appellant are engaged in representing employees of appellee in the judicial district of the United States in which the action was brought. This allegation meets the requirements stated in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, supra, to vest jurisdiction in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio if the complaint presents a suit for violation of contract between the Western Union and the American Federation of Labor.

The complaint alleges that appellant and appellee entered into two collective bargaining agreements in writing, effective respectively as of April 1, 1946, and April 1, 1947. Both agreements, in material part annexed as exhibits to the complaint, fix the terms and conditions of employment...