American Federation of Technical Engineers, Local 144 v. La Jeunesse, 47414
| Citation | 63 Ill.2d 263,347 N.E.2d 712 |
| Decision Date | 29 March 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 47414,47414 |
| Parties | , 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2125, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2573, 80 Lab.Cas. P 54,023, 81 Lab.Cas. P 55,025 AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TECHNICAL ENGINEERS, LOCAL 144, Appellee, v. Thomas A. LA JEUNESSE et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
E. Allan Kovar and Christopher B. Nelson, of Schiff, Hardin & Waite, Chicago, for appellants.
Gilbert Feldman, of Kleiman, Cornfield & Feldman, Chicago, for appellee.
We granted the defendants leave to appeal under our Rule 315 (58 Ill.2d R. 315) from a judgment of the appellate court reversing the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint in the circuit court of Cook County. The appellate court held that the plaintiff, a union and a voluntary unincorporated association, had capacity to bring in its own name a representative suit in law. 25 Ill.App.3d 765, 324 N.E.2d 23.
On January 19, 1972, the plaintiff, Local 144, American Federation of Technical Engineers, by Fred Bowen, its president, filed a complaint in the law division of the circuit court of Cook County seeking to recover monetary fines which had been assessed against the defendants, Thomas A. La Jeunesse and other members of the union, and to recover costs and attorneys' fees. The complaint alleged that the defendants had violated the union's constitution and bylaws when they disobeyed instructions from the union to honor a lawful strike and picket line. The complaint further alleged that fines had been assessed under the union's disciplinary procedures and that each of the defendants had failed to pay his fine. On the defendants' motion the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground the plaintiff lacked capacity to bring an action in law in its own name or in a representative suit.
A little more than six months later, on August 9, 1972, the union through its president, Fred Bowen, filed an amended complaint in equity containing substantially the same allegations. The complaint did not, however, seek judgment against each defendant in the amount of his unpaid fine, but prayed for an order directing the defendants to specifically perform their constitution and bylaws by paying the fines assessed against them. On the defendants' motion the trial court dismissed the amended complaint for the want of equity, holding that the remedy of specific performance to enforce a contract based on the union constitution and bylaws did not lie when only a payment of money was sought.
The appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the complaint. It held that in view of the merger of law and equity (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 110, par. 31) and section 9 of article VI of the Constitution of 1970, which confers on the circuit court jurisdiction in all justiciable matters (Ill.Const.1970, art. VI, sec. 9), an unincorporated association had the right to bring a representative suit in law to recover damages.
It has been generally held that an unincorporated association has no separate legal existence independent of the members who compose it. (Chicago Grain Trimmer's Association v. Murphy, 389 Ill. 102, 107, 58 N.E.2d 906; Butler Manufacturing Co. v. Department of Finance, 383 Ill. 220, 228, 49 N.E.2d 31.) Thus, the common law rule was that a voluntary unincorporated association could not sue or be sued in its own name. If an action was to be brought by or against the association it was necessary that all members be joined as parties. (Guiffoil v. Arthur, 158 Ill. 600, 604, 41 N.E. 1009; M. Forkosch, A Treatise on Labor Law 231--32 (2d ed. 1965).) This has been the generally accepted rule in Illinois. See Burkhart v. Illinois Power Co., 9 Ill.App.3d 139, 291 N.E.2d 673; Boozer v. Local 457, UAW, 4 Ill.App.3d 611, 279 N.E.2d 428; Murley v. Painter's Local 147, 133 Ill.App.2d 578, 273 N.E.2d 538; Collins v. Barry, 11 Ill.App.2d 119, 136 N.E.2d 597; Montgomery Ward and Co. v. Franklin Union, Local No. 4, 323 Ill.App. 590, 56 N.E.2d 476; Cahill v. Plumber's Local 93, 238 Ill.App. 132; Merchant's Underwriters v. Parkhurst-Davis Mercantile Co., 131 Ill.App. 617.
In a number of jurisdictions the rule has been changed, usually through legislation. (See Forkosch, The Legal Status and Suability of Labor Organizations, 28 Temple L.Q. 1 (1954).) At this time in Illinois there is a statute which permits certain unincorporated associations to sue and be sued in their own name in actions concerning their real estate. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 30, par. 185.) If there are to be additional changes in the rule it should come through legislative action.
An exception to the general rule was developed in equity which allowed a representative suit to be brought in the names of a portion of the members of the association who were suing for themselves and also in behalf of all other members of the association. (Guilfoil v. Arthur, 158 Ill. 600, 606, 41 N.E. 1009; Carpenters' Union v. Citizens' Committee to Enforce the Landis Award, 333 Ill. 225, 254, 164 N.E. 393; S. Puterbaugh, 1 Illinois Chancery Pleading and Practice 96--97 (7th ed. 1930).) In Carpenters' Union this court stated:
'Had the union been incorporated the bill might have been filed by the corporation in its own name in behalf of all its members, but, being a voluntary, unincorporated association, the bill might be maintained by the members of the association in their names, or where, as in this case, the members are numerous and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, the suit may be brought in the name of some of the members suing in behalf of all of the members, or it may be brought by the officers of the association or a committee appointed or authorized to prosecute it.' 333 Ill. 225, 254, 164 N.E. 393, 403.
While unincorporated associations have thus been permitted to bring representative suits in equity, representative suits at law have not been allowed. (Cox v. Shupe, 41 Ill.App.2d 413, 420--21, 191 N.E.2d 250; Tornquist, Roadmap to Illinois Class Actions, 5 Loyola U.L.J. 45, 61 (1974).) In 1 Nichols Illinois Civil Practice, section 281 (1961), it is said: 'There is no authority for an action at law against a defendant in a representative capacity or for an action at law by a plaintiff in a representative capacity.' It is true that where the right to equitable relief is established the court may consider incidental legal matters so as to be in a position to grant full relief. (Steele v. Rosehill Cemetery Co., 370 Ill. 405, 408, 19 N.E.2d 189.) However, unless the court has jurisdiction in equity there is no jurisdiction to award money damages or provide other legal relief. (Turek v. Mahoney, 407 Ill. 476, 483, 95 N.E.2d 330; Webster v. Hall, 388 Ill. 401, 408--09, 58 N.E.2d 575; O'Donnell v. Henley, 327 Ill. 406, 411, 158 N.E. 692; Fleming v. Reheis, 275 Ill. 132, 137, 113 N.E. 923; Patterson v. Patterson, 251 Ill. 153, 182--83, 95 N.E. 1051; O'Shaughnessy, Suits in Equity Contrasted with Actions at Law, 1954 U.Ill.L.F. 1, 19.) This court in Webster v. Hall stated: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial