American Meat Institute v. Ball

• Decision Date: 20 August 1981
• Docket Number: No. G75-39.,G75-39.
• Parties: AMERICAN MEAT INSTITUTE, Plaintiff, v. Dale B. BALL, Replaced by Dean M. Pridgeon, Director of the Department of Agriculture of the State of Michigan and Edward C. Heffron, Chief of the Food Inspection Division of the Michigan Department of Agriculture, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

520 F. Supp. 929

AMERICAN MEAT INSTITUTE, Plaintiff, v. Dale B. BALL, Replaced by Dean M. Pridgeon, Director of the Department of Agriculture of the State of Michigan and Edward C. Heffron, Chief of the Food Inspection Division of the Michigan Department of Agriculture, Defendants.

No. G75-39.

United States District Court, W. D. Michigan, S. D.

August 20, 1981.

Richard B. Foster, David Vander Haagen, Lansing, Mich., J. Stanley Stroud, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

Harry G. Iwasko, Jr., Robert Ianni, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, Mich., for defendants.

OPINION

ENSLEN, District Judge.

This case was originally before Judge Noel Fox who issued a partial summary judgment dismissing Count I of this Complaint that Section 4a of the Michigan Comminuted Meat Law, 1973 P.A. 143, M.C.L. § 289.584a; M.S.A. § 12.964(4.1) violated the Supremacy Clause. Plaintiff, representing seven meat producers, stated that Congress had preempted the entire marking and labeling field for federally inspected meat and meat food products when, in Section 408 of the Wholesome Meat Act, 21 U.S.C. § 678, it declared, in material part, that:

... Marking, labeling, packaging, or ingredient requirements in addition to, or different than, those made under this chapter may not be imposed by any State or Territory or the District of Columbia with respect to articles prepared at any establishment under inspection in accordance with the requirements of subchapter I of this chapter...

Although Michigan has imposed its ingredient standards since 1952, the Michigan Comminuted Meat Law did not become effective until 1974. This Michigan statute provides as follows:

(1) A person shall not sell or offer for retail sale a product which is not manufactured to the ingredient standards of this act unless the federal government preempts Michigan's ingredient standards. In that case federally inspected meats not meeting the ingredient requirements of this act must be prominently identified in the display area where they are offered for sale.

(2) The identification shall consist of a sign not less than 18 by 24 inches with the heading to read: `The following products do not meet Michigan's high meat ingredient standards but do meet lower federal standards,' printed in letters not less than 1½ inches high. The name of the manufacturer or distributor and the specific name of that product shall be carried on the sign in letters not less than ½ inch high. All letters and numerals in the sign shall be in red on a yellow background.

(3) When sold or offered for sale from a retail sales display, vending machine, or bulk container, the required placard shall be clearly visible to a customer.

(4) When sold or offered for sale in a food service establishment or other public eating place, the required information must be on a placard as described above, or printed on the menu in type and lettering similar to, and as prominent as, that normally used to designate the serving of other food items.

Plaintiff contends that, even if the language of this statute, as Judge Fox ruled, does not constitute labeling as defined by the Act, but is merely a notification requirement and an exercise of commercial speech protected by the First Amendment, it nonetheless violates the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, and imposes ingredient standards on meat and meat products traveling in interstate commerce in violation of the Wholesome Meat Act.¹

Among other things, Plaintiff alleges that these sign posting requirements are discriminatory, in effect, in that they operate as intended: (1) to discriminate against federally inspected meat food products in favor of Michigan-produced products, thus unduly burdening interstate commerce as there is no extra cost for Michigan producers to conform to the Michigan statute, while there are increased costs to out of state producers who wish to sell products in Michigan; and (2) as there are virtually no retailers wishing to sell meat products which require posting of a placard, Michigan has not provided consumers with information to exercise freedom of choice, but has succeeded in enforcing preempted ingredient standards. The United States, which has filed an amicus curiae brief in this action, contends that the Michigan requirement violates Congress' clearly manifested intent to preempt the field, and as the sign requirement only applies to out of state producers, it has an inherently discriminatory effect.

The major differences between the federal and Michigan ingredient requirements which have prompted enforcement actions by the Michigan Department of Agriculture under Section 4a are that: (1) the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and the United States Department of Agriculture regulations (USDA) permit poultry to be used in combination with red meat in certain sausage products; while the Michigan Comminuted Meat Law permits the use of either poultry or red meat, but not a combination thereof in Grade 1 sausage; (2) federal law permits the use of certain meat by-products, cheese and soya products in various sausages, while Michigan does not permit such ingredients in Grade 1 sausage, although it does permit them in various other comminuted meat products; and (3) federal law subjects comminuted beef to a 30 percent fat limitation, and permits it to be called "ground beef", "hamburger" or with the addition of binders, extenders, or seasonings "beef patties" while Michigan law requires that comminuted beef be called "ground beef" if it contains not more than 20 percent fat, or "hamburger" if it contains not more than 30 percent fat and makes no provision for "beef patties". As the federal standards are designated as wholesome, Plaintiff argues that the truth of the language on the placard is irrelevant to the issue. Defendants assert that there is a legitimate state interest in consumer protection, and that they have a valid right to provide truthful notification to consumers to minimize confusion in the marketplace. Thus, Defendants assert that the federal standards merely assure a minimum uniformity and do not prohibit a state from enforcing higher ingredient and inspection standards for its intrastate producers and insuring that purchasers of meat products are informed of that fact.

Acknowledging that the Michigan requirement does not explicitly prohibit producers from selling non-conforming products, Plaintiff categorizes the sign as pejorative of the federal standards and cites Best & Company v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 61 S.Ct. 334, 85 L.Ed. 275 (1940) for the proposition that the Commerce Clause forbids discrimination whether forthright or ingenious. Affidavits from Armour, Dubuque Packing, Hormel & Company, Libby, John Morrell & Company, Pierre Frozen Foods, Inc. state that, by vigorous enforcement of the sign requirements, Michigan has succeeded in restricting interstate flow of commerce in meat products. Plaintiff further alleges that Michigan has not only enforced Section 4a against the by-products that are deemed most offensive; i. e. snout, entrails, udders, etc., but also against soya protein or hydrolized vegetable protein or beef hearts, none of which ingredients are forbidden in all Michigan inspected meat products by the Michigan Comminuted Meat Law. Michigan does permit some of these by-products in certain specialty items which are clearly described as such. For example, head cheese, blood sausage and liver sausage utilize ingredients otherwise prohibited by the Michigan statute.

While emphasizing the position that Michigan's placard requirement is a per se prohibited discrimination against articles of commerce because of their out of state origin, Plaintiff also contends that Michigan has no significant local interest to protect which then permits a balancing of legitimate considerations.

I find after listening to oral argument and considering the record, that a final determination of whether Michigan does have a local interest to protect, and to require the balancing of legitimate interests of the State and the burdens on interstate commerce must await trial. I am not convinced that the manifest intent of Congress in enacting the Wholesome Meat Act is to prevent the consumer information that is provided by these placards. Plaintiff alleges that even if Michigan has a significant local interest, reasonable non-discriminatory alternatives exist to protect these legitimate concerns. Thus, Plaintiff acknowledges that Michigan has a right to inform its consuming public that Plaintiff's products conform to the federal standards and may contain ingredients deemed offensive by some. It is the manner in which this information is conveyed and its attendant effect on interstate commerce that form the basis of this dispute. It appears to me that there are potentially conflicting constitutional considerations to be evaluated in this action. Whether Michigan has adopted the placard for a legitimate rather than a protective purpose, whether Michigan has other alternatives which are reasonable and non-discriminatory and which do not impair the First Amendment right to free speech, and whether there is a substantial burden on interstate commerce to preclude consideration of local interests are questions to be answered after the facts are illuminated at trial.

Plaintiff, in oral argument, asserts that the truth of the Michigan placard requirement is irrelevant—that the discriminatory effect on commerce is the determinative factor for the Court to consider. However, I find that, while there are many facets of this issue to be considered before arriving at an ultimate conclusion, the factual basis for the language on the placard is significant. I find that, in all respects, a democracy is premised upon an educated citizenry, and that it is no less important for a citizen to have access to information about the quality of the food that he ingests...