American Mfg. Co. v. City of St. Louis

• Citation: 270 Mo. 40,192 S.W. 402
• Decision Date: 29 January 1917
• Docket Number: No. 18184.,18184.
• Parties: AMERICAN MFG. CO. v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

192 S.W. 402

270 Mo. 40

AMERICAN MFG. CO. v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS.

No. 18184.

Supreme Court of Missouri. In Banc.

January 29, 1917.

Motions for Rehearing and to Modify Judgment Overruled February 13, 1917.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Wilson A. Taylor, Judge.

Action by the American Manufacturing Company against the City of St. Louis. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded, with directions to enter judgment in accordance with the view of the opinion.

Charles H. Daues and Truman P. Young, both of St. Louis, for appellant. Barclay & Wallace, of St. Louis, for respondent.

BROWN, C.

This case, like the one numbered 18185 (192 S. W. 399) decided at this term, is to recover license taxes paid the city of St. Louis by the plaintiff, a corporation of West Virginia of the same name as, and successor to, the plaintiff in the other case, in the manufacture of jute bagging.

The questions raised in this appeal are the same as those raised in the other case, with the addition that in this case the tax exacted for manufacturers' license was extended upon sales of goods manufactured in the city of St. Louis, and warehoused outside the state of Missouri, and sold and delivered from such warehouses to customers outside the state, for which, with other items not now in dispute, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff with interest at 6 per cent. from the date of payment.

The sales in dispute were described in the plaintiff's return as follows:

"Sales made through St. Louis office and filled from stock made in St. Louis, but shipped from points other than St. Louis to states other than Missouri."

In its evidence its bookkeeper and cashier explained this by saying that the company had a dozen warehouses in St. Louis, that he did not know how many there were in New York, and that the bagging is stored in St. Louis as long as the company can find a warehouse to take it, and when the local capacity is exhausted it ships to Memphis or points like New Orleans, from which places orders are filled from goods made in St. Louis, which may lie there for a year.

In its letter June 23, 1910, transmitting a check tendered as payment of its license tax, the respondent wrote:

"In explanation of the small aggregate amount of our sales for the year ending June 1, 1910, we would say that during that year the principal selling office of this company has not been in the city of St. Louis, as had been the case in prior years."

And in a letter of July 21, 1910, made the following additional explanation:

"Since our report for year ending June 30, 1909, was made, we made a very material change in our method of doing business with our home office in New York, so that substantially all our sales, though negotiated here, of merchandise stored in this and other cities, are confirmed by and are not effective until they are confirmed by the home office in New York. We are advised by our counsel that sales so made are not taxable in the city of St. Louis."

The matters at issue in this appeal are: (1) Whether the circumstances under which the payment was made were voluntary or involuntary with respect to the right to recover it back; (2) whether interest was recoverable; and (3) whether the city had the right to levy the license tax based on the amount of these sales.

We have stated these questions in the order named because the first two are decided by us in the other case, in which they were presented upon precisely similar facts and with the same arguments, and we see no reason to modify the opinion there expressed.

The important question relates to the nature of the tax, for the defendant city has not the right to levy a direct tax upon subjects of taxation outside the state from which it holds its powers. These subjects are persons, property, and business, and each must be situated within the jurisdiction of the taxing power to authorize its exercise. The vital difference between these parties is whether the tax in question is a tax upon business done in the city of St. Louis or upon property situated in states other than Missouri. The dividing line must be definite however; for, if a part of the subject upon which the tax is sought to be imposed is situated in another state, we have no data by which it can be apportioned, and, as is said by Judge Cooley (1 Cooley on Taxation, 25):

"The power of taxation, however vast in its character and searching in its extent, is necessarily limited to subjects within the jurisdiction of the state."

On the other hand, the state may exercise this sovereign right with respect to all persons, things, and business activities which exist under the protection of its laws, and, as is said by the same...