American Nat. Red Cross v. Department of Employment
Citation | 263 F. Supp. 581 |
Decision Date | 08 September 1965 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 8233. |
Parties | The AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, and Bernard E. Teets, Executive Director of Employment of the Department of Employment, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
William Massar, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., John L. Currin, Gen. Counsellor's Office, American National Red Cross, Washington, D. C., and Jack D. Henderson, Denver, Colo., for plaintiff.
James D. McKevitt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, Colo., for defendants.
Before SETH, Circuit Judge, and ARRAJ and CHILSON, District Judges.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This matter came on for trial to this District Court of three judges on June 30, 1965. The Court heard the evidence and argument of counsel and is now duly advised.
This is an action by the United States and The American National Red Cross, hereinafter referred to as "Red Cross", against the Department of Employment of the State of Colorado and its Executive Director, hereinafter referred to as the "Department".
The action seeks to have the Colorado Employment Security Act, Chapter 82 Colorado Revised Statutes 1953, declared inapplicable to the Red Cross and seeks a refund of all sums collected under the Act from the Red Cross.
Briefly stated the contentions of the parties are as follows.
Plaintiffs contend that Red Cross is an instrumentality of the United States, and as such is immune from taxation by Colorado, and Congress has not waived that immunity.
Defendants contend that the Red Cross is not an instrumentality of the United States and in any event, Congress has, by the 1960 amendments to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, waived whatever immunity Red Cross had with respect to the application of the Colorado Employment Security Act.
The issues as set forth in the pre-trial order are as follows:
There is little dispute as to the facts. The pre-trial order contains the following statement of uncontroverted facts:
In addition, it was admitted by the defendants at the trial that the local chapters of the Red Cross have no legal entity apart from the plaintiff, The American National Red Cross.
The Court incorporates in its findings of fact the foregoing uncontroverted facts and admission, and in addition thereto finds the following facts.
The Red Cross' charter designates it as the organization authorized to act in matters of relief under the Treaties of Geneva and to perform all duties devolved upon a national society by each nation which has acceded to any of said treaties or conventions.
In addition, it is authorized to act in matters of voluntary relief and as a medium of communication between the people of the United States and their armed forces.
By the provisions of Title 10 United States Code, § 2602, the President may accept the cooperation and assistance of the Red Cross and employ it under the armed forces under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, and pursuant to this statute the President has so utilized the Red Cross.
The Red Cross is the authorized agency for communication with prisoners of war held by unfriendly governments.
In addition to these services performed for and on behalf of the United States Government, the Red Cross is also authorized to and does carry on a system of national and international relief in time of peace and apply the same in mitigating the sufferings caused by pestilence, fire, famine, floods, and other great national calamities, and devise and carry on measures for preventing the same.
The Court concludes it has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action and of the parties thereto.
The Court concludes that the local chapters of The American National Red Cross are not separate legal entities but are integral parts of the plaintiff The American National Red Cross.
The Court concludes that The American National Red Cross is an instrumentality of the United States, and as such is immune from taxation under the Colorado Employment Security Act, unless that immunity has been waived by the 1960 amendments to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act.
The Court concludes that the United States of America has a legal interest in this litigation and is a proper party plaintiff to this action.
The Court concludes that the 1960 amendments to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act do not waive the immunity of the Red Cross from taxation under the Colorado Employment Security Act.
The reasons for the Court's conclusions in the latter respect are as follows:
The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (Chapter 23 of Title 26 U.S.C.) imposes a federal tax upon employment to provide a fund for unemployment compensation. However, the act recognizes the right of the states...
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Murgia v. Commonwealth of Mass. Bd. of Retirement
...954; Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U.S. 355, 357, 87 S.Ct. 464, 17 L.Ed.2d 414, aff'g American National Red Cross v. Department of Employment, D.C., 263 F.Supp. 581. At the least, the decision to retain three-judge jurisdiction may be within our discretion, see Jenkins v. M......
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...to exhaust available administrative and state judicial remedies. The three-judge federal District Court, American National Red Cross v. Department of Employment, 263 F.Supp. 581, ruled in favor of the Red Cross and the United States on each of these issues, ordered a refund of taxes already......
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