American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty
| Decision Date | 14 June 1900 |
| Citation | 102 F. 565 |
| Parties | AMERICAN SCHOOL OF MAGNETIC HEALING v. McANNULTY. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Harkless O'Grady & Crysler (F. N. Judson and David Overmyer, on the brief), for complainants.
William Warner, U.S. Atty., and Edward A. Rozier, U.S. Atty., for defendant.
On May 15, 1900, the postmaster genera, in pursuance of section 2 of an act of congress approved September 19, 1890 (26 Stat. 466 c. 908), and by authority of section 4 of another act approved March 2, 1895 (28 Stat. 964, c. 191), directed J. M McAnnulty, the defendant above named, who is postmaster at Nevada, Mo., to return to the senders thereof 'all letters, whether registered or not,' which arrived at said office addressed to the above-named complainants, and to stamp thereon the word 'Fraudulent,' or to transmit said letters to the dead-letter office at Washington, D.C to be disposed of as other dead matter, under the laws relating thereto, when there was nothing on said letters to indicate who were the senders of the same. This order contained a finding by the postmaster general, in accordance with the acts of congress above mentioned, that it had been made to appear upon evidence satisfactory to him that the American School of Magnetic Healing, S. A. Weltmer, the president thereof, and J. H. Kelly, its secretary, were engaged at Nevada, Mo., in conducting a scheme or device for obtaining money through the mails by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises. A bill of complaint was thereupon filed by the complainants herein, they being the same persons whose mail was interrupted by the aforesaid order, the object of said bill being to obtain an injunction restraining the postmaster at Nevada from obeying said order. A rule to show cause why a temporary injunction as prayed for should not be awarded has been duly issued and served, and the question to be determined at this time is whether the complainants, on the showing made, are entitled to the interlocutory relief prayed for.
Counsel for the complainants concede that it has been settled by at least two decisions of the supreme court of the United States (Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 24 L.Ed. 877; In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 12 Sup.Ct. 374, 36 L.Ed. 93) that under the power conferred upon the legislative branch of the government to establish post offices and post roads, congress has full control of the entire postal system of the country, and may lawfully determine what shall and what shall not be carried in the mails, and that the judicial branch of the government has no right to override or interfere with the will of congress on that subject. They also concede the elementary proposition that whenever, for the purpose of executing the laws, an executive officer is vested by congress with discretionary powers, the courts can neither interfere by mandamus nor by injunction with the exercise of such powers. Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall. 347, 19 L.Ed. 62; Stotesbury v. U.S. 146 U.S. 196, 13 Sup.Ct. 1, 36 L.Ed. 940; Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475, 18 L.Ed. 437; City of New Orleans v. Paine, 147 U.S. 261, 13 Sup.Ct. 303, 37 L.Ed. 162; Noble v. Railroad Co., 147 U.S. 165, 13 Sup.Ct. 271, 37 L.Ed. 123. Notwithstanding these concessions, it is claimed, however, that in the present instance the postmaster at Nevada may be lawfully enjoined from obeying the order of his superior officer, and this contention appears to be based mainly on two grounds: First, that the order under which the postmaster is acting is void because the postmaster general exceeded his authority under the statute in directing the return of 'all letters, whether registered or not, and other mail matter'; and, second, that it is void because the statute under which the postmaster general acted attempts to devolve on that officer powers which cannot be lawfully exercised by an executive officer. The language of the statute (26 Stat. 466) on which reliance is placed to sustain the first of these propositions is as follows:
'The postmaster general may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any other scheme or device for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, instruct postmasters at any office at which registered letters arrive directed to any such person or company or to the agent or representative of any such person or company * * * to return all such registered letters to the postmaster at the office at which they were originally mailed, with the word 'Fraudulent' plainly written or stamped upon the outside thereof.'
By the fourth section of the act of March 2, 1895, the powers conferred upon the postmaster general by the statute last quoted were extended to and made applicable 'to all letters or other matter sent by mail.'
It is manifest that an inspection of these statutes that congress has in express terms conferred upon the postmaster general the power to prohibit the delivery of any and all mail matter to a person whom that officer, after a due investigation finds to be engaged in conducting through the mails either a lottery or a scheme to obtain money by false and fraudulent pretenses; and it is doubtless true that it intended to confer that power because of...
To continue reading
Request your trial