American Steel Foundries v. Indus. Bd.

• Decision Date: 20 June 1918
• Docket Number: No. 11873.,11873.
• Citation: 284 Ill. 99,119 N.E. 902
• Parties: AMERICAN STEEL FOUNDRIES v. INDUSTRIAL BOARD et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

284 Ill. 99

119 N.E. 902

AMERICAN STEEL FOUNDRIES

v.INDUSTRIAL BOARD et al.

No. 11873.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 20, 1918.

Error to Circuit Court, Madison County; J. F. Gillham, Judge.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Kate Shaw for compensation for death of her husband, Harry Shaw, the employé, opposed by the American Steel Foundries, the employer. Compensation was awarded by the Industrial Board, the award affirmed by circuit court on writ of certiorari, and the employer brings error. Judgment of the circuit court affirmed.

William E. Wheeler, of East St. Louis (Parn & Hurd, of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Owen G. Jackson and Jones H. Parker, both of St. Louis, Mo., for defendants in error.

COOKE, J.

Defendant in error Kate Shaw, filed her petition with the Industrial Board for the allowance of compensation claimed to be due her from plaintiff in error, the American Steel Foundries, on account of the death of her husband, Harry Shaw. A hearing before the arbitrator resulted in a finding that plaintiff in error was not liable to pay compensation for the death of Shaw. Upon review the Industrial Board set aside the decision of the arbitrator and awarded Mrs. Shaw the sum of $3,500 against plaintiff in error. The circuit court of Madison county upon writ of certiorari affirmed the award of the Industrial Board, and, having certified that the proceeding is one proper to be reviewed by this court, the record has been brought here for review by writ of error.

The case was heard by the arbitrator and by the Industrial Board upon a stipulation of facts, from which it appears that plaintiff in error is a corporation engaged exclusively in making railway steel castings; that in conducting its business it maintains a number of buildings at its plant in Granite City fitted with smokestacks; that on October 25, 1915, the plaintiff in error entered into a written contract with Charles Malone, whereby Malone agreed to completely wreck one of those smoke stacks for $140; that thereafter Malone arranged with Harry Shaw, the husband of defendant in error Kate Shaw, to undertake the work of employing help and supervising the work of wrecking the smokestack, Malone agreeing to give Shaw for his services one-half of the contract price after deducting the expenses, and further agreeing that, if such one-half should not equal $5 per day for the time Shaw devoted to the work, Malone would make up the deficiency of $5 per day; that thereafter Malone employed two men to work on the smokestack under the direction of Shaw, and those two men and Shaw entered upon the performance of the work of wrecking the smokestack, Malone furnishing all appliances; that while engaged in this work Shaw on October 30, 1915, fell from the smokestack a distance of 90 feet, and sustained injuries from which he died; that at the time of his death Shaw was a stack wrecker, and in that employment earned $1,000 per year; that he left surviving him his widow, the defendant in error Kate Shaw, and certain stepchildren, towards whose support he had contributed for a period of five years next preceding his death. It was further stipulated that at the time of the accident plaintiff in error was operating under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and that Shaw had not rejected the provisions of that act; that Malone had not taken out any insurance covering his liability to his employés for compensation in accordance with the Workmen's Compensation Act; and that Malone is insolvent.

Plaintiff in error contends that, as Shaw was not in its employ, it cannot be required to pay compensation for his death. Section 31 of the Workmen's Compensation Act of June 28, 1913 (Laws of 1913, p. 355) which was in force when Shaw was injured, provided:

‘Any person, firm or corporation, who undertakes to do or contracts with others to do, or have done for him, them or it, any work enumerated as extrahazardous in paragraph (b), section 3, requiring employment of employés in, on or about the premises where he, they or it, as principal or principals, contract to do such work, or any part thereof, and does not require of the person, firm or corporation undertaking to do such work for said principal or principals, that...