American Steel Foundries v. Indus. Comm'n

Citation361 Ill. 582,198 N.E. 687
Decision Date04 December 1935
Docket NumberNo. 22808.,22808.
PartiesAMERICAN STEEL FOUNDRIES v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al.
CourtSupreme Court of Illinois

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Error to Circuit Court, St. Clair County; Maurice V. Joyce, Judge.

Proceeding for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Nona Wilson, widow of John Henry Wilson, deceased employee, opposed by the American Steel Foundries, employer. To review a judgment sustaining award of the Industrial Commission, the employer brings error.

Affirmed.

Wheeler, Oehmke & Dunham, of East St. Louis, for plaintiff in error.

R. B. Hendricks, of East St. Louis (James K. Moran, of Belleville, of counsel), for defendant in error.

HERRICK, Justice.

This cause is here on the petition of the plaintiff in error (hereinafter called the employer) to review a judgment entered by the circuit court of St. Clair county confirmingan award, after correcting the same, of the Industrial Commission to Nona Wilson, defendant in error, widow of John Henry Wilson, deceased.

On March 28, 1928, John Henry Wilson, while in the employ of the employer, received an injury to his right thumb arising out of and in the course of his employment. First aid and medical attention were furnished. The employee was sent to the hospital by the employer and remained there until August 26, following, when the physician in charge discharged him as not heeding further treatment. Compensation for the injury, including partial loss of the employee's thumb, was adjusted by agreement between him and the employer. Under the settlement made it was agreed that $235.71 had been paid for temporary incapacity, and that the employer was to pay the sum of $577.50, payable in weekly installments of $11 for 52 1/2 weeks for 75 per cent. loss of the use of the employee's right thumb. On October 28, 1928, the settlement contract, together with the employee's petition signed by himself and his counsel, was filed with the Industrial Commission, praying that the commission approve and authorize a lump sum settlement of the amount found and agreed to be due the employee. The petition recited that the employee believed it would be to his best interest that compensation due him be paid in a lump sum, for the reason that he was suffering from a systemic disability requiring medical treatment and he was otherwise without means to obtain the treatment. The petition was approved on October 29, 1928, and an order was entered by the commission that compensation be commuted to and paid the employee in a lump sum of $571.90. On November 9, following, the final report of the settlement, with the employee's receipt thereto attached, was filed with the commission. On September 22, 1928, Wilson entered St. Mary's Hospital, where he remained until October 12, when at the direction of his physician he was permitted to leave. He returned to the hospital on November 13 and remained there until he died, December 30 following.

On January 23 the widow of Wilson, in her own behalf and that of a five year old child of the deceased and the widow, filed her application with the Industrial Commission to recover compensation under paragraph (g) of section 8 of the act (Smith-Hurd Ann.St. c. 48, § 145(g) on account of the death of her husband, alleging that his death resulted from accidental injuries received by him on March 28, 1928, which arose out of and in the course of his employment with the employer. The cause was referred to an arbitrator, who took the evidence, which included a certified copy of the settlement contract made between the deceased employee and the employer and the records showing the commutation of the compensation and the payment thereof by the employer. The arbitrator made a finding that he was without jurisdiction, inasmuch as the matter had been concluded by settlement contract, under which the sum of $813.21 had been paid to the deceased employee on account of the injury. The widow sought review of the arbitrator's finding before the Industrial Commission. There the employer moved to dismiss the proceeding on the ground that the commission was without jurisdiction. This motion was denied. The commission entered an order setting aside the decision of the arbitrator and awarded compensation in the sum of $4,200, with a credit of $813.21 as having been thereto fore paid. The circuit court on certiorari reviewed the decision of the Industrial Commission and remanded the cause for further hearing. Testimony was thereafter taken and the Industrial Commission found the average annual earnings of the deceased were $1,029.60, and entered an award of $11 a week for a period of 370 weeks and 1 week at $9.79, less a credit of $813.21, as compensation for the death of the employee. On review the circuit court confirmed this award except as to the total amount due, and entered an order fixing the award at a sum equal to four times the deceased employee's average annual earnings as found by the commission, making a total of $4,118.40, from which a credit of $813.21 was deducted.

Three highly controversial issues are presented by the record: (1) Was the injury sustained by the employee the proximate cause of his death? (2) Did the lump sum settlement approved by the Industrial Commission and paid by the employer extinguish the right, if any, to recovery of compensation by the dependents of the deceased in the event his death was occasioned by the traumatic injury received by him? (3) Was the claim of the dependents filed within the period permitted by the statute? Such issues will be treated in the order named.

The proximate cause of the death of the deceased is a much-debated issue. It would serve no useful purpose to undertake a detailed review of the evidence bearing upon that question. For the petitioner, there was competent qualified evidence tending to prove causal connection between the injury sustained by the employee and his subsequent death. It is established that the Industrial Commission may properly draw reasonable inferences from facts and circumstances in evidence, and that its ultimate finding upon a controverted factual issue will be sustained unless this court can say that such finding is manifestly contraryto the weight of the evidence. Ford Motor Co. v. Industrial Commission, 357 Ill. 401, 192 N.E. 345;Ohlson v. Industrial Commission, 357 Ill. 335, 192 N.E. 196;Plano Foundry Co. v. Industrial Commission, 356 Ill. 186, 190 N.E. 255. The cause of death here was a scientific question, upon which the physicians testifying in the cause differed. We would not be justified in holding that the finding of the Industrial Commission as to the cause of the death of the employee is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

As to whether a lump sum settlement duly approved by the Industrial Commission and paid by the employer to the employee in his lifetime concludes his dependents where the ensuing death of the employee is caused by the injury for which he made settlement and executed and delivered a release is one of first impression in this state. All concede that the Workmen's Compensation Act is a creature of the statute; that rules ordinarily applicable to tort actions to not prevail under such statutory proceedings, and whether recovery, as a matter of law, can be had in a given cause must be gleaned from the four corners of the statute and from a construction thereof in the light of the purpose of the statute and the decisions of courts of last resort in those jurisdictions where similar statutes exist.

Sections 7 and 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Smith-Hurd Ann.St. c. 48, §§ 144, 145; Cahill's Rev.St. 1933, c. 48, pars. 207, 208, pp. 1380-1384) correspond in meaning and legal substance with sections 8 and 9 of the Workmen's Compensation Act of Great Britain. 6 Edward VII, c. 58. We have held that in an interpretation of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act it will be presumed that our Legislature intended the same construction be given the provisions of the act in Illinois as is given like provisions in the compensation act of Great Britain unless such construction should be contrary to the public policy of this state. Armour & Co. v. Industrial Board, 275 Ill. 328, 114 N.E. 173;Suburban Ice Co. v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. 630, 113 N.E. 979. The Engl...

To continue reading

Request your trial
26 cases
  • People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • June 2, 1937
    ...in favor of the dependents, where death subsequently ensues as the result of the same injuries. American Steel Foundries v. Industrial Comm., 361 Ill. 582, 198 N.E. 687, 101 A.L.R. 1405. Although the Industrial Commission is an administrative agency, yet its findings on certain matters are ......
  • Segers v. Industrial Comm'n
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • May 18, 2000
    ...the Act. In support of her argument, plaintiff cites the following passage from this court's decision in American Steel Foundries v. Industrial Comm'n, 361 Ill. 582, 198 N.E. 687 (1935): "The claim for compensation on behalf of the dependents is not derivative of the employee but is an inde......
  • Buchanan v. Kerr-McGee Corp.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • October 18, 1995
    ...from other jurisdictions. See Kay v. Hillside Mines, Inc., 54 Ariz. 36, 39, 91 P.2d 867, 870 (1939); American Steel Foundries v. Industrial Comm'n, 361 Ill. 582, 198 N.E. 687, 690 (1935); Routh v. List & Weatherly Const. Co., 124 Kan. 222, 257 P. 721, 724 (1927); In re Cripp, 216 Mass. 586,......
  • Barbee v. Illinois Ins. Guar. Fund
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 24, 2009
    ...resulting in death." A.O. Smith Corp., 109 Ill.2d at 56, 92 Ill.Dec. 524, 485 N.E.2d at 337 (citing American Steel Foundries v. Industrial Comm'n, 361 Ill. 582, 589, 198 N.E. 687, 690 (1935), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Segers v. Industrial Comm'n, 191 Ill.2d 421, 43......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT