American Transit Co. v. City of Philadelphia

• Citation: 18 F.2d 991
• Decision Date: 19 April 1927
• Docket Number: No. 3995,3997.,3995
• Parties: AMERICAN TRANSIT CO. v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA et al. AMERICAN MOTOR COACH SYSTEM v. SAME.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

18 F.2d 991 (1927)

AMERICAN TRANSIT CO. v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA et al.

AMERICAN MOTOR COACH SYSTEM v. SAME.

Nos. 3995, 3997.

District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

April 19, 1927.

Earl G. Harrison, Saul, Ewing Remick & Saul, and Howard M. Long, all of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiffs.

Joseph P. Gaffney, Sol., Jas. Francis Ryan and John B. Gest, Asst. Solicitors, all of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.

THOMPSON, District Judge.

The two cases were heard together. The two plaintiff corporations operate under the same management twelve motor busses for the carrying of passengers for hire between Philadelphia and Wilmington, Del., Philadelphia and Atlantic City, N. J., and Philadelphia and New York City, N. Y. From the testimony adduced at the hearing, it appears that they carry passengers in interstate commerce only, but the drivers are permitted to accept passengers for interstate carriage at intermediate points. The two corporations maintain their executive offices and the terminus of all of their routes in the city of Philadelphia. Some of the busses have been registered under Delaware and others under New Jersey motor license laws and all under the Pennsylvania law.

On or about March 1, 1927, the plaintiff corporations received from one of the defendants, William B. Mills, superintendent of the department of public safety, bureau of police of the city of Philadelphia, a letter, as follows:

"You are hereby officially notified that on and after Thursday, March 10, 1927, persons operating motor busses carrying passengers for hire upon the highways of the city of Philadelphia, without having complied with the ordinances of council regulating same, and having in their possession a license issued by the department of public safety, will be arrested, and the owner or owners of said busses will be prosecuted in accordance with the law."

The ordinances referred to in the letter are as follows:

Ordinances of 1924, p. 271:

"Section 1. The council of the city of Philadelphia ordains that no motor bus for public use in the carriage of passengers for hire upon any of the streets, avenues, bridges, highways, boulevards or public places in the city of Philadelphia and running wholly or in part within such city under authority of any ordinance or otherwise, including sight-seeing busses, shall be run or operated after the effective date of this ordinance unless and until a license be first obtained by the owner, lessee or bailee of such vehicle from the department of public safety, bureau of police. A separate application shall be filed for each motor bus to be licensed hereunder upon a form provided by said bureau and containing the same information which is provided to be given in the first paragraph of section 2 of an ordinance approved July 2, 1915, entitled `An ordinance to regulate the operation of motor busses in the city of Philadelphia and providing for the license thereof': Provided that the superintendent of the said bureau may in any case in his discretion dispense with so much of the information prescribed by said paragraph as in his judgment may be deemed unnecessary. Before any such license shall be issued the applicant or applicants therefor shall produce a receipt from the receiver of taxes showing the payment by the person or persons, firm, association or corporation in the sum of fifty (50) dollars for each vehicle so licensed.

"Sec. 2. This ordinance shall take effect July 15, 1924, and all licenses issued hereunder shall expire on June 30th next succeeding the date of issuance, unless sooner revoked by the department of public safety, bureau of police: Provided, that one-half only of the license fees specified in this ordinance shall be charged in the case of licenses issued after the first day of January and before the first day of July in each year.

"All ordinances or parts of ordinances inconsistent herewith be and the same are hereby repealed upon the taking effect of this ordinance.

"Approved the twenty-fourth day of June, A. D. 1924.

"W. Freeland Kendrick "Mayor of Philadelphia."

The first paragraph of section 2 of the ordinance approved July 2, 1915 (Ordinances of 1915, p. 347), to which reference is made in section 1 of the ordinance of 1924, reads as follows:

"That no motor bus shall be operated in or upon the streets of the city of Philadelphia unless a license be first obtained by the owner, lessee or bailee, from the department of public safety (bureau of police). Application for a license shall be made to said bureau of police upon a form provided by it, and shall give the name, age, and residence of the person or persons applying therefor; if a partnership or association, the names, ages and residences of the person or persons composing such partnership or association; if a corporation, the corporate name and place of incorporation, with the names and residences of the officers. The applicant shall also state whether he is the owner, lessee, or bailee of the motor bus sought to be licensed, and the experience and qualifications as a driver of motor vehicles of the person who is to operate said motor bus, the route or routes over which it is proposed to operate such motor bus, together with such other information as the said bureau of police may require. A separate application shall be filed for each motor bus to be licensed, in which such motor shall be described by giving the make of the car, factory number, motor number and the state license number, together with the number of persons, including the driver, who are to be carried thereon. Every application shall be acknowledged before a notary public or other person duly authorized to administer oaths."

The Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Law (Act April 27, 1925, P. L. 254), amending the Act of June 30, 1919 (P. L. 678), as amended by the Act of May 16, 1921 (P. L. 582), and by the Act of June 14, 1923 (P. L. 718), providing for the regulation of the use and operation of motor vehicles, requires their registration and the licensing of all operators thereof, for which it is required that fees be paid. The act of 1925, so far as its provisions are pertinent to the ordinances under attack, provides as follows:

"Section 6 (1925 P. L. 266). * * * The fees herein set forth for the registration of motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers shall be in lieu of any other fees or taxes to be imposed by this commonwealth, or any subdivision thereof, and no city, borough, incorporated town, township, or county shall require or collect any registration or license fee or tax for any motor vehicle or license from any operator thereof, except as to motor vehicles transporting passengers for pay or hire within the limits of any city or from points within such city to points outside of the city limits. * * *

"Section 12 (1925 P. L. 281). * * * Provided, that any city may regulate the transportation by motor vehicles of passengers for pay within the limits of such city or from points in the city to points beyond the city limits, and make and enforce regulations for the operation of such vehicles, not inconsistent with this act, and designate certain streets upon which such vehicles may be operated."

The plaintiffs contend that the enforcement of the ordinance of June 24, 1924, requiring each of them to take out a license thereunder and to furnish the information and to pay the license fees required therein, would constitute an unwarranted interference by the defendants with the plaintiff's business of carrying passengers exclusively in interstate commerce for hire, and would impose an undue burden upon their business in interstate commerce, in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States.

The defendants, through the city solicitor, contend that the ordinance, authorized as it is by the Motor Vehicle Law, represents a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, reserved to it under the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution; that it only incidentally affects interstate commerce, the ordinance being directed to the regulation of all motor busses serving the public in both interstate and intrastate carriage of passengers for hire upon the highways of the city of Philadelphia; that the amount of the license fee is not unreasonable, as it is not levied as a tax for raising revenue for general purposes, but the sum of the fees collected is no more than sufficient to pay the cost to the city of its regulation of traffic by public carriers by motor bus and of the administration of the registration and licensing features of the ordinance; that it is a police regulation, necessary for the safety and convenience of the public and the maintenance of good order in the use of its streets, for the benefit of its citizens and the public generally.

We are not dealing here with a case where the ordinance adopted under the authority of the state law conflicts with any legislation upon the subject by Congress, as in the cases of Adams Express Co. v. New York, 232 U. S. 14, 34 S. Ct. 203, 58 L. Ed. 483, and Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 11 S. Ct. 851, 35 L. Ed. 649. Nevertheless any attempt by the states, directly or through their municipalities, to exercise such control over interstate commerce as to directly interfere with its operation must be such as does not impose unreasonable burdens on that commerce nor subject it to unreasonable demands. Crutcher v. Kentucky, supra; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 190, 54 L. Ed. 355; Adams Express Co. v. New York, supra; Sault Ste. Marie v. International Transit Co., 234 U. S. 333, 34 S. Ct. 826, 58 L. Ed. 1337, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 574; Southern Railway Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 444, 32 S. Ct. 145, 56 L. Ed. 257. Congress has not yet seen fit to occupy the field of control of that part of interstate commerce represented by the carriage of passengers for hire by motor vehicles upon the open highways of the respective states.

The question, then, is whether the...