American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. I.C.C.

Decision Date09 November 1984
Docket Number84-1032,RBC-T,Nos. 84-1008,s. 84-1008
Citation747 F.2d 787,241 U.S.App.D.C. 350
PartiesAMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., et al., Petitioners, v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION and United States of America, Respondents, National-American Wholesale Grocers' Association,ransport, Inc., Anheuser-Busch Companies, Carnaco Transport, Inc., National Industrial Transportation League, Intervenors. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, Petitioner, v. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION and United States of America, Respondents.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Joseph E. Kolick, Jr., Washington, D.C., for petitioner Intern. Brotherhood of Teamsters in No. 84-1032. Robert J. Higgins, Joan M. Darby and Robert M. Baptiste, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for petitioner. Angelo V. Arcadipane, Washington, D.C., entered an appearance for petitioner in No. 84-1032.

Kevin M. Williams, Washington, D.C., with whom Nelson J. Cooney and Kenneth E. Siegel, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for petitioners American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., et al. in No. 84-1008.

H. Glenn Scammel, Atty., I.C.C., Washington, D.C., with whom J. Paul McGrath, Associate Atty. Gen., John Broadley, Gen. Counsel, Henri F. Rush, Associate Gen. Counsel, I.C.C., and Robert B. Nicholson and Edward T. Hand, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for respondents in Nos. 84-1008 and 84-1032.

John F. Donelan, Frederic L. Wood and Richard D. Fortin, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for intervenor Nat. Indust. Transp. League in No. 84-1008.

William H. Borghesani, Jr., Michael F. Morrone and Timothy Brown, Washington, D.C., were on the joint brief, for intervenors Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc., et al. in No. 84-1008.

Before WILKEY, WALD, and SCALIA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SCALIA.

SCALIA, Circuit Judge:

Petitioners in these consolidated cases challenge the validity of an Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") policy statement regarding applications for permits to operate as motor contract carriers. They claim the policy statement liberalizes the process in a fashion that is inconsistent with the statutory definition of contract carriage and with the statutory provisions governing permits for motor contract carriage. We do not reach those issues because we find that the case is not ripe for adjudication.

I

The Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 793 (1980) (codified at scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (1982) ), modified various aspects of the law governing contract carriage. Among other things it amended the definition of contract carriage to mean:

a person providing motor vehicle transportation of property for compensation under continuing agreements with one or more persons--

(i) by assigning motor vehicles for a continuing period of time for the exclusive use of each such person; or

(ii) designed to meet the distinct needs of each such person.

49 U.S.C. Sec. 10102(14)(B) (1982).

In June 1983 the ICC asked for comments on issuance of contract carriage permits authorizing industry-wide service. 48 Fed.Reg. 24,39 7 (1983). In December 1983, it issued the policy statement challenged in these proceedings, Ex Parte No. MC-165 (Sub-No. 1), Motor Contract Carriers of Property--Proposal to Allow Issuance of Permits Authorizing Industry-Wide Service, 133 M.C.C. 298 (1983). The following month the American Trucking Associations, Inc., et al. ("ATA"), and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters filed separate petitions for this court's review under 28 U.S.C. Secs. 2342(5), 2344 (1982). We consolidated the appeals.

The parties disagree sharply on the scope and meaning of the challenged policy statement. The ICC maintains that it does little more than give formal recognition to the possibility that industry-wide needs may be sufficiently distinct to qualify for contract carriage, a possibility recognized long before the 1980 Act in the limited context of banks and other entities needing armored vehicle service, Armored Carrier Corporation Extension--Vermont, 102 M.C.C. 411 (1966). See Brief for Respondents at 18-19. At oral argument, counsel for the ICC asserted that the only substantive feature of the policy statement is its provision that an applicant for a contract carriage permit need not provide shipper evidence to support its application--in his view an almost trivial change in evidentiary requirements.

Petitioners, on the other hand, view the policy statement as little short of revolutionary. At oral argument counsel for petitioners asserted that it amounts to allowing contract carriers to act as common carriers without being subject to the accompanying regulation. Petitioners argue that the policy statement's guidelines violate the statutory requirement that a contract carrier must either assign motor vehicles for the exclusive use of each shipper or provide service under a continuing agreement designed to meet the needs of each shipper. See Brief for ATA at 15-18. The ICC's announced standard, they say, "alters the requirement that each individual customer have distinct, specialized needs. The focus now is on just the opposite. It is on the common, generic transportation requirements." Id. at 17. To demonstrate that their own interpretation, rather than the respondents' is correct, they have appended to their briefs and discussed at oral argument a number of ICC decisions on permit applications issued after the policy statement, "as evidence and illustrations of the Commission's actual course of action and practices with respect to the challenged decision." Reply Brief for ATA at 15.

II

We do not reach the merits of this dispute because a sound application of the doctrine of ripeness requires our abstention at this stage. As the Supreme Court noted in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515-1516, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), the function of that doctrine in the context of reviewing agency action is to "prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties." Except to the extent, which we need not here determine, that the ripeness doctrine is part of the "case or controversy" requirement that determines the limits of our jurisdiction, see Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138, 95 S.Ct. 335, 355, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974), the latter purpose--that of protecting the agency--can perhaps be disregarded when, as here, the affected agency itself has raised no objection to our involvement. The former purpose, however--that of avoiding our entanglement in abstract disagreements--serves the function not merely of protecting the agency, but of protecting ourselves in two respects: First, protecting us from adjudicating matters that are not sufficiently "fleshed out" that we may see the concrete effects and...

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