AMERICAN TRUCKING ASS'NS v. United States

• Decision Date: 04 December 1939
• Docket Number: No. 3200.,3200.
• Parties: AMERICAN TRUCKING ASS'NS, Inc., et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. (ANDREWS, Administrator of Wage and Hour Division of United States Department of Labor, Intervener).
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

31 F. Supp. 35

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASS'NS, Inc., et al. v. UNITED STATES et al. (ANDREWS, Administrator of Wage and Hour Division of United States Department of Labor, Intervener).

No. 3200.

District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia.

December 4, 1939.

J. Ninian Beall and Albert F. Beasley, both of Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.

Frank Coleman, Nelson Thomas, John E. Skilling, and Irving J. Levy, all of Washington, D. C., for defendants.

Before GRONER, Chief Justice, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and BAILEY and LETTS, Justices, District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia.

GRONER, C. J.

The main question we have to answer is whether defendant, Interstate Commerce Commission, has jurisdiction and power under Sec. 204(a) (1) and (2) of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935¹ to establish reasonable requirements with respect to qualifications and maximum hours of service for all employees of common and contract carriers by motor vehicle.

Plaintiff, American Trucking Associations, Inc., is an organization of motor carriers subject to regulation under the Act, and its principal place of business is in the District of Columbia. The other plaintiffs are common carriers by motor vehicle in interstate commerce, likewise subject to regulation.

The Motor Carrier Act, which is Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act,² contains a declaration of policy, as follows:

"Sec. 202 § 302. (a). It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to regulate transportation by motor carriers in such manner as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, and foster sound economic conditions in, such transportation and among such carriers in the public interest; promote adequate, economical, and efficient service by motor carriers, and reasonable charges therefor, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, and unfair or destructive competitive practices; improve the relations between, and coordinate transportation by and regulation of, motor carriers and other carriers; develop and preserve a highway transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the commerce of the United States and of the national defense; and cooperate with the several States and the duly authorized officials thereof and with any organization of motor carriers in the administration and enforcement of this part chapter."

The duties and powers of the Commission are described in Sec. 204(a):

"(1) To regulate common carriers by motor vehicle as provided in this part chapter, and to that end the Commission may establish reasonable requirements with respect to continuous and adequate service, transportation of baggage and express, uniform systems of accounts, records, and reports, preservation of records, qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees, and safety of operation and equipment.

"(2) To regulate contract carriers by motor vehicle as provided in this part chapter, and to that end the Commission may establish reasonable requirements with respect to uniform systems of accounts, records, and reports, preservation of records, qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees, and safety of operation and equipment.

"(3) To establish for private carriers of property by motor vehicle, if need therefor is found, reasonable requirements to promote safety of operation, and to that end prescribe qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees, and standards of equipment. In the event such requirements are established, the term `motor carrier' shall be construed to include private carriers of property by motor vehicle in the administration of sections 204 304 (d) and (e), 205 305, 220 320, 221 321, 222 322 (a), (b), (d), (f), and (g), and 224 324 of this part chapter."

Shortly after the passage of the Act, the Commission established qualifications and maximum hours for drivers of motor vehicles operated by common and contract carriers.³ It left undecided the extent of its jurisdiction over other employees. Subsequently, and after the passage in 1938 of the Fair Labor Standards Act,⁴ the Commission again instituted proceedings to determine the previously undetermined extent of its jurisdiction. It concluded that its power over employees was limited to the promotion of safe operation, in consequence of which it had jurisdiction to establish hours of work and qualifications of drivers, but of no other employees.⁵

Plaintiffs filed their petition June 9, 1939, asking the Commission to hear evidence and establish regulations as to all employees. The Commission declined to do so, adhered to its former ruling, and declared that any further consideration would be futile, since it had no power to do the things asked. This action was then begun against the United States and the Commission. The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division was allowed to intervene.

Jurisdiction of the court is conceded. Sec. 205(h) of the Motor Carrier Act; Interstate Commerce Comm. v. United States ex rel. Humboldt Steamship Co., 224 U.S. 474, 32 S.Ct. 556, 56 L.Ed. 849; United States ex rel. Louisville Cement Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 246 U.S. 638, 38 S.Ct. 408, 62 L.Ed. 914; United States ex rel. Kansas City So. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 252 U.S. 178, 40 S.Ct. 187, 64 L.Ed. 517.

At the hearing counsel stated that, if the Act be construed as plaintiffs insist, the Commission will have to prescribe qualifications and hours for stenographers, clerks, accountants, mechanics, solicitors, and other employees of whose duties and qualifications it has no special knowledge; in this function its determination would not be based upon considerations of transportation — on which it is held to be expert — but upon social and economic considerations, matters on which it is not qualified or equipped, and which would entail the performance of a duty wholly foreign to its normal activities. But even if this be granted, we think there is no doubt that Congress had the power to impose the challenged duty. And the answer to the query cannot be found in the fact of inconvenience to the Commission,⁶ but must be first looked for in the language of the statute. If the words are clear, there is no room for construction.

"To search elsewhere for a meaning either beyond or short of that which they disclose is to invite the danger, in the one case, of converting what was meant to be open and precise, into a concealed trap for the unsuspecting, or, in the other, of relieving from the grasp of the statute some whom the Legislature definitely meant to include." Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245, 253, 49 S.Ct. 112, 113, 73 L.Ed. 311, 60 A.L.R. 1060.

This rule has been applied even where the literal meaning leads to a hard or unexpected result. Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60, 51 S.Ct. 49, 75 L.Ed. 156; Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. NuEnamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 333, 59 S.Ct. 191, 83 L.Ed. 195. Statutes have been annulled by construction only where the effect of giving the words their clear meaning would "offend the moral sense * * * involve injustice, oppression, or absurdity". United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 103, 18 S.Ct. 3, 4, 42 L.Ed. 394; Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245, 253, 254, 49 S.Ct. 112, 73 L.Ed. 311, 60 A.L.R. 1060.

Guided by this rule, we find that Congress in the first section of the Act declared the definite policy to regulate motor transportation (1) so as to foster sound economic conditions in the public interest; (2) to promote adequate, economical, and efficient service and reasonable charges; (3) to prevent unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages; (4) to avoid destructive competition; (5) to coordinate transportation by motor carriers and other carriers; (6) to develop and preserve a highway transportation system adapted to the needs of commerce and the national defense. The stated objects demonstrate beyond question that Congress has preempted the entire field. To the achievement of the ends sought, Congress provided that it should be the duty of the Commission to regulate carriers by establishing reasonable requirements with respect to (a) service; (b) transportation of baggage and express; (c) uniform systems of accounts, records, and reports; (d) qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees; (e) safety of operation and equipment.

In (d) the word "employees" is inclusive. There is nothing in its use or in its relation to other words in the section which, considered in the ordinary sense, can be said to indicate only a particular class of employees. If Congress had intended to distinguish between those employees engaged in the actual operation of motor vehicles and those engaged in other work, it could have done so, as it did in a former statute,⁷ by the addition of less than half a dozen words. Hence, to read that limitation into the section would be not only to disregard the letter of the law but to find, without guide or compass in the Act, a legislative intent to that end. To the contrary, such guide as there is — outside the distinct and definite meaning of the words — supports the view that Congress used the language of the section advisedly, and meant precisely what it said. For the third paragraph of Sec. 204, which concerns private carriers, expressly limits the power of the Commission over qualifications and hours to those employees whose work relates to safety of operation. This distinction between the two classes of carriers is convincing of a definite purpose, and the reason for it is obvious: private carriers are defined to be persons who transport for themselves — in furtherance of a commercial enterprise — or as bailees, their own or another's property in interstate commerce.⁸ As to such carriers, Congress properly concluded that to bring all their employees under the Commission's jurisdiction — as well those engaged in the manufacturing...