Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 July 2004
• Docket Number: Docket No. 244779,Docket No. 244778,Docket No. 244777,Docket No. 244780.
• Citation: Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 262 Mich.App. 10, 684 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. App. 2004)
• Parties: Grand Valley Health Center, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMERISURE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee. Spectrum Health, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Anthony, Defendant-Appellee, and Amerisure Insurance Company, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee. Michael Anthony, through his Guardian and Conservator, Diana L. Smith, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michigan Department of Community Health, Intervenors, v. Amerisure Insurance Company, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee. Hope Network Rehabilitation Services, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Amerisure Insurance Company, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, and Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan

684 N.W.2d 391

262 Mich.App. 10

Grand Valley Health Center, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMERISURE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.

Spectrum Health, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Anthony, Defendant-Appellee, and Amerisure Insurance Company, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.

Michael Anthony, through his Guardian and Conservator, Diana L. Smith, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michigan Department of Community Health, Intervenors, v. Amerisure Insurance Company, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.

Hope Network Rehabilitation Services, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Amerisure Insurance Company, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, and Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.

Docket Nos. 244777, 244778, 244779, 244780.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 2, 2004, at Grand Rapids.

Decided March 9, 2004, at 9:10 a.m.

Approved for Publication May 11, :10 a.m.

Released for Publication July 21, 2004.

Miller, Shpiece & Andrews, P.C. (by Ronni Tischler), Southfield, for Grand Valley Health and Hope Network.

Miller, Johnson, Snell & Cummiskey (by Stephen R. Ryan), Grand Rapids, for Spectrum Health.

Scholten & Fant (by Bruce P. Rissi), Grand Haven, for Michael Anthony.

Wheeler Upham P.C. (by Gary A. Maximiuk), Grand Rapids, for Auto-Owners Insurance Company.

Harvey Kruse (by Gary L. Stec and Lanae Monera), Grand Rapids, for Amerisure Insurance Company.

Before: METER, P.J., and WILDER and BORRELLO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Amerisure Insurance Company appeals by right from a judgment, entered after a jury trial, mandating that it pay personal injury protection (PIP) benefits for Michael Anthony, who suffered injuries in September 1999 after jumping from a Ford Explorer while another person, Jeremy Whitworth, drove the vehicle. Amerisure argues that the jury's verdict, as well as several pretrial and posttrial orders entered by the trial court, must be reversed. We affirm.

I

Amerisure first argues that the trial court erred in granting partial summary disposition, before trial, to Auto-Owners Insurance Company. We disagree.

At the time Anthony sustained his injuries, neither he nor any member of his household had no-fault automobile insurance. Moreover, the Ford Explorer, while owned by Whitworth and registered in his name, had been insured by Auto-Owners under a policy issued to Whitworth Borta, Incorporated. Whitworth was not a named insured in the Auto-Owners policy.¹ Anthony's sister, believing no insurance policy covered Anthony's injuries, applied to the Michigan Assigned Claims Facility for PIP benefits, and the facility assigned the case to Amerisure.

Amerisure moved for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), requesting that the trial court hold that Auto-Owners, not Amerisure, would be responsible for paying any available PIP benefits to Anthony. The trial court denied Amerisure's motion and instead granted Auto-Owners' cross-motion for summary disposition, finding that "the named insured, Wh[i]tworth-Borta Corporation[,] did not have an insurable interest in the 1991 Ford Explorer. Consequently, no valid policy of insurance existed to cover the driver of the vehicle or its occupants at the time of the accident." The trial court held that Amerisure would be responsible for paying any available PIP benefits to Anthony.

We review de novo a trial court's decision to grant summary disposition. Spiek v. Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich. 331, 337, 572 N.W.2d 201 (1998). Under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ritchie-Gamester v. City of Berkley, 461 Mich. 73, 76, 597 N.W.2d 517 (1999). Summary disposition is appropriate if there is no genuine issue with regard to any material fact. Id.

Additionally, we review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Roberts v. Mecosta Co. Gen. Hosp., 466 Mich. 57, 62, 642 N.W.2d 663 (2002). The rules of statutory construction require the courts to give effect to the Legislature's intent. Institute in Basic Life Principles, Inc. v. Watersmeet Twp. (After Remand), 217 Mich.App. 7, 12, 551 N.W.2d 199 (1996). "This Court should first look to the specific statutory language to determine the intent of the Legislature," which is "presumed to intend the meaning that the statute plainly expresses." Id. If the language is clear and unambiguous, "the plain meaning of the statute reflects the legislative intent, and judicial construction is not permitted." Tryc v. Michigan Veterans' Facility, 451 Mich. 129, 135, 545 N.W.2d 642 (1996). If reasonable minds could differ regarding the meaning of a statute, judicial construction is warranted. Yaldo v. North Pointe Ins. Co., 457 Mich. 341, 346, 578 N.W.2d 274 (1998). A court must not read into a statute anything "that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as gathered from the act itself." In re S R, 229 Mich.App. 310, 314, 581 N.W.2d 291 (1998).

MCL 500.3114(4) provides that a person who suffers bodily injury while the occupant of a motor vehicle² and who has no available insurance policy of his own or in his family shall claim PIP benefits from "[t]he insurer of the owner or registrant of the vehicle occupied[ ]" or "[t]he insurer of the operator of the vehicle occupied." MCL 500.3114(4)(a) and (b). The owner, registrant, and operator of the Ford Explorer was Whitworth, and he did not have a policy of insurance with Auto-Owners.³ Accordingly, Anthony could not claim PIP benefits from Auto-Owners by virtue of this plainly worded statute. See Tryc, supra at 135, 545 N.W.2d 642.

Amerisure argues that, even if MCL 500.3114(4) is inapplicable, Auto-Owners must provide available PIP benefits to Anthony by virtue of the wording in the Auto-Owners policy. For example, Amerisure points to a section of the policy indicating that Auto-Owners will pay "personal injury protection benefits to or on behalf of an injured person for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ... use of a motor vehicle...." Amerisure contends that this language plainly applies to Anthony's injuries because he was injured in connection with the Ford Explorer insured in the Auto-Owners policy. Amerisure's argument is untenable. Indeed, there is simply no authority for the proposition that the insurer of a vehicle involved in an accident must pay PIP benefits under the circumstances present in the instant case, when no named insureds were involved in the accident. See, e.g., Madar v. League Gen. Ins. Co., 152 Mich.App. 734, 742-743, 394 N.W.2d 90 (1986) (PIP coverage applies to the insured person, and not to the motor vehicle).

Amerisure cites Clevenger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 443 Mich. 646, 505 N.W.2d 553 (1993), in support of its argument. In Clevenger, supra at 648-649, 505 N.W.2d 553, the plaintiff was injured by a motor vehicle driven by Douglas Preece, who had purchased the vehicle earlier in the day from his aunt, JoAnn Williams. Williams remained the registrant of the vehicle at the time of the accident. Id. at 648, 505 N.W.2d 553. The Court ruled that Allstate, Williams's insurer, had to provide indemnification and liability coverage in the plaintiff's lawsuit against Preece. Id. at 655-656, 505 N.W.2d 553.

Clevenger is not applicable to the instant case. Indeed, Clevenger dealt with liability coverage and indemnification, not PIP benefits. Id. Moreover, the Clevenger Court relied on specific policy provisions that are not identified in the instant Auto-Owners policy. See, e.g., id. at 654-655, 505 N.W.2d 553. Additionally, the Clevenger Court emphasized that Williams remained the registrant of the vehicle in question⁴ and specifically stated that Allstate had a duty to defend and indemnify "under the unique facts of this case[.]" Id. at 662, 505 N.W.2d 553. Clevenger does not compel us to reverse the trial court's grant of partial summary disposition to Auto-Owners.

Nor do two additional cases cited by Amerisure, Madar, supra, and Universal Underwriters Group v. Allstate Ins. Co., 246 Mich.App. 713, 635 N.W.2d 52 (2001), compel reversal. In Madar, the plaintiff's decedent, Albert Madar, was killed by an automobile insured by the defendant, League General Insurance Company. Madar, supra at 736, 394 N.W.2d 90. Before his death, Madar had sold an automobile insured by the Auto Club Insurance Association (AAA). He was the named insured in the policy, and it had not been canceled at the time of his death. Id. at 736, 742, 394 N.W.2d 90. The Court held that AAA was the party responsible for paying PIP benefits associated with Madar's death, despite his having sold the automobile, because the AAA policy insured Madar's health and well-being, not his specific automobile. Id. at 738-739, 742-743, 394 N.W.2d 90. The Court stated that PIP coverage "protects the person, not the motor vehicle." Id. at 742-743, 394 N.W.2d 90.

Far from supporting Amerisure's position, Madar supports the opposite position, given its holding that PIP coverage applies to the insured person, and not to the motor vehicle. Additionally, Universal Underwriters does not support Amerisure's position. In Universal Underwriters, a woman was injured while driving a dealer's vehicle that she did not yet own. Universal Underwriters, supra at 715-717, 635 N.W.2d 52. However, she had obtained insurance from Allstate at the time of the accident. Id. at 730, 635 N.W.2d 52. The Court held that Allstate was responsible for paying PIP benefits to the woman even though she did not own the vehicle that caused her injuries. Id.

Universal Underwriters simply reaffirmed that PIP benefits apply to the person, and not to the vehicle; it does not support Amerisure's argument here.⁵ The trial court...