Ames v. Randle

• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: RUBEN CASTILLO
• Citation: Ames v. Randle, 933 F.Supp.2d 1028 (N.D. Ill. 2013)
• Decision Date: 18 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11 C 920.,11 C 920.
• Parties: Thomas R. AMES, Plaintiff, v. Michael P. RANDLE, Terry McCann, Anthony Ramos, Frank Shaw, Marvin Reed, Anna Dockery & John Doe, Defendants.

933 F.Supp.2d 1028

Thomas R. AMES, Plaintiff,

v.Michael P. RANDLE, Terry McCann, Anthony Ramos, Frank Shaw, Marvin Reed, Anna Dockery & John Doe, Defendants.

No. 11 C 920.

United States District Court,

N.D. Illinois,

Eastern Division.

March 18, 2013.

Jeremy Todd Pfeifer, Pfeifer and Pfeifer, Evanston, IL, for Plaintiff.

Illinois Department of Corrections, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RUBEN CASTILLO, District Judge.

Plaintiff Thomas R. Ames brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against Michael P. Randle, Terry McCann, Anthony Ramos, Frank Shaw, Marvin Reed, Anna Dockery and John Doe (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. (R. 34, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1–2.) Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (R. 52, Defs.' Mot.) For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

RELEVANT FACTS

Ames has been incarcerated at Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”) since 1993. (R. 34, Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) Defendants are various employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) who allegedly were responsible for the conditions of Ames' confinement. ( Id. ¶¶ 9–14.) Michael P. Randle was the Director of IDOC during the time relevant to this action. ( Id. ¶ 9.) Anthony Ramos, Frank Shaw, and Terry McCann were wardens of Stateville at various times relevant to this action, ( id. ¶¶ 10–12); McCann and Shaw were also Chief Administrative Officers during the time relevant to Ames' complaint, ( id. ¶ 10; R. 34–3, Ex. 3 at 2). Marvin Reed was Assistant Warden of Operations during the time relevant to this action. (R. 34, Am. Compl. ¶ 13.) Anna Dockery was Unit E Correctional Counselor II during the time relevant to this action. ( Id. ¶ 14.) John Doe is not addressed in the body of Ames' amended complaint; however, in his initial complaint Ames identified Doe as a “Maintenance Clerk/Supervisor,” (R. 1, Pl.'s Compl. 2a).

In 2008, Ames was moved to Cell 928, which is located within Unit E. ¹ (R. 61, Pl.'s Opp'n at 2 n.1). Ames alleges numerous problems with his cell and Unit E, including unsanitary conditions, a lack of ventilation, and continuous lighting that interferes with sleep. (R. 34, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15–30.) Upon moving in, Ames noticed basic problems with the condition of his new cell, including dried bodily fluids on the wall of his cell and a strong odor of ammonia from his uncleaned toilet. ( Id. ¶ 17.) Ames alleges that throughout Unit E there is a pest infestation accompanied by filth and feces, ( id. ¶ 18), and a complete lack of basic cleaning supplies or even garbage bags, ( id. ¶¶ 19–21). Although Stateville issues two soap bars measuring approximately 2? x 1? x 1/2? to each inmate per week, Ames alleges that during a seven-week period in November and December 2008, he was not issued these soap bars, and therefore had nothing with which to clean himself or his cell during this time period. ( Id. ¶¶ 19–20; R. 34–1, Ex. 1 at 4–5, ¶ 2.)

Ames additionally avers that ventilation in his unit is severely limited for several reasons. (R. 34, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22–27.) First, the vent intended to allow fresh air to flow into his cell is covered with a steel plate. ( Id. ¶ 23.) Moreover, in Unit E the exhaust fans are not used, ( id. ¶ 24), and most windows are screwed shut, ( id. ¶ 25). Altogether the lack of ventilation causes the air quality to be poor and the air temperature to routinely exceed 90 degrees, even in the winter months. ( Id. ¶¶ 26–27.) According to Ames, the lack of ventilation undermines his health. ( Id. ¶ 27.)

With respect to the lighting in Unit E, Ames avers that Unit E is equipped with numerous large ceiling lights, all of which are left on 24 hours a day. ( Id. ¶ 28; R. 34–1, Ex. 1 at 12–13 ¶ 12.) These lights are situated such that they shine directly into Ames' cell, causing him to suffer sleeping problems, which inhibit his ability to recover from his other ailments. (R. 34, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29–30, 35.)

In an IDOC grievance, Ames also complained about the recycling of filthy, soiled bedding, (R. 34–1, Ex. 1 at 3–4 ¶ 1), missing or dilapidated, and sometimes dangerously damaged, cell furniture and fixtures, and badly peeling toxic paint, ( id. at 5–9, ¶¶ 3–7).

Ames suffers from endocarditis (an infection of the lining of the heart), which he claims is due to the conditions of his confinement, and from which his “numerous, almost constant, fungal infections” stem. (R. 34, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31–32.) Ames' endocarditis visibly manifests itself through discolored and splintered nails. ( Id. ¶ 33.) He also suffers from frequent upper respiratory infections. ( Id. ¶ 34.) Allegedly, these health problems result from and are exacerbated by unsanitary living conditions and Ames' inability to rest adequately due to the constant illumination of his cell. ( Id. ¶ 35.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 9, 2009, Ames filed an Emergency Grievance (“Grievance”) with McCann concerning his living conditions and the staff's conduct. ( Id. ¶ 36; R. 34–1, Ex. 1.) When McCann failed to respond, Ames forwarded his Grievance to Dockery on March 2, 2009. (R. 34, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 36–37.) Dockery responded to the Grievance on or about March 12, 2009, and Grievance Officer Margaret Thompson made her recommendations in a Grievance Officer's Report on April 23, 2009. ( Id.¶¶ 38–39; R. 34–3, Ex. 3 at 2.) With respect to Ames' complaints regarding cleaning supplies, lighting and ventilation, Thompson recommended denying the Grievance. (R. 34, Am. Compl. ¶ 39; R. 34–3, Ex. 3 at 2.) Shaw, the Chief Administrative Officer, concurred with Thompson's recommendation on May 4, 2009. (R. 34, Am. Compl. ¶ 40; R. 34–3, Ex. 3 at 2.) Ames appealed this decision to Director Randle, who denied the appeal on May 7, 2009. (R. 34–3, Ex. 3 at 2.) On August 6, 2009, Sarah Johnson, on behalf of the Administrative Review Board Office of Inmate Issues, determined that Ames' Grievance had been appropriately addressed and recommended that the Grievance be denied; Randle, as Director, concurred with Johnson's decision. (R. 34, Am. Compl. ¶ 42; R. 34–4, Ex. 4 at 2).

Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Ames filed a pro se complaint in this Court on February 9, 2011, (R. 1, Compl.), and sought appointment of counsel, (R. 4, Mot. App't Counsel). This Court granted Ames' motion for appointment of counsel, (R. 6, Op. at 2), and on February 29, 2012, with the assistance of counsel, Ames filed an amended complaint. (R. 34, Am. Compl.) In his amended complaint, Ames presents two claims against Defendants in their individual (Count I) and official capacities (Count II), alleging that Defendants have been deliberately indifferent to the conditions of his confinement at Stateville, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. ( Id. ¶ ¶ 50–66.)

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Ames' amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on May 17, 2012. (R. 52, Defs.' Mot.) Defendants raise three principal arguments in the memorandum supporting their motion to dismiss. (R. 53, Defs.' Mem.) Defendants first argue that Ames' amended complaint fails to state a claim that the conditions of his confinement are unconstitutional. ( Id. at 8.) Further, they argue that Ames fails to plead sufficient personal involvement for them to be liable for the conditions of his confinement. ( Id. at 5.) Lastly, Defendants argue that they are not amenable to suit under Section 1983, and that they are otherwise immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. ( Id. at 10.)

On July 20, 2012, Ames filed an opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss. (R. 61, Pl.'s Opp'n). Defendants filed their reply on August 10, 2012. (R. 64, Defs.' Reply.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir.2009). Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ sufficient to provide the defendant with ‘fair notice’ of the claim and its basis.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir.2008) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff by accepting as true all of the well-pleaded factual allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.) “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Furthermore, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.) “ ‘Plausibility’ in this context does not imply that the district court should decide whose version to believe, or which version is more likely than not.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir.2010). After all, “the plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Rather, to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “the plaintiff must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that...