Ames v. Snider

• Decision Date: 30 September 1873
• Citation: 69 Ill. 376,1873 WL 8474
• Parties: ZIMRI F. AMESv.CORNELIUS SNIDER.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

69 Ill. 376

1873 WL 8474 (Ill.)

ZIMRI F. AMES

v.CORNELIUS SNIDER.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1873.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. EDWIN S. LELAND, Judge, presiding.

This was an action on the case, brought by Cornelius Snider against Zimri F. Ames, for malicious prosecution. The opinion of the court contains a summary of the facts of the case. On the trial, the jury found the defendant guilty, and assessed the plaintiff's damages at $350, upon which judgment was rendered.

Mr. J. B. RICE, Mr. E. K. WALBRIDGE, and Messrs. ELDRIDGE & LEWIS, for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. R. D. MCDONALD, for the defendant in error. Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court:

The court very properly refused to give the 14th instruction asked, for the reason the same principle was stated with sufficient accuracy in the 6th instruction of the series that was given; nor was there any error in admitting in evidence the docket of the justice of the peace. No doubt it is true it was not written up at the time it ought to have been, but the rights of defendant in error ought not to be affected by any failure of the justice to do his duty in that regard. The only purpose for introducing the docket in evidence was to show the prosecution had been terminated, and this fact did sufficiently appear from the record made by the justice.

The court, we think, erred in permitting the witness Lockwood to give his opinion of the appearance of plaintiff in error on the stand when giving his evidence in the criminal prosecution. The witness was allowed, against objection, to state, “my recollection is, that he was vindictive. I thought so. I don't know how I reached that conclusion. I have a recollection that I had that idea; that there was something wrong; that it was a vindictive thing.”

There is no principle of law or rule of evidence, with which we are familiar, under which the admission of such evidence can be justified. No doubt malice may be proved by showing the conduct and declarations of the prosecuting witness, but that is a very different thing from permitting the witness to express his opinion as to whether he was vindictive. The witness should state the facts and circumstances, and leave the jury to draw their own conclusions whether the party was actuated by motives of malice or was influenced by an honest purpose to elicit the truth. On neither question should the witness be allowed to express an opinion.

In view of the other evidence in the case, we think the testimony of the witnesses Lockwood and McDonald, on this point, was calculated to mislead the jury, and, for this reason, ought to have been excluded from their consideration. It was error not to do so. The most serious question, however, in the case, arises on the first error assigned, viz: the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence.

The action is for malicious prosecution in causing the arrest of defendant in error on a charge of perjury. He had brought an action against plaintiff in error for work and labor done and materials furnished in erecting a house. By some inadvertence, no plea was filed, but a default suffered, and it was on the assessment of damages in that case the alleged perjury was committed.

We do not intend to comment minutely on the evidence showing probable cause, or the want of probable cause, for the criminal prosecution. All we mean to say is, we are not entirely satisfied with the verdict. A party ought not to be held guilty when he sets in motion a criminal prosecution, simply because he fails to convict the person accused, or indeed in every case where he fails to show the party was guilty. The policy of the law is rather to encourage the prosecution of criminals alleged to be guilty of grave offenses; but if the prosecuting witness is to be mulcted in damages for an honest error in judgment, few prudent men would run the hazard of instituting a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient if there is probable cause, whether the accused is in fact guilty or not.

Probable cause is defined, in numerous decisions of this court, to be a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief the person charged is guilty of the offense charged. Where probable cause exists, it is not material ...