AMF Pinspotters, Inc. v. Harkins Bowling, Inc., s. 38210

• Decision Date: 28 July 1961
• Docket Number: Nos. 38210,38341,s. 38210
• Citation: AMF Pinspotters, Inc. v. Harkins Bowling, Inc., 260 Minn. 499, 110 N.W.2d 348 (Minn. 1961)
• Parties: AMF PINSPOTTERS, INC., Respondent, v. HARKINS BOWLING, INC., Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 348

110 N.W.2d 348

260 Minn. 499

AMF PINSPOTTERS, INC., Respondent, v.HARKINS BOWLING, INC., Appellant.

Nos. 38210, 38341.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 28, 1961.

Syllabus by the Court

Part I

Great caution and deliberation should be exercised by a trial court in granting an interlocutory injunction.The right to and the necessity for the granting or refusal of such an injunction lies largely within the discretion of the trial court, whose action will not be disturbed on appeal unless from the whole record it appears that there has been an abuse of such discretion.

While damages from a wrongful issuance of an injunction may be determined in an injunction suit, they are recoverable (unless the writ was procured by malice) only by action on the bond.Reasonable attorneys' fees may also be recovered.

Injunctions should be awarded only in clear cases, reasonably free from doubt, and when necessary to prevent great and irreparable injury.The burden of proof rests upon the complainant to establish the material allegations entitling him to relief.

Injunctions ought not to be granted in any case except where it is clear that any legal remedy the party may have is inadequate.

An injunction will not issue to prevent an imagined injury which there is no reasonable ground to fear.The threatened injury must be real and substantial.

Held, that injunctive relief and orders appealed from should not have been granted and the orders should be reversed.

Part II

Issues arising under the Federal antitrust laws, whether raised by way of attack or defense, are by statute exclusively within the jurisdiction of Federal courts and beyond that of the state courts.

Maun, Hazel & Busch, Joseph A. Maun, John A. Murray, and C. Paul Jones, St. Paul, for appellant.

Oppenheimer, Hodgson, Brown, Baer & Wolf, Benno F. Wolff and Richard G. Lareau, St. Paul, for respondent.

FRANK T. GALLAGHER, Justice.

This action involves two appeals by defendant, Harkins Bowling, Inc., which we shall consider separately.The first is from orders of the district court(1) denying defendant's motion to dismiss the temporary restraining order and granting the motion of plaintiff, AMF Pinspotters, Inc., for a temporary injunction, and (2) denying defendant's motion to vacate and dismiss the temporary injunction.The second appeal is from a district court order granting plaintiff's motion to strikedefendant's antitrust defenses.

Part I

Due to the somewhat prolonged procedural history of this casewe shall chronologically review as briefly as possible the events leading up to this action and appeal.On August 3, 1953, plaintiff leased 24 automatic pinsetting machines and certain extra equipment to defendant, the operator of a bowling alley in St. Paul.The corporation is solely owned by Thomas J. Harkins, its president.

In 1959 a dispute arose concerning the payment for rentals and parts in regard to the 24 AMF-owned machines.In July of that year plaintiff sued defendant for $8,554.92, past-due rental, and $5,073.63 for repair parts sold to defendant.Defendant answered by alleging that the lease was void, unenforceable, and illegal because it violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1,2, and the Clayton Act,15 U.S.C.A. § 14, as well as the Minnesota antitrust statute, Minn.St. 623.01.It also generally denied allegations regarding repair parts sold.

According to defendant, agreements were reached in the first part of June 1960 between defendant and Carl A. and A. S. Ernst whereby defendant leased to the Ernsts that portion of its building formerly used for bowling and sold to the Ernsts the personal property it had formerly used including 24 bowling beds, shoes, balls, etc.Under the same agreement, the Ernst brothers were to manage the cocktail lounge for defendant.These agreements allegedly became effective July 1, 1960, but were not reduced to writing until July 9, 1960.

On June 10, 1960, defendant advised plaintiff that it was discontinuing its bowling alley business and requested plaintiff to remove its 24 machines by July 1, 1960, and that the lease would be terminated pursuant to paragraph 6(c) thereof.Paragraph 6(c) reads as follows:

'If Operator discontinues its bowling alley business at its establishment referred to in Schedule A hereof during the term of this Agreement (unless Operator transfers such business to others with AMF's consent), Operator may request AMF or AMF may elect to remove the machines within a reasonable time to the manufacturer's factory or other place of storage designated by AMF at Operator's expense.Upon such removal and after payment of such expense and all rental for all periods to the end of the minimum rental year in which such removal occurs, this Agreement shall terminate and neither party shall have any further obligations hereunder.'

On June 29, 1960, plaintiff refused to remove its machines.On July 1, 1960, plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order and order to show cause, and writ of attachment against defendant's building.The restraining order enjoined defendant from damaging plaintiff's 24 pinsetting machines; from removing them from defendant's building; from replacing them with other pinsetting machines; and from transferring any of defendant's bowling alley business, including 24 bowling alleys, defendant's building, and any interest of defendant in the real estate involved.

Plaintiff's affidavit, based primarily on information and belief, on which the restraining order and writ of attachment were obtained, substantially states: That defendant intends to continue the operation of its bowling business on its premises; that it has negotiated with a competitor of plaintiff to replace plaintiff's machines; that defendant intends to remove the machines and replace them with others, thereby causing possible loss of or damage to plaintiff's machines, and causing further loss of future rentals under the lease, which damage would be impossible of computation; that the removal would violate the terms of the lease; that defendant is remodeling its bowling alley premises; that the danger of defendant's removing plaintiff's machines and installing new ones is imminent; that defendant is attempting to effect an apparent but not real discontinuance of its bowling alley business; that it intends to transfer its business and assets to persons acting in concert with it for the purpose of making any judgment that plaintiff might obtain ineffective; that this would cause irreparable harm to plaintiff; and that defendant is about to assign or dispose of its property with intent to delay or defraud its creditors.

On the other hand, sworn affidavits and responses on behalf of the defendant in support of its motion to vacate and dismiss the temporary restraining order state: That defendant discontinued its bowling alley business July 1, 1960, and now its business consists of continuing to lease the basement of its building for a restaurant, barber shop, and billiard room, continuing to operate a cocktail lounge, and leasing without restriction as to use the rest of the building that defendant has not negotiated with a competitor of plaintiff to replace plaintiff's machines but has discontinued its bowling alley business and has no intention of purchasing or leasing other pinsetting machines or replacing plaintiff's machines with other; that since plaintiff refused to remove its machines it is necessary for defendant to remove them in order to realize a reasonable return on its investment in its building; that no loss or damage to plaintiff's machines would occur by the removal of them by defendant or plaintiff; that plaintiff's lease terminated on July 1, 1960, subject to the payment of the cost of removal of the machines and other items to be decided in the present suit, so there can be no loss of future rentals.Defendant also claims that future rentals, if any, can be easily computed from the terms of the lease and that, in the light most favorable to plaintiff, future rentals would be $61,285.10.

In response to plaintiff's claim that the removal of the machines would violate the terms of the lease, defendant states that paragraph 6(c) of the lease specifically provides for the removal of the machines upon discontinuance of the bowling alley business; also that paragraph 6(i) prohibits the transfer of the machines and contract to others without plaintiff's consent, but that defendant cannot and does not intend to do this.Defendant further states it is remodeling its cocktail lounge but not its former bowling alley premises; that it will cause the removal of plaintiff's machines as soon as it is no longer enjoined by the court but has no intention of replacing them; that the discontinuance of its bowling alley business on July 1, 1960, was actual, and that it is now strictly a landlord with the exception of its cocktail lounge.Defendant further claims that no person or persons are acting in concert with it to make any judgment plaintiff may obtain ineffective and has no intention of doing so; that it is 'more than solvent with an equity in its building of at least $400,000, and does not intend to defeat any legitimate claim.'

Defendant on appeal assigns as error: That the trial court erred (1) in granting the motion of plaintiff for a temporary injunction and denying defendant's motion to dismiss the temporary restraining order; (2) in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the temporary injunction; and (3) in failing to find facts specially and to state separately its conclusions of law.

1.It appears to us that the principal question in connection with part one of this appeal is whether the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law so as to eliminate the necessity for injunctive relief.An injunction will not issue where there is an adequate remedy at law.9 Dunnell, Dig.(3 ed.) § 4472, and Minnesota cases cited.

Great caution and deliberation must be exercised...