Amha, LLC v. Howard Cnty. Bd. of Appeals, 2176
| Decision Date | 03 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2176,2176 |
| Parties | AMHA, LLC, ET AL. v. HOWARD COUNTY BOARD OF APPEALS, ET AL. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
UNREPORTED
Berger, Nazarian, Zarnoch, Robert A. (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Berger, J.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
This appeal involves a dispute regarding the approval of appellee's, H & R Rock, LLC's ("H & R Rock's") redline revision to a previously approved Site Development Plan ("SDP"). Following the approval by the Howard County Planning Board (the "Planning Board"), appellants; AMHA, LLC ("AMHA"), British American Building, LLC ("British American"), and the Howard County Independent Business Association, Inc. ("HCIBA") (collectively "appellants") challenged the decision before the appellee, the Howard County Board of Appeals ("Board of Appeals"), which affirmed the Planning Board's decision, albeit on different grounds. Thereafter, AMHA filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Howard County, which affirmed the Board of Appeals' decision, again, on different grounds. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, AMHA presents two issues for our review.1 Additionally, H & R Rockhas filed a cross-appeal, and presents two issues for our review.2 We condense and rephrase appellants' second question, and H & R Rock's questions as follows:
Whether the Board of Appeals erred in dismissing appellants' challenge to a zoning decision on the grounds that appellants were not specially aggrieved.
For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the decision of the Board of Appeals, and the judgment of the Circuit Court for Howard County. As a result, we do not reach the first issue presented by appellants.
H & R Rock is a developer that has been improving property located at the corner of Snowden River Parkway and Minstrel Way in Columbia, Maryland ("the property"). In 2008, the Planning Board approved a SDP, under which H & R Rock sought to construct a hotel and a bank on two of five undeveloped lots. In 2012, the Planning Board reconvened to consider revisions to the 2008 SDP. Under the 2012 revisions, H & R Rock sought to construct two structures on the remaining undeveloped lots. Specifically, H & R Rock sought to construct a 9,200 square-foot one-story building to be used for commercial or retailpurposes, and another 10,000 square-foot one-story building to be used for retail purposes as well as a vehicle repair facility.
AMHA owns property adjacent to appellants', located across both Snowden River Parkway and Minstrel Way.3 AMHA's property is situated approximately 324.35 feet from the property. AMHA permits a gasoline service station, car wash, and convenience store that is owned by a separate entity to operate on its property. A representative of AMHA testified before the Board of Appeals that the revised SDP would diminish the value of its property by 50 percent because it would permit an increased supply of available commercial land. Additionally, AMHA argued that the proposed revisions would negatively affect his property because of increased traffic flow and decreased accessibility to its property.
Perry Burman ("Burman"), a planning consultant and commercial real estate agent, testified that the new development would negatively affect traffic by causing competition for green lights at the intersection of Snowden River Parkway and Minstrel Way. Accordingly, Burman testified that traffic generated by the development would decrease the value of AMHA's property. On cross-examination, however, Burman conceded that he had no empirical evidence to rebut H & R Rock's position regarding the negligible effect the development would likely have on traffic.
British American operates an automotive repair facility located more than 1,300 feet from the property. A representative from British American, Charles Gordon Gilbert, Jr. ("Gilbert"), testified that he believed that British American's property and the property at issue were subject to covenants which prohibited the uses proposed in the revised SDP. British American averred that approving the SDP would negatively affect the value of its property because it would impair its ability to enforce covenants to which H & R Rock may be subject.
The Board of Appeals also heard testimony from Chris Rosato ("Rosato"), a certified commercial real estate developer. Rosato testified that the 2012 revisions to the SDP would not negatively affect the value of AMHA's property. Rather, Rosato opined that any increase in traffic would be more likely to result in an increase in the value of AMHA's property.
Additionally, the Board of Appeals heard testimony from Mickey Cornelius ("Cornelius") a certified professional traffic operations engineer who opined that, given the dedicated turn lanes on Snowden River Parkway and the split phasing at the intersection, the development under the revised SDP would not frustrate access to AMHA's property. Additionally, Cornelius testified that a member of the public would not notice any significant changes in the operation of the intersection, nor would there be any significant capacity or safety concerns caused by the approval of the revised SDP.
At the conclusion of the presentation of all of the evidence, the Board of Appeals concluded that neither AMHA, British American, nor the HCIBA had standing to pursue an appeal before the Board of Appeals. Accordingly, the Board of Appeals dismissed theappellants' petition for appeal. Thereafter, appellants appealed the Board of Appeals' dismissal to the Circuit Court for Howard County. The circuit court considered the parties' arguments as to whether the appellants were specially aggrieved, and, therefore, had standing to challenge the Planning Board's decision. The circuit court reversed the Board of Appeals' with respect to its decision that appellants lacked standing. Nevertheless, the circuit court rejected the merits of appellants' argument against the procedure by which the revised SDP was approved. This timely appeal followed.
Byniarski v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Appeals, 247 Md. 137 (1967) is the seminal case on the subject of who has standing to seek judicial review of zoning decisions. Appellants contend that the analysis in Bryniarski does not apply to the decisions of the Board of Appeals. H & R Rock and the Board of Appeals maintain that appellants' challenge to the applicable law is not appropriately before us on appeal. Further, H & R Rock and the Board of Appeals contend that it was not error for the Board of Appeals to rely upon the analysis set forth in Bryniarski, and, under that analysis, the appellants lack standing. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that appellants' arguments are properly presented before us. Additionally, we hold that the Board of Appeals was not required to strictly adhere to Bryniarski, but did not err in doing so. Finally, in Part III, infra, we analyze the Board of Appeals' decision under Bryniarski, and hold that there was substantial evidence to support their decision that the appellants lacked standing.
Appellants contend that they have the right to challenge a zoning decision because they need not be "specially aggrieved" to contest a zoning action enforce the Board of Appeals. See generally Byniarski, supra, 247 Md. 137; Ray v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 430 Md. 74 (2013). In support of their argument, appellants cite Sugarloaf Citizens' Ass'n v. Dept. of Env't, 344 Md. 271 (1996), for the proposition that aggrieved person inquiry under Bryniarski is not applicable to agency decisions that engage in de novo review. Id. at 286 (). H & R Rock, for its part, argues that appellants are estopped from arguing that the "specially aggrieved" standard under Bryniarski is inapplicable. H & R Rock and the Board of Appeals further aver that appellants' argument is unpreserved. We address each contention in turn.
H & R Rock argues that appellants are estopped from arguing that the "specially aggrieved" status established in Bryniarski is inapplicable because appellants cited the Bryniarski standard with approval in prior proceedings, and previous tribunals in this action have relied on the parties' representations that Bryniarski is the applicable law. We disagree. In our view, the doctrine of judicial estoppel or the doctrine against inconsistent positions does not bar the appellants from arguing against the applicability of the "special aggrieved" standard established in Bryniarski here.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel exists "to protect the integrity of the judicial system from one party who is attempting to gain an unfair advantage over another party by manipulating the court system." Dashiell v. Meeks, 396 Md. 149, 171 (2006). Indeed, if litigants "'were permitted to assume inconsistent positions in the trial of their causes, the usefulness of courts of justice would in most cases be paralyzed; the coercive process of the law, available only between those who consented to its exercise, could be set at naught by all.'" Kramer v. Globe Brewing Co., 175 Md. 461, 469 (1938) (quoting Melville M. Bigelow, The Law of Estoppel, 783 (Little, Brown & Co. 6th ed. 1913)).
The doctrine of judicial estoppel, however, is inapplicable here.
First, judicial estoppel only applies to a position taken in a subsequent action that is inconsistent with a position taken in a previous action. See Dashiell v. Meeks, 396 Md. 149, 170, 913...
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