Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mutrie
| Decision Date | 13 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2013–400,2013–400 |
| Citation | 105 A.3d 595,167 N.H. 108 |
| Parties | AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Beverly P. MUTRIE |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
167 N.H. 108
105 A.3d 595
AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
Beverly P. MUTRIE
No. 2013–400
Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
Argued: March 5, 2014
Opinion Issued: November 13, 2014
Sulloway & Hollis, P.L.L.C., of Concord (Sarah S. Murdough on the brief and orally), for the petitioner.
Coughlin, Rainboth, Murphy & Lown, P.A., of Portsmouth, for the respondent, filed no brief.
Boynton, Waldron, Doleac, Woodman & Scott, P.A., of Portsmouth (Christopher E. Grant on the brief and orally), for the intervenors.
BASSETT, J.
The intervenors, Scott Kukesh, Eric Kulberg, Jeremiah Murphy, and Gregory Turner, appeal an order of the Superior Court (McHugh , J.) granting summary judgment in favor of the petitioner, Amica Mutual Insurance Company (Amica), in the declaratory judgment action that Amica filed against the respondent, Beverly P.
Mutrie. In its order, the trial court concluded that the reckless and wanton conduct in which Mutrie was alleged to have engaged—knowingly permitting her son to engage in criminal activity on her property—did not constitute an "occurrence" as required for coverage under the homeowner's and umbrella insurance policies issued to Mutrie by Amica (the Policies). We affirm.
The following facts are drawn from the trial court's order and the record, or are otherwise undisputed. The intervenors are four police officers who served on a drug task force. On April 12, 2012, the intervenors executed a search warrant at a property in Greenland where Mutrie's son lived. The property is owned by a trust, of which Mutrie is the trustee. The warrant was issued because there was probable cause that Mutrie's son was engaged in criminal activity. During the execution of the search warrant, Mutrie's son opened fire, wounding the intervenors. Mutrie's son then turned the gun on himself.
The intervenors filed a civil suit against Mutrie in July 2012. They alleged that Mutrie was responsible for their injuries because, "with the knowledge, information, and belief" that her son was engaged in criminal activity, she "did recklessly and wantonly allow ... criminal activity and conduct to take place at the subject property and otherwise directly and indirectly and wantonly and recklessly supported and facilitated [her son's] criminal activity at the subject property."
Amica assigned counsel to defend Mutrie, subject to a reservation of rights. In September 2012, Amica filed a petition for declaratory judgment, requesting a ruling that Amica has no duty to defend and indemnify Mutrie because the "reckless and wanton misconduct" alleged by the intervenors
in their writ did not constitute an "occurrence" under the Policies. Subsequently, Amica moved for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in favor of Amica. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the intervenors argue that the trial court erred when it concluded that the reckless and wanton acts alleged by the intervenors constituted "inherently injurious" or "intentional" conduct on the part of Mutrie and, therefore, the conduct did not constitute an "occurrence" under the Policies. The intervenors also argue that the court erred when it failed to consider all of the materials that had been submitted in support of their opposition to Amica's motion for summary judgment. Amica counters that the court properly ruled that Amica owes no duty to defend or indemnify Mutrie because her conduct—as alleged by the intervenors—does not constitute an "occurrence." On cross-appeal, Amica also asserts that the trial court should have ruled that coverage is barred by the Policies' "controlled substances exclusion."
"We review de novo the trial court's application of the law to the facts in its summary judgment ruling." Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 151 N.H. 649, 652, 864 A.2d 368 (2005). "[W]e consider the affidavits and other evidence, and all inferences properly drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Lacasse v. Spaulding Youth Ctr., 154 N.H. 246, 248, 910 A.2d 1262 (2006) (quotation omitted). "If our review of the evidence does not reveal a genuine issue of material fact, and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm the trial court's decision." Id. (quotation omitted).
"In New Hampshire, an insurer's obligation to defend its insured is determined by whether the cause of action against the insured alleges sufficient facts in the pleadings to bring it within the
express terms of the policy." Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 161 N.H. 778, 780, 20 A.3d 977 (2011) (quotation omitted). Thus, our analysis begins with an examination of the Policies' language. Id. The interpretation of insurance policy language, like any contract language, is ultimately an issue of law for this court to decide. Id. We look to the plain and ordinary meaning of the policy's words in context. Id. at 781, 20 A.3d 977. Policy terms are construed objectively, and when the terms of a policy are clear and unambiguous, we accord the language its natural and ordinary meaning. Id.
We first consider whether the trial court properly found that Amica owes no duty to defend and that coverage is precluded because Mutrie's alleged conduct did not constitute an "occurrence" under the Policies. Pursuant to the relevant provisions in the Policies, coverage and the insurer's duty to defend are triggered only by an "occurrence." The Policies define an "[o]ccurrence" as "an accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions, which results, during the policy period, in: a. Bodily injury; or b. Property damage." The Policies do not define the term "accident." However, in construing the word "occurrence" in insurance policies with similar language, we have defined "accident" to mean "an undesigned contingency, a happening by chance, something out of the...
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