Aminti v. Liquor Control Com'n

• Decision Date: 23 October 1957
• Citation: 144 Conn. 550,135 A.2d 595
• Parties: Salvatore AMINTI v. LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 595

135 A.2d 595

144 Conn. 550

Salvatore AMINTI v. LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Oct. 23, 1957.

Thomas J. Conroy, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was John J. Bracken, Atty. Gen., for appellant (defendant).

T. Clark Hull, Danbury, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before WYNNE, C. J., and BALDWIN, DALY, KING and MURPHY, JJ.

BALDWIN, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff sought from the defendant commission a package store liquor permit for premises located on route 37A in Danbury a short distance south of the New Fairfield town line. The commission denied the permit, stating as its reason that 'having considered the character of the neighborhood [it finds that] the granting of a permit at this location would be detrimental to public interest.' The present appeal is from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the plaintiff's appeal from the commission's denial of the permit.

Section 4263 of the General Statutes provides that the commission may refuse to grant a permit for the sale of alcoholic liquor, 'if it has reasonable cause to believe * * * (3) that the number of permit premises in the locality is such that the granting of a permit is detrimental to public interest.' In reaching this conclusion the commission, under the terms of the statute, may consider 'the character of, the population of, the number of like permits and number of all permits existent in, the particular town and the immediate neighborhood concerned, the effect which a new permit may have on such town or neighborhood or on like permits existent in such town or neighborhood.' Because of the nature of the liquor business, 'the police power to regulate and control it runs broad and deep, much more so than the power to curb and direct ordinary business activity.' Ruppert v. Liquor Control Commission, 138 Conn. 669, 674, 88 A.2d 388, 390, and cases cited. The statute vests the commission with a liberal discretion. Cusano v. Dunn. 137 Conn. 20, 25, 74 A.2d 477, and cases cited. It does not, however, authorize the commission to act capriciously, unreasonably or arbitrarily. Kantrowitz v. Patterson, 132 Conn. 426, 428, 44 A.2d 916.

Upon appeal under General Statutes, § 4277, the Court of Common Pleas 'may reverse or affirm, wholly or partly, or may modify or revise the decision appealed from.' If the court decides 'that the appellant is a suitable person to sell alcoholic liquor, and that the place named in his application is a suitable place' for the class of permit sought, it may render judgment accordingly. In proceeding under § 4277, the court considers so much of the transcript of the hearing before the commission as is competent and relevant under the rules of evidence, and the commission's reasons for its action. Before additional testimony can be received by the court, it must find either that good cause is shown for the failure to offer the testimony before the commission or, in its discretion, that reception of additional testimony is necessary for a just decision of the appeal. We have had occasion heretofore to examine the legislative history of this section of the Liquor Control Act and to consider the amendments to it made by the legislature. We have held that the function of the court upon appeal is to determine whether the commission acted illegally or so arbitrarily and unreasonably as to abuse its discretion. We have said that the court cannot substitute its discretion for that of the commission and that it can do no more than decide whether the commission upon the facts has mistaken the law and so has acted illegally, or whether it has reached a conclusion untenable in the light of logic...