Amisi v. Riverside Reg'l Jail Auth.
Decision Date | 30 June 2020 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 3:20cv218 (DJN) |
Citation | 469 F.Supp.3d 545 |
Parties | Bikachi AMISI, Plaintiff, v. RIVERSIDE REGIONAL JAIL AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Daniel Guinnane Zemel, Mark J. Krudys, Krudys Law Firm, PLC, Richmond, VA, for Plaintiff.
Brittany Elizabeth Shipley, Rosalie Pemberton Fessier, Timberlake Smith Thomas & Moses PC, Staunton, VA, William Woodul Tunner, Matthew Traynham Anderson, ThompsonMcMullan, P.C., Richmond, VA, Carlene Booth Johnson, Perry Law Firm PC, Dillwyn, VA, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Bikachi Amisi ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Riverside Regional Jail Authority (the "Authority"), Bryan Brown ("Brown"), Roy Townsend, Jr. ("Townsend"), and Lakeyta Brooks ("Brooks") (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging that Defendants violated her constitutional rights by subjecting her to a strip search as she entered Riverside Regional Jail (the "Jail") on her first day working as a nurse for the Jail's healthcare contractor.
Plaintiff also brings claims under state law for negligence, gross negligence, willful and wanton negligence, false imprisonment, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
This matter now comes before the Court on the Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 12, 14, 16) filed by the Authority, Townsend and Brown.1 Because Plaintiff concedes in her Response (ECF No. 19) to the Authority's Motion (ECF No. 12) that the Authority enjoys sovereign immunity from suit in this matter, the Court GRANTS the Authority's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12) and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE all claims by Plaintiff against the Authority.2 Therefore, the Court need only address the remaining Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 14, 16) filed by Townsend and Brown, which move pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against them.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Townsend's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) and Brown's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16). The Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Count One of Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1) as to all Defendants and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Count Six as to Townsend and Brooks.
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept Plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations as true, though the Court need not accept Plaintiff's legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Further, to the extent that Defendants raise substantive challenges to the Court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of Plaintiff's Complaint, the Court may consider facts outside of the Complaint and need not accept the allegations in the Complaint as true. Kerns v. United States , 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). With these principles in mind, the Court accepts the following facts.
The Authority serves the cities of Hopewell, Petersburg and Colonial Heights, Virginia, as well as the counties of Prince George, Surry, Charles City and Chesterfield. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) ¶ 13.) As part of its responsibilities, the Authority operates the Jail, which houses inmates on behalf of the above localities. (Compl. ¶ 13.) During the relevant period, Townsend, Brown and Brooks served as correctional officers at the Jail. (Compl. ¶¶ 14-16.) On Thursday, September 5, 2019, Plaintiff reported to the Jail to begin her orientation as part of an eight-week assignment as a nurse at the facility, working on behalf of a staffing agency that staffed the Jail's medical contractor. (Compl. ¶ 17.)
As she arrived at the Jail, Plaintiff had difficulty navigating the Jail complex. (Compl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff observed Brown standing outside one of the buildings and asked him for assistance. (Compl. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff informed Brown that she had been assigned as a nurse at the Jail, and Brown directed Plaintiff to the appropriate parking lot and building. (Compl. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff parked her vehicle and approached the building identified by Brown. (Compl. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff wore her nurse's scrubs and carried her wallet, water bottle and lunch. (Compl. ¶ 20.)
Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, Brown had directed her to the wrong building, and she in fact entered the Jail's Pre-Release Center, where her orientation was not being held. (Compl. ¶ 21.) The Pre-Release Center houses inmates referred to as "Weekenders," who serve their sentences only on weekend days. (Compl. ¶ 21.) Brown unlocked and escorted Plaintiff through the Pre-Release Center's secure sally port entrance, the same entrance used by Weekenders to begin their weekend sentences. (Compl. ¶¶ 21-23.) Contrary to jail policy, Brown did not verify Plaintiff's status as a Weekender before opening the secure sally port entrance and escorting Plaintiff into the Pre-Release Center. (Compl. ¶ 23.)
Upon entering the Pre-Release Center, Plaintiff approached Townsend, the Center's intake officer that day. (Compl. ¶ 24.) Without confirming Plaintiff's status as a Weekender, Townsend opened a second secure door and escorted Plaintiff into the intake area of the Center. (Compl. ¶¶ 25-26.) Once inside the intake area, Plaintiff informed Townsend about her work assignment and orientation. (Compl. ¶ 27.) Townsend then directed Plaintiff to take a seat and Plaintiff complied. (Compl. ¶ 28.)
After Plaintiff sat down, Brooks entered the intake area and spoke with Townsend. (Compl. ¶ 29.) Although Plaintiff could not hear their conversation, Brooks and Townsend pointed at Plaintiff and appeared to be talking about her. (Compl. ¶ 29.) Following her conversation with Townsend, Brooks asked Plaintiff to follow her into the female locker room. (Compl. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff attempted to take her lunch and water bottle into the locker room, but Brooks informed her that she could not bring those items inside the facility. (Compl. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff asked if she could return her lunch and water bottle to her vehicle, at which point Brooks informed Plaintiff that she could not leave the Center once inside. (Compl. ¶ 31.) Townsend also refused to hold Plaintiff's lunch, directing Plaintiff to throw it away, though he agreed to keep her water bottle. (Compl. ¶¶ 32, 34.) At this point, Plaintiff began shaking in fear. (Compl. ¶ 33.) Despite Plaintiff's behavior and the fact that Plaintiff's name did not appear on the list of Weekenders in Townsend's possession, Townsend permitted Plaintiff to enter the female locker room with Brooks. (Compl. ¶¶ 35, 59.)
Once inside the female locker room, Brooks put on gloves and directed Plaintiff to remove her clothing for a strip search. (Compl. ¶ 36.) Plaintiff explained that she was a nurse assigned to work at the Jail, but Brooks again directed her to remove her clothing. (Compl. ¶ 36.) Plaintiff asked whether, as a nurse, she would have to submit to a strip search each day that she entered the facility and Brooks responded that she would. (Compl. ¶ 37.) Plaintiff asked if she could leave and contact her staffing agency, but Brooks repeated that once Plaintiff entered the Pre-Release Center she could not leave. (Compl. ¶¶ 38-39.) Brooks stated that Plaintiffs staffing agency should have warned her about the strip search requirement. (Compl. ¶ 39.)
Brooks then directed Plaintiff to remove her pants. (Compl. ¶ 40.) When Plaintiff protested and refused, Brooks emphasized that Plaintiff had no choice. (Compl. ¶ 40.) Eventually, Plaintiff removed her pants and Brooks searched them, finding nothing. (Compl. ¶ 41.) Brooks then directed Plaintiff to remove her undergarments, which would leave Plaintiff completely naked. (Compl. ¶ 42.) Plaintiff again protested but eventually removed her bra and underwear. (Compl. ¶ 43.) Brooks then directed Plaintiff to " ‘squat and cough.’ " (Compl. ¶ 44.) Brooks also directed Plaintiff to bend forward at her waist, spread her buttocks apart and cough while Brooks stood behind her, requiring Plaintiff to expose her anogenital area to Brooks. (Compl. ¶ 46.) After performing the strip search, Brooks returned Plaintiff's clothing and allowed Plaintiff to get dressed. (Compl. ¶ 46.)
Following the strip search, Brooks escorted Plaintiff through a metal detector and patted down Plaintiff's legs. (Compl. ¶ 47.) Brooks then directed Plaintiff to sit down in the intake area. (Compl. ¶ 47.) Plaintiff waited unrestrained in the intake area for fifteen minutes before the coordinator of the Jail's Weekender program arrived at Townsend's request. (Compl. ¶¶ 48-49.) While waiting, Plaintiff overheard staff members discussing what she had just experienced, and several unidentified staff members apologized to her. (Compl. ¶ 50.)
Approximately thirty minutes after Plaintiff entered the Pre-Release Center, a nurse with the Jail's medical contractor verified Plaintiff's work assignment. (Compl. ¶ 51.) Townsend then returned Plaintiff's water bottle and a nurse directed Plaintiff back through the sally port entrance and other secure doors and escorted her to the main building. (Compl. ¶ 53.) On her way to the main building, Plaintiff encountered Brooks, who stated " ‘no wonder you have been so confused throughout the whole process, they should have told us there would be a nurse coming, we didn't know.’ " (Compl. ¶ 54.)
Ultimately, Plaintiff completed her eight-week assignment at the Jail. (Compl. ¶ 56.) However, Plaintiff's anxiety required her to arrive twenty minutes early to her remaining shifts to afford herself enough time to control her anxiety. (Compl. ¶ 56.) Plaintiff's physicians also diagnosed her with post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") based on her experience at the Jail, for which she continues to take prescribed medications and has been referred to counseling. (Compl. ¶ 57.) Plaintiff's experience has also impacted her family life and ability to work, putting a strain on her...
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