Amisi v. Riverside Reg'l Jail Auth.

Decision Date16 August 2021
Docket NumberCivil No. 3:20cv218 (DJN)
Parties Bikachi AMISI, Plaintiff, v. RIVERSIDE REGIONAL JAIL AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

Daniel Guinnane Zemel, Mark J. Krudys, The Krudys Law Firm, PLC, Richmond, VA, for Plaintiff.

William Woodul Tunner, Matthew Traynham Anderson, ThompsonMcMullan, P.C., Richmond, VA, for Defendant Bryan Brown.

Carlene Booth Johnson, Perry Law Firm PC, Dillwyn, VA, for Defendant Roy Townsend, Jr.

Alexander Francuzenko, Philip Corliss Krone, Thea Alicia Paolini, Cook Craig & Francuzenko PLLC, Fairfax, VA, Andrew Jules Tureaud, Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease, LLP, Washington D.C., DC, for Defendant Lakeyta Brooks.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(Denying DefendantsMotions for Summary Judgment)

David J. Novak, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Bikachi Amisi ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Bryan Brown ("Brown"), Roy Townsend, Jr. ("Townsend") and Lakeyta Brooks ("Brooks") (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging that Defendants violated her constitutional rights by subjecting her to a strip search as she entered Riverside Regional Jail ("RRJ" or the "Jail") on her first day working as a nurse for the Jail's healthcare contractor. The Court dismissed Plaintiff's negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims at the motion to dismiss stage. (ECF No. 28.) Plaintiff's state law claims for gross negligence, willful and wanton negligence, false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"), as well as Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims remain.

This matter now comes before the Court on the Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 56, 63, 66) filed by Townsend, Brooks and Brown. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motions in their entirety.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Undisputed Factual Background

While the parties’ versions of what occurred on September 5, 2019, differ in several material respects, the basic facts of Plaintiff's claims prove largely undisputed. The Court will recount these facts before endeavoring to detail the ways in which the parties’ accounts of events diverge.

B. Undisputed Factual Background

On the morning of September 5, 2019, Plaintiff reported to RRJ to begin her orientation as part of an eight-week assignment as a nurse at the facility, working on behalf of Accountable, a healthcare staffing agency that staffed the Jail's medical contractor. (Amisi Dep. (ECF Nos. 57-23, 64-1, 67-3, 79-1) at 100:2-23, 114:8-12, 201:1-4.) When Plaintiff arrived at RRJ, she had difficulty navigating the complex and did not know where to park or which building to enter. (Amisi Dep. at 119:3-120:1.) While in one of RRJ's parking lots, Plaintiff encountered Defendant Brown, a sergeant at RRJ, and requested assistance. (Amisi Dep. at 120:16-22; Brown Aff. (ECF No. 67-1) at ¶¶ 1, 8.) Brown directed Plaintiff to a parking lot and instructed her to enter a nearby building through the back of the building. (Amisi Dep. at 123:11-14.) Plaintiff parked and approached the identified building. (Amisi Dep. at 124:11.) Plaintiff was wearing black scrubs and carrying a water bottle and her lunch at that time. (Townsend Dep. (ECF Nos. 57-22, 64-2, 79-2) at 213:21, 234:4-23; Brown Dep. (ECF Nos. 57-24, 64-3, 67-2, 79-4) at 78:9-11, 115:6-13.)

Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, Brown had directed her to the Pre-Release Center at RRJ, a building separate from the main entrance to RRJ. (Brown Aff. at ¶ 4.) The Pre-Release Center, also known as Housing Unit 6, normally houses inmates serving non-continuous jail sentences. (Brown Aff. at ¶ 5.) Jail staff refer to these inmates as "weekenders" or "weekend inmates." (Brown Aff. at ¶ 5.) The only orientation that occurred in the Pre-Release Center constituted orientation for weekenders or "weekender orientation." (Brown Dep. at 44:14-20; Brown Aff. at ¶ 9.) Nurse orientation occurred in the main jail. (Brown Dep. at 55:13-17, 56:1-3; Rose Dep. (ECF Nos. 57-27, 64-5, 67-6, 79-19) at 89:3-6.)

When a weekender arrives at the jail for orientation, they must undergo the Jail's inmate intake process. (Townsend Dep. at 63:7-23.) This process involves both a strip search and a pat down search. (Townsend Dep. at 63:7-23.) An officer of the same gender as the incoming inmate conducts the strip search. (Brooks Dep. at 68:21-25.) The Jail typically seizes any personal property carried by the incoming inmate into the Jail, and either disposes of the property or puts it into a property bag. (Townsend Dep. at 12-16.)

Instead of entering the Pre-Release Center through the back door as instructed by Brown, Plaintiff entered the building through the front door, which opened into the building's lobby. (Amisi Dep. at 124:11.) Upon entering the building, Plaintiff again encountered Brown who had also entered the building. (Amisi Dep. at 124:15-20; Brown Dep. at 83:22-84:5, 101:1-10, 104:17-20.) The two conversed. (Amisi Dep. at 124:21-25; Brown Dep. at 83:22-84:5, 107:15-25.) Brown again directed Plaintiff to exit the building and reenter through the back door. (Amisi Dep. at 124:21-25.) At this time, Brown also took over the position of "Primary Control" from Defendant Brooks, while Brooks proceeded to the Pre-Release Center's intake area to perform intake procedures for an incoming female inmate. (Brown Dep. at 119:11-17, 170:15-17; Brooks Dep. at 64:21-65:13.)

Plaintiff complied with Brown's directive and went to the door at the back of the Pre-Release Center, SP6. (Amisi Dep. at 125:18-126:2.) This entrance to the Pre-Release Center serves as the inmate intake entrance. (Brown Aff. at ¶ 6.) The entrance consists of two doors on either side of a sallyport — SP6, the outer door, which Primary Control locks and controls from an area adjacent to the lobby, and SP5, the inner door, which is locked and controlled by the Intake Officer stationed just inside the SP5 door. (Brown Aff. at ¶ 6.) A jail policy exists that requires the Primary Control officer who accepts an inmate via the SP6 door to verify that the inmate is a weekender before allowing their entrance into the sallyport. (Brown Dep. at 170:18-171:24; "Jail Policy" (ECF No. 92-12) at 2.) Plaintiff rang the buzzer outside SP6, walked through SP6 and proceeded into the sallyport. (Amisi Dep. at 126:7-21.)

Once inside the intake area, Plaintiff encountered Defendant Townsend, the Intake Officer in the Pre-Release Center that day. (Amisi Dep. at 126-127; Townsend Dep. at 176, 215:4-8.) Townsend communicated to Plaintiff that she should take a seat in the intake area. (Amisi Dep. 128:17-19; Townsend Dep. at 204.)

Another jail policy exists regarding RRJ's policy and procedures for accepting Pre-Release Center intakes. This policy states:

Prior to accepting custody of an inmate, staff determines that the inmate is legally committed to the facility, and that the inmate is not in need of immediate medical attention (2A19). The Pre-Release Staff will verify all documentation of the reporting FBOP and Weekenders before accepting any intakes to be housed in the Pre-Release Center prior to being admitted. Staff will take all necessary steps to verify the reporting individual is ordered and scheduled to report to the Pre-Release Center as FBOP or Weekender.

(Jail Policy at 1.) Ordinarily, Weekend Coordinator Nichole Roney would organize a group of files for people that RRJ anticipated would come for weekender orientation on a particular day. (Brown Dep. at 64-65; Brooks Dep. at 90:20-25, 117-18; Townsend Dep. at 71, 109:24-25, 110:1-6, 126, 178; Roney Dep. (ECF Nos. 57-26, 64-6, 79-13) at 60-64, 80-83, 87-91.) However, sometimes individuals would arrive at the jail on the wrong day, or the court would be delayed in sending paperwork to the jail. (Roney Dep. at 81:7-83:11.) Roney would regularly attempt to accommodate these individuals by allowing them to participate in their orientation despite their absence on the Jail's schedule. (Roney Dep. at 81:7-83:11.)

No such file existed for Plaintiff among the files that Townsend had. (Townsend Dep. at 179-82, 199-200; Roney Dep. 92:23-25, 93:1, 94.) Townsend attempted to call Roney to verify Plaintiff's status. (Townsend Dep. at 179-82, 199-200; Roney Dep. at 92:23-25, 93:1, 94.) From where she sat, Plaintiff could not observe these efforts and otherwise did not know what Townsend was doing. (Amisi Dep. at 130.)

When Roney answered Townsend's call, Townsend communicated to her that Plaintiff had arrived for weekender orientation, but that he did not have a file for her. (Roney Dep. at 94:12-16, 98:24-99:12.) He asked whether Roney had paperwork for Plaintiff. (Roney Dep. at 100:4-101:6.) Roney determined that she did not have any paperwork either. (Roney Dep. at 101, 114-15, 140-41; Townsend Dep. at 79, 239-40.) Roney communicated to Townsend that she would come to intake to speak with Plaintiff. (Roney Dep. at 102:4-15, 116:9; Townsend Dep. at 94, 102, 240.)

While Plaintiff waited in the intake area, Defendant Brooks entered the intake area from the adjoining female locker room, after completing a search of the incoming female inmate. (Amisi Dep. at 131:10-13; Brooks Dep. at 140:14.) Brooks indicated to Plaintiff that Plaintiff should follow her into the locker room. (Brooks Dep. at 179:12-23; Amisi Dep. at 132:1013.) Plaintiff went with Brooks into the locker room. (Brooks Dep. at 179-80; Amisi Dep. at 133:13-15.)

Plaintiff then underwent the same inmate intake procedure as an incoming weekender, despite her actual status as an employee working at the jail. Specifically, Brooks performed a complete strip search of Plaintiff. (Amisi Dep. at 143:4-6, 20-22, 23-24.) Brooks and Plaintiff discussed the fact that Plaintiff had food and a water bottle with her and that the jail did not allow this. (Amisi Dep. at 134-35; Brooks Dep. at 181:20-25.) Brooks directed Plaintiff to throw away the food. (Amisi Dep. at 134-35; Brooks Dep. at...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • Williams v. Kincaid
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • August 16, 2022
    ...policy on body searches and thus cannot be said to have exhibited any degree of care toward Williams. See Amisi v. Riverside Reg'l Jail Auth. , 555 F. Supp. 3d 244, 261 (E.D. Va. 2021) (allowing gross negligence claim to proceed where jail officials conducted "a highly invasive strip search......
  • Williams v. Kincaid
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • August 16, 2022
    ...basis in the prison's policy and was both aggressive and "highly invasive," bruising her breast and causing pain that lasted several days. Id. Such facts, if proven, would suffice to "a complete neglect of [Williams'] safety." Giddens, 816 S.E.2d at 294. Accordingly, we must reverse the dis......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT