AMMC, P.C. v. Snell
| Decision Date | 10 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | 1180308 |
| Citation | 309 So.3d 625 (Mem) |
| Parties | AMMC, P.C., d/b/a Alabama Men's Clinic, and John Justin Caulfield, M.D. v. Robert SNELL and Tabitha Snell |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Bert P. Taylor of Taylor Partners, LLC, Orange Beach, for appellants.
William A. Yearout of Yearout & Traylor, P.C., Birmingham, for appellees.
AFFIRMED. NO OPINION.
Robert Snell and Tabitha Snell sued AMMC, P.C., d/b/a Alabama Men's Clinic ("AMMC"), and Dr. John Justin Caulfield, alleging medical malpractice. After a trial in 2018, a jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, and the Snells filed a motion for a new trial. The trial court granted that motion, and the defendants appealed. I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to affirm the trial court's judgment.
In their motion for a new trial, the Snells asserted that, after the trial, they discovered evidence of juror misconduct. Specifically, they alleged that several jurors had failed to give complete and truthful answers to questions asked during voir dire.
The trial court held two hearings on the motion for a new trial, during which it heard testimony from the jurors. After the hearings, the trial court entered an order granting the motion for a new trial based on the failure of three particular jurors to reveal during voir dire that they or their family members had been defendants in lawsuits. Dr. Caulfield and AMMC appealed.
The applicable standard of review calls for this Court to determine whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting the Snells' motion for a new trial. Hood v. McElroy, 127 So. 3d 325, 328 (Ala. 2011). "[T]he proper inquiry for the trial court on [a] motion for new trial, grounded on allegedly improper responses or lack of responses by prospective jurors on voir dire, is whether this has resulted in probable prejudice to the movant." Freeman v. Hall, 286 Ala. 161, 166, 238 So. 2d 330, 335 (1970). "[N]ot every failure of a venireman to respond correctly to a voir dire question will entitle the losing party to a new trial." Wallace v. Campbell, 475 So. 2d 521, 522 (Ala. 1985).
The following occurred during voir dire:
In its order granting the Snells' motion for a new trial, the trial court stated that the Snells were probably prejudiced by the failure of jurors C.D.C., M.H., and R.G.H. to properly respond to voir dire questioning.
Juror C.D.C. had three small-claims default judgments entered against her in collections actions from January 2015 to May 2016. She testified during one of the hearings on the motion for a new trial that she did not remember being asked during voir dire if she or her family members had been a defendant in a lawsuit. She also testified that she was not even aware of the default judgments and that she was not trying to deceive anyone by not disclosing their existence. The Snells, however, introduced evidence indicating that D.C. had been personally served with garnishment papers with respect to one of the small-claims judgments.
Juror M.H. and her mother were sued in an eviction action in October 2015 and had a judgment entered against them in that action. M.H. testified during one of the hearings on the motion for a new trial that she did not remember the question being asked during voir dire regarding whether she or her family members had been a defendant in a lawsuit. When asked if she had, in fact, been a defendant in a lawsuit, she responded that she and her mother had lived at an apartment and that both their names were on the lease. She testified that she did not mean to deceive anyone and that the existence of the eviction judgment did not influence her deliberations.
Juror R.G.H. and his wife had multiple small-claims judgments entered against them in collections actions. During one of the hearings on the motion for a new trial, R.G.H. claimed that he was unaware of some of the judgments. As for the ones he did remember, he testified that he never attended court proceedings and that he did not consider the voir dire questions in the present case to be aimed at collections actions. He testified that he did not intend to deceive anyone and that the fact that he had been a defendant in the collections actions did not influence his deliberations.
After R.G.H. testified, an investigator employed by the Snells' attorney testified that, when he served R.G.H. with a subpoena to appear at the new-trial hearing, R.G.H. told the investigator that lawyers are "greedy," that R.G.H. had discussed his opinion on that matter with the other jurors at some unknown point during or after the trial, and that R.G.H. had decided early in the proceedings that he was not going to award the Snells anything. R.G.H. denied those allegations. Defense counsel moved to strike the investigator's testimony as hearsay and as an improper attempt to impeach the jury's verdict under Rule 606(b), Ala. R. Evid. The trial court did not rule on the motion to strike, but its order granting the Snells a new trial expressly referenced the investigator's testimony. Even assuming the investigator's testimony was admissible for one reason or another, I am still of the opinion that the trial court exceeded its discretion in...
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