Ammonett v. Harris & Turpin
| Decision Date | 17 October 1807 |
| Parties | Ammonett v. Harris & Turpin |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
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Charles Ammonett brought an action of trespass, assault and battery, in the District Court of Richmond, against twelve defendants jointly. Some of them eluded the process, and others prevented it from being served upon them, by force; so that, in the end, the writ was executed on four only. Casey and Landrum, two of them, on whom it was first served, appeared and pleaded not guilty; and a verdict was rendered against them jointly for 6001. At the term in which the verdict was found, for reasons appearing to the Court, it was ordered that, unless the plaintiff should, within three months, release to those defendants 5001. part of those damages, the judgments should be set aside, and a new trial granted them, and the cause again put upon the docket; but, in case of such release, that execution be issued for the balance and costs. The release was executed accordingly, and the plaintiff took judgment and sued out execution for the balance, part of which was levied. Afterwards, two other defendants, Harris and Turpin, having been served with process, after the former had filed their plea, but before the judgment had been obtained against them, and the cause standing as to them on a new writ of inquiry, appeared and pleaded the release as to part, and judgment for the residue of the damages assessed, in bar of any farther assessment of damages; bringing into Court and tendering to the plaintiff the full balance due on the judgment.
To this plea the plaintiff demurred specially; and for cause of demurrer, assigned that the present defendants were not arrested when the former filed the plea; that the Jury might find the present defendants guilty of several parts of the same trespass, or one of them guilty of the same at different times; that several damages might be assessed against several defendants, in the same action, according to their several degrees of guilt; and that the order of Court, directing the release, applied to the particular judgment against the first defendants, and related to that particular judgment alone.
The defendants joined in demurrer; and judgment was thereupon given in their favour, to which the plaintiff obtained a writ of supersedeas from one of the Judges of this Court.
Judgment affirmed.
Randolph, for the plaintiff in error. The release was to Casey and Landrum, saying nothing about the other defendants. I contend, therefore, that it enured to those only to whom it was given.
My primary position is, that, in this action, and under these circumstances, it was in the power of the Jury to sever the damages. If this position is in my favour, the release enured distinctly to Casey and Landrum: so too, the execution was against men who had committed separate injuries; and so, on the fourth place, the doctrine of taking judgment pro melioribus damnis did not apply.
I. Whether, where the declaration is joint, the Jury can sever the damages.
On this point, if reason only is consulted, the question will be decided in the affirmative. Torts are either joint or several: the guilt of one man is not that of another: and different considerations ought to apply to persons of different wealth.
Reason only ought to be consulted, because the authorities are very numerous, confused, and contradictory. The chief is Lord Mansfield in Hill and another v. Goodchild, 5 Burrow, 2790, and he declares there is so great inconsistency in the cases, it is impossible to reconcile them. I argue, therefore, that you are emancipated from British authorities as to this point, and should settle the law by your own decision. But, if we are to be governed by precedent, that case is different from ours: for there the Jury found all the defendants jointly guilty; whereas, here, although Casey and Landrum had a joint judgment against them, Harris and Turpin were not then before the Court. We cannot avail ourselves of the observation of Lord Mansfield, relative to cases where defendants are charged severally: but he says that his decision has no application to cases where they plead severally.
The principle in the case of Jones v. The Commonwealth, 1 Call, 555, is in our favour. 1 Bulstrode, 157, cited in 5 Burrow, 2791, is in point. Cro. Eliz. 860, Austin v. Wilward, states that where one is found guilty in part, and the others in all, the damages shall be severed. But 11 Co. Rep. p. 5, Haydon's case, is in our favour; and it will appear that all the decisions which prohibit severance of damages are where the cases of all the defendants were submitted to the same Jury; and no instance occurs of an authority against severing the damages, where the defendants are, at different times, brought before different Juries.
Chapman v. House and others, 2 Stra. 1140, shews that where the defendants severed in their pleas, the Jury might assess separate damages. Lowfield v. Bancroft and others, 2 Stra. 910, is a case against us. Yet, in the same book, the case of Lane v. Santloe, p. 79, is in our favour.
II. The release enured to Casey and Landrum only. Esp. 415, Cook v. Jenner, (cited from Hobart, p. 66,) appears against me on this point: but the release executed by Ammonett was not voluntary, but directed by the Court. Besides, if my doctrine is true, that the damages might be severed, how can this release operate in favour of other defendants, who were not then before the Court?
III. These were different judgments; therefore different executions might be issued.
IV. The doctrine de melioribus damnis does not apply to circumstances like these, where the defendants drop in at different times; but only where the judgment is obtained against all at once. When Casey and Landrum had pleaded, we were not bound to wait till we could get them all before the Court. This would have been a great hardship upon the plaintiff. If a contrary doctrine should prevail, a wealthy defendant, to screen his own fortune, might put forward others, who were his tools, and worth nothing.
JUDGE TUCKER. Might not the severance of damages lead to the inconvenience you mention? A man might set on another to commit a trespass. The instigator might be compelled to pay only one shilling, while a large sum might be assessed against the insolvent perpetrator.
Randolph. The severance of the damages is the only way to prevent that inconvenience. The Jury would find against each according to the enormity of his offence, and consider the sum which had been granted against one, in estimating the damages against the rest.
Wickham, for the defendants in error. No authority can be produced to shew that there may be several verdicts and several judgments against defendants who are jointly sued. Where the object is punishment, the atrocity of the crime and the property of the offender ought to be considered, as in Jones v. The Commonwealth; but, where compensation for the injury is in question, the injured person has a right to look equally to all who have injured him.
In Co. Litt. 232 a. it is said that a trespass is joint or several, at the will of him to whom the wrong is done; and in Esp. 395, quoting Yelv. 68, that, if the person injured sues one and obtains judgment, the others may plead it in bar.
It is a strange doctrine that, although you cannot by separate actions recover separate damages for one and the same trespass, yet in a joint action you can.
I admit that, where the trial is of several issues, or writs of inquiry by different Juries, the damages may be severed. This arises from the necessity of the case; and there an execution must be taken de melioribus damnis. But I never heard before that twenty different satisfactions could be obtained for the same injury. The Jury must take into consideration the whole injury. If, then, there were twenty Juries, the plaintiff might recover twenty times as much as he was entitled to.
Lord Mansfield, in 5 Burr. 2790, decided only certain points; leaving others to be settled by comparison of the authorities. Sayer's Law of Damages, p. 148, 149, cites Bulstrode, 157, and says, " it may be inferred, from divers cases, both prior and subsequent, that this case is not law." Austin v. Wilward and others, Cro. Eliz. 860, was a case where some were found guilty in part, and others in all: --but this is not a case of that sort; for, here, it was not a divisible offence, being a single assault and battery; and the verdict was that Casey and Landrum were guilty of the whole.
From 2 Bac. Abr. 272, and the authorities cited there in the margin, it appears that the Jury cannot regularly assess several damages for one trespass, where the charge in the declaration is joint. Mitchell v. Milbank and others, 6 Term Rep. 199, is a very strong case against Mr. Randolph. According to that case, where the judgment is pro melioribus damnis, it must be against one only, and a nolle prosequi must be entered as to the rest.
Where there are verdicts at different times against several obligors in a bond, the plaintiff can have only one satisfaction. So here he can have but one satisfaction.
Mr. Randolph says his client was not bound to wait till he could get the other defendants before the Court. Agreed: but he might have got his verdict against those who were arrested--have proceeded afterwards to get verdicts against others, and finally taken his judgment and execution de melioribus damnis. He did not choose to do this; but made his election in the first instance.
It is contended that he might have got greater damages of the other defendants: but he chose the first which were assessed, considering them better, as being prior in point of time.
Randolph in reply. We...
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