Ammons v. Canadian Nat'l Ry. Co., 1-17-2648
| Decision Date | 17 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-17-2648,1-17-3205,1-17-2648 |
| Citation | 2018 IL App (1st) 172648,124 N.E.3d 1,429 Ill.Dec. 232 |
| Parties | Melvin AMMONS, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. CANADIAN NATIONAL RAILWAY COMPANY, a Foreign Corporation, and Wisconsin Central, Ltd., a Foreign Corporation, Individually and as a Subsidiary of Canadian National Railway Company, Defendants (Wisconsin Central, Ltd., Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellant). Darrin Riley, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. Wisconsin Central, Ltd., Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
¶ 1 If there is a train crash and the railway employee involved files a personal injury claim against his employer for negligence, can the railway-employer file a counterclaim for negligence for the property damage caused in the crash? That is the question posed by this appeal.
¶ 2 The trial court held that, no, the employer could not pursue such a counterclaim. The trial court dismissed the counterclaims filed by the railway, finding that they are barred. A finding was entered under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) that made the order appealable. We agree that the answer to the question posed above is no, and we affirm.
¶ 4 Plaintiffs, Melvin Ammons and Darrin Riley, filed these lawsuits against defendant, Wisconsin Central, Ltd. (Wisconsin Central), for injuries they sustained during the course of their employment. Riley was the locomotive engineer and Ammons was the conductor when the train they were operating struck another train that was stopped ahead on the same track. Both Ammons and Riley filed lawsuits alleging that the railway-defendant was negligent and violated several rules and regulations that led to their injuries. The lawsuits were consolidated below and, for purposes of this appeal, the issues are the same as to both plaintiffs.
¶ 5 Defendant Wisconsin Central responded to the lawsuit by denying liability and also by filing counterclaims against both employees. The counterclaims are for money damages to redress property damage caused by the accident and for contribution in tort from the plaintiffs for one another's injuries. In its counterclaims, Wisconsin Central alleges that plaintiffs were negligent; that they violated rules and operating practices and that their failure to follow mandated speed limits or apply the emergency brakes before the collision caused significant damage to its property. Both trains involved in the collision were damaged as was the railroad track, and environmental clean-up and remediation was required.
¶ 6 Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaims arguing that such claims are prohibited under sections 55 and 60 of the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) ( 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (2012) ). Section 55 of the FELA voids "[a]ny contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from liability" under the FELA. Id. § 55. Section 60 voids "[a]ny contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose, intent, or effect of which shall be to prevent employees of any common carrier from furnishing voluntarily information to a person in interest as to the facts incident to the injury or death of any employee." Id. § 60.
¶ 7 Plaintiffs argued in their motion to dismiss that the counterclaims asserted by defendant were a "device" that defendant was using to exempt itself from liability for their on-the-job injuries and that the counterclaims were being used coercively—to dissuade injured workers from asserting their FELA claims and providing information about the accident. The trial court dismissed the counterclaims. Defendant appeals pursuant to the trial court's ruling under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) that there was no just reason for delaying appeal of its order.
¶ 9 This appeal presents a pure question of law. Can a railroad counterclaim for property damage in an employee's personal injury suit where both parties' alleged harm arises out of the same occurrence and both parties are alleged to have been negligent? The trial court answered in the negative and dismissed the counterclaims.
¶ 10 Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the counterclaims was presented as a motion under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016) ). Defendant argues that it is really a section 2-619 motion to dismiss because the FELA sections on which plaintiffs rely raise "an affirmative matter that seeks to avoid the legal effect of or defeat the claims" (citing id. § 2-619(a)(9) ). Our supreme court has stated that raising the defense that a claim is barred by a prevailing statute should be done under section 2-619. See Sandholm v. Kuecker , 2012 IL 111443, ¶ 54, 356 Ill.Dec. 733, 962 N.E.2d 418. We review the dismissal of a claim under either section 2-615 or section 2-619 de novo . Jones v. Brown-Marino , 2017 IL App (1st) 152852, ¶ 18, 413 Ill.Dec. 96, 77 N.E.3d 701. Defendant does not raise any serious concern over which section of the Code was applied and is not prejudiced.
¶ 11 The case is governed by FELA ( 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (2012) ). The FELA provides injured railroad workers with their exclusive remedy against their employers for injuries resulting from their employers' negligence. New York Central R.R. Co. v. Winfield , 244 U.S. 147, 151-52, 37 S.Ct. 546, 61 L.Ed. 1045 (1917). The FELA was enacted as a response to the special needs of railroad workers who are exposed daily to the risks inherent in railroad work and are helpless to provide adequately for their own safety. Sinkler v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. , 356 U.S. 326, 329, 78 S.Ct. 758, 2 L.Ed.2d 799 (1958). The purpose of the FELA is to provide fair compensation for injured railroad workers by imposing liability upon railroads for injuries to their employees resulting from the railroads' negligence. Wilson v. CSX Transportation, Inc. , 83 F.3d 742, 745 (6th Cir. 1996).
¶ 12 Both parties have pointed us to compelling case law that supports their respective positions on appeal. Both parties likewise admit, at least tacitly, that there is decisional law from other jurisdictions that supports the opposing outcome. See Russell J. Davis, Employers' Liability Acts: Counterclaims , 11 Fed. Proc., L.Ed. § 30:48 (Nov. 2018 Update). The issue has apparently never been decided by an Illinois court—at least no such decisions have been reported.
¶ 13 Sections 55 and 60 of the FELA both serve to void certain contracts, rules, regulations, or devices that might be used defensively by a railway in FELA litigation. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 55, 60 (2012). Section 55 bars the use of those instruments insofar as they allow the railway to exempt itself from liability, and section 60 bars their use for preventing employees from furnishing information relating to the injury or death of another employee. Id. The determination of this appeal turns on whether the counterclaims for property damage asserted by the railway-defendant are "devices" as set out in the Act and whether their interposition enables defendant to exempt itself from liability. If the counterclaim is such a device, then it is barred as void by section 55 of the FELA.
¶ 14 One of the first cases to address the issue and shape the discourse on section 55 is Cavanaugh v. Western Maryland Ry. Co. , 729 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1984). In Cavanaugh , the court began its analysis by recognizing the common law principle that employers have a right of action against employees for property damages arising out of an employee's negligence occurring within the scope of employment. Id. at 290-91. The court went on to explain that nothing in the FELA explicitly forecloses the railways' right to redress for property damage caused by a negligent employee. Id. at 291.
The court further stated that a counterclaim by a railway to recoup money for its own property damages is "plainly not an ‘exempt[ion] ... from any liability’ and thus is not a ‘device’ within the contemplation of Congress." Id. Thus, the court held, railways may file counterclaims for negligent damage to their property in a personal injury case brought by an employee. Id. at 294-95. One judge dissented. See id. at 295-97.
¶ 16 After the decision in Cavanaugh , the United States Courts of Appeals for the First Circuit, Eighth Circuit, and Fifth Circuit followed suit. See Sprague v. Boston & Maine Corp. , 769 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1985) ; Nordgren v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co. , 101 F.3d 1246 (8th Cir. 1996) ; Withhart v. Otto Candies, L.L.C. , 431 F.3d 840 (5th Cir. 2005). The cases do not really build on Cavanaugh with any significant original reasoning but adopt its interpretation of the statute. The basic analytical underpinning of those three cases and Cavanaugh is that counterclaims for property damage do not fit within the meaning of "device" under section 55 of the FELA because they do not serve to exempt the railways from liability. Instead, the railway may still be liable to the injured employee for its own negligence, but the employee must answer for his negligence resulting in property damage as well. Those courts held that contracts and devices prohibited under section 55 are those that are "creative agreements or arrangements the railroad might come up with to exempt itself from liability." Nordgren , 101 F.3d at 1251. To interpret section 55 as the...
To continue reading
Request your trial