Ammons v. Dade City, Fla.
| Decision Date | 03 March 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-3786,84-3786 |
| Citation | 783 F.2d 982 |
| Parties | William J. AMMONS, Jr., Barbara H. Dobson, Charles A. Harrison, Vann M. Hughes, and Freddie A. Mitchell, Jr., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DADE CITY, FLORIDA, William L. Dennis, Mayor of Dade City, Florida, Agnes L. Lamb, Colonel Charles McIntosh, Jr., Williams F. Brewton, and D.L. Williams, City Commissioners of Dade City, Florida, their successors and agents in their official capacities, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Charlie Luckie, Jr., Dade City, Fla., for defendants-appellants.
David M. Lipman, Robert E. Weisberg, Miami, Fla., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
Before FAY and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges, and HOFFMAN*, Senior District Judge.
Appellants Dade City, Florida and its public officials, William F. Brewton, Agnes Lamb, Charles McIntosh, Jr., William L. Dennis and D.L. Williams, appeal the judgment of the district court that they intentionally discriminated in violation of the fourteenth amendment in the provision of street paving, street resurfacing and maintenance, and storm water drainage facilities to the black community of Dade City. We find that the district court's finding that appellants' conduct constituted intentional racial discrimination in the provision of these municipal services is amply supported by the record evidence and not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.
On February 23, 1981 appellees, a class of black citizens of Dade City, Florida 1 filed this action patterned after the municipal services equalization cases of Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.1971), aff'd on rehearing, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir.1972) (en banc); and Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F.Supp. 1363 (M.D.Fla.1978). Appellees alleged in their complaint that Dade City, its Mayor and four city commissioners deprived black citizens of equal municipal services in violation of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, 2 and sought that the qualitative and quantitative disparities between the municipal services provided to the black and white residential communities be eliminated.
A three day non-jury trial was held during July 13-15, 1983. At the conclusion of trial the court reserved ruling and allowed both parties to submit proposed findings and post-trial memoranda. On September 21, 1984 the district court entered final judgment for appellees on the basis of its findings of fact and conclusions of law which determined that street paving, street resurfacing and maintenance, and storm water drainage facilities were provided inadequately and unconstitutionally to the black community of Dade City. 3 Ammons v. Dade City, 594 F.Supp. 1274 (M.D.Fla.1984). The district court consequently enjoined appellants from providing the three contested municipal services in a racially discriminatory manner and from initiating any new municipal services or improvements, other than customary and regular maintenance work, in the white residential community until the services in issue in the black residential community were on a par with those in the white community. Id. at 1305-06. Appellants were also directed to submit a plan to the district court for the elimination of the disparities in services which were found to have existed. Id. at 1306.
The basic issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in finding that Dade City and its public officials intentionally discriminated against the City's black residents in the provision of street paving, street resurfacing and maintenance, and storm water drainage facilities. Appellants in particular cite the following as error: (1) the district court's inclusion in the overall municipal services disparity analysis of certain streets in the black residential community that were annexed into Dade City in 1982, subsequent to the filing of the lawsuit; (2) the district court's inclusion in the overall municipal services disparity analysis of certain streets that although located in the white residential community of Dade City, were owned and maintained by state and county authorities; and (3) the district court's conclusion that Dade City did not have a non-discriminatory uniform special assessment policy for street paving purposes.
As we stated in the municipal services equalization case of Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1184-85 (11th Cir.1983) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)), in order "[t]o trigger strict scrutiny analysis under the fourteenth amendment, preliminary findings of both disparate impact and discriminatory intent are required." Accordingly, in reviewing the district court's decision in this case we focus on its findings of disparate impact and discriminatory intent. We address these findings seriatim.
We are mindful at the outset that while conclusions of law are freely reviewable, we are bound under Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) by the district court's factual findings, including its finding of intentional discrimination, unless clearly erroneous. 4 See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-90, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789-91, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982). For a finding to be clearly erroneous the reviewing court, looking at all the evidence, must be "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). As the Supreme Court instructed this past term in Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (citations omitted):
If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.
This is so even when the district court's findings do not rest on credibility determinations, but are based instead on physical or documentary evidence or inferences from other facts.
The district court's methodology in reaching its findings of disparate impact was to first analyze appellees' evidence on the racial and demographic characteristics of Dade City. 5 On the basis of this evidence the court found that the City's black residential community is comprised of two adjoining areas that are geographically segregated " 'on the other side of the railroad tracks.' " 6 Ammons, 594 F.Supp. at 1278 (footnote omitted). Having thus determined the existence of racially identifiable neighborhoods in Dade City, the court then analyzed a wealth of statistical, documentary and testimonial evidence 7 introduced by appellees relating to the distribution and financing of the three contested City provided services. This evidence amply supports the district court's findings of a significant disparity between the races in the provision of street paving, street resurfacing and maintenance, and storm water drainage facilities. 8
In so holding, we reject appellants' arguments challenging the validity of the statistical data base from which the district court derived its findings. As stated earlier, appellants cite as error the district court's inclusion in the overall disparity analysis of: (1) streets in the black residential community that were annexed into the City in 1982 during the course of the litigation; and (2) streets in the white residential community that were owned and maintained by state and county authorities. Appellants contend, as they did at trial, that this statistical evidence has no materiality to the instant lawsuit, alleging intentional discrimination in the provision of municipal services, because the City is responsible only for providing services to areas within its municipal limits that are owned by the City.
We do not, however, understand the district court to have ruled that a city has an obligation to annex black residential areas or to service areas outside of its municipal limits, or that it has the power or duty to service areas owned by other governmental authorities. Rather, what the district court determined, as a factual matter, was that it was equitable in this case that these two categories of streets be included in the statistical data base for the purpose of calculating disparate impact. This determination was premised on a number of subsidiary factual findings which we find persuasive and, at the very minimum, not clearly erroneous.
First, as regards the inclusion of residential streets in the 1982 annexed area, the court determined that, "the relationship between the area annexed in 1982 and the City is sufficient to constitute part of the black community for the purposes of a present disparity analysis," id. at 1287, based on the following factual findings: (1) the 1982 area is part of the general black community wedged west of the railroad tracks and "for years previously, [had] functioned as an integral part of the City," id. at 1286, and as part of the black community; (2) that geographically, according to the uncontraverted testimony of appellees' planning expert, it "is essentially engulfed by and contiguous with the City limits," id. at 1287; and (3) that the equities compel inclusion, given the City's past active participation and encouragement of annexing white residential areas into the City, particularly through its sharing of the expenses in paving of those new white residential areas, id., as contrasted to the lack of "evidence that the [C]ity took any steps to initiate the annexation process for [the 1982 annexed area]." Id.
Second, as regards the inclusion of City residential streets owned by the...
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