Ammons v. Franklin Life Insurance Company
Decision Date | 28 June 1965 |
Docket Number | No. 21418.,21418. |
Citation | 348 F.2d 414 |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Parties | Jean N. AMMONS, Appellant, v. The FRANKLIN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee. |
M. Roland Nachman, Jr., H. T. Fitzpatrick, Jr., Montgomery, Ala., Steiner, Crum & Baker, Montgomery, Ala., of counsel, for appellant.
William Inge Hill, Montgomery, Ala., Hill, Hill, Stovall & Carter, Montgomery, Ala., of counsel, for appellee.
Before RIVES, WISDOM and BELL, Circuit Judges.
On April 8, 1963, The Franklin Life Insurance Company issued an insurance policy on the life of Charles Lester Ammons, aged 35, in the face amount of $100,000. The policy provided for double indemnity in the event "that the death of the insured resulted directly and independently of all other causes, from bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means." The double indemnity provision does not exclude intentional homicide from its coverage. His wife, Jean N. Ammons was named as beneficiary.
Within two months, on May 29, 1963, the insured died from arsenic poisoning. The circumstances were consistent with intentional criminal homicide, but his death remains an unsolved mystery.
The widow's attorney furnished proofs with accompanying death certificate, findings of the coroner, and autopsy reports indicating that the insured's death was due to homicide accomplished by arsenic poisoning. The transmitting letter claimed both the face amount of the policy and the double indemnity benefit. The Company replied, referring to the extensive report of its own investigator and stating that it
The Company filed a bill of interpleader depositing in court the face amount of the policy. Later on the same day, the widow sued for the double indemnity benefit. The court awarded the face amount of the policy to the widow, held that there was no reasonable basis for the Company's alleged fear of double liability or conflicting and vexatious claims, and declined to tax attorneys' fees or costs against the interpleader fund or either of the defendants.
As a defense to the widow's suit for the double indemnity benefit, the Company asserted the following policy provision:
"RISKS NOT ASSUMED: This Accidental Death Benefit shall not be payable if the death of the Insured shall result either directly or indirectly from * * * (9) any poison, gas or fumes, voluntarily or involuntarily, accidentally or otherwise taken, administered, absorbed or inhaled * * *."
On motion, and after the filing of affidavits and counteraffidavits, the court entered summary judgment for the defendant Insurance Company, succinctly stating its basis as follows:
On appeal the widow-beneficiary insists that a genuine issue of fact remained as to "whether the parties to this insurance contract intended that the poison exclusion work a forfeiture of these double indemnity proceeds because a murderer, who intentionally inflicted fatal injuries on the insured, chose poison, rather than some other instrument, to accomplish his end."
The widow-beneficiary also urges that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether the Company waived the defense now relied on by its response to her attorneys' claim for both the face amount of the policy and the double indemnity benefit. Asserting that, at the very least, there is ambiguity in the scope and meaning of the poison exclusion provision, the widow urges that under Alabama law the solution of that ambiguity presents an issue of fact properly reserved to the jury for decision, citing Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Wills, 1962, 273 Ala. 648, 143 So.2d 846, 847, and Air Conditioning Engineers v. Small, 1953, 259 Ala. 171, 65 So.2d 698, 703, 704. In the latter case, the Supreme Court of Alabama said:
"We think our cases mean that the court, and not the jury, will analyze and determine the meaning of a contract, whether verbal or written when its terms are clear and certain, and also ascertain whether or not it is ambiguous in the light of its terms, and if it is found to be ambiguous, but not void for uncertainty, its meaning may be clarified by a consideration of the facts and circumstances aliunde and...
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